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Abstract 
Making Up People and Styles of Scientific Reasoning: 
An Articulation of Hacking's Philosophy of the Human Sciences 
Lourdes M. Ortiz Bautista 
 
This work offers a comprehensive reading of Hacking's project on making up people. Making 
up people refers to practices involved in the scientific classification of people, which may 
implicitly assume or foster the existence of human types. Hacking's works on human kinds 
have been presented in a fragmentary manner for over the last 30 years. Some of its central 
notions, such as "human kind" and "looping effects", have been critically received as stand 
alone notions within the debate between social constructivism and scientific realism 
concerning psychiatric categories. Despite his critical stance on social constructivism and his 
proposed reconciliation between social constructivism and scientific realism, Hacking's work 
has been read as a challenge to scientific realism. Hacking's account of human kinds in terms 
of the presence of looping effects, alongside his analyses of various classifications that have 
been revised and ultimately abandoned in the history of psychiatry, have contributed to that 
interpretation. Hacking's MUP, however, addresses the way in which the scientific 
classification of people works, rather than whether mental illness classifications are founded 
in nature or not. By focusing on classification from a historicist stance, Hacking is able to 
reconfigure the philosophy of the sciences in a distinct and unprecedented manner, 
presenting an original account on historical epistemology and ontology. It is not one 
argument, but a comprehensive reconfiguration of the philosophy of the sciences, which 
allows Hacking to go beyond the divide between scientific realism and social constructivism. 
This work brings together a larger set of notions to characterize Hacking's account of MUP, 
makes explicit the philosophical background on classification that supports it, and explores 
relevant connections to other aspects of Hacking's work, remarkably, his alternative project 
on the Styles of Scientific Reasoning. On the basis of such a comprehensive reading, it 
	 vi	
responds to four representative criticisms. By assembling the elements of Hacking's MUP in a 
comprehensive and consistent picture, this work shows the extent to which it represents a 
major contribution to the philosophy of the sciences, introducing a distinct approach to the 
analysis of scientific concepts and a novel vision of the human sciences.  
 
Keywords: human kinds, making up people, looping effects, psychiatric categories, scientific 
categories, styles of scientific reasoning, relevant kinds, historical ontology, historical 
epistemology, dynamic nominalism 
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1 
Introduction   
 Philosophers of science have by and large neglected the social sciences in their 
analysis and models of scientific knowledge. In particular, philosophical analyses of the 
scientific study of human beings were nearly nonexistent until recent years. The growth of the 
brain and behavioral sciences has made it urgent to engage in such philosophical study. 
Philosophers of special sciences such as Psychiatry, Psychology, and the Cognitive 
Neurosciences have made progress examining traditional themes in the context of the newer 
bodies of knowledge produced in their respective disciplines. Noteworthy within these recent 
philosophies are works on scientific explanation, natural kinds, and scientific realism (e.g., 
Bechtel 2008, Craver 2007, Cooper 2005, Cummins 1977, Gold and Stoljar 1999, Khalidi 
1998, Kendler, et al, 2011, Kincaid and Sullivan, eds., 2014, and Murphy 2006). Ian 
Hacking's works on human kinds or kinds of people have been most widely received within 
the academic spaces created by such studies (especially, Hacking 1999 and 2002a). 
Hacking's works on the scientific classification of people, however, introduce a distinct 
approach to engage in the philosophical analysis of the sciences, including the sciences 
concerned with the study of human beings. Such an approach has not been clearly 
acknowledged in the philosophical literature. In this work I piece together the different 
elements that comprise Hacking's account of kinds of people, make explicit the philosophical 
background which supports it and offer some responses to representative criticisms of the 
account on the basis of my articulation. By assembling the elements of Hacking's account in 
a comprehensive and consistent picture, I show the extent to which his proposal represents a 
major contribution to the philosophical analysis of the human sciences.  
 Hacking's studies of "making up people" highlight the ways in which scientific 
classification enables the identification of people as being of a kind, opening and closing new 
possibilities of being. The idea that there are human types supported by scientific knowledge 
is not entirely new. It became a popular idea, for example, by the end of the Eighteenth 
Century and well into the Nineteenth Century, during the heydays of phrenology (Fower and 
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Flower 1857, and Wells 1890). During the late 1800s and especially the beginning of the 
1900s, the growth of statistical knowledge, evolutionary thinking and psychoanalysis fostered 
and popularized studies on the physiognomy and character of types of men (Atkinson 1913, 
Davenport 1911, Gorgin 1913, Pick 1996). Today we may laugh and find amusing the old 
phrenology charts with their "moral faculties", such as Gorgin's portraits of "the criminal men" 
and the typologies of men based on character during the early 1900s, but we feel more 
comfortable with ideas such as "the autistic", "the bipolar", "the hyperactive", "the antisocial", 
"the aggressive", and many more labels, when applied to people's brains and behaviors 
(Dumit 2004, Gardin and Panek 2014, Strakawoski, ed. 2012, Wender 1987). With the 
exponential increase in experimental studies on the brain and the behavioral sciences, the 
idea of human types has acquired a distinct, "more scientific", character. Our understanding 
of ourselves, of what types of human beings there are and under which of those types we 
and our fellow human beings fit, has been deeply transformed.  
 Hacking popularized the notion of "human kinds" in the philosophical literature within 
the context of a discussion on social constructivism and scientific realism about mental 
illness.1 Despite his critical stance on social constructivism and his proposed defense of a 
conciliatory view between social constructivism and scientific realism, Hacking's account has 
been taken as a challenge to scientific realism concerning mental illness. This has been 
further supported by Hacking's account of human kinds in terms of the presence of looping 
effects, alongside his analyses of various classifications that have been revised and 
ultimately abandoned in the history of psychiatry.  
                                                            
1 The notion of "human kinds" may have been first introduced in the philosophical literature by Hacking 
in "The looping effects of Human Kinds" (Hacking 1995c). The broader notion of "making up people" 
was perhaps first discussed in a 1983 conference paper entitled “Making Up People” (Hacking 1986). In 
the reading I offer in this work I suggest that there is a consistency between the notions of "human kind" 
and "kinds of people". The notion of "human kinds" has received the most attention and criticisms within 
the philosophical literature. In this work I take "kinds of people" as the central notion of Hacking's 
comprehensive philosophical project of analyzing "making up people".  
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Hacking, however, has only tangentially touched on the debate between social 
constructivism and scientific realism. His account of human kinds addresses the way in which 
the scientific classification of people works, rather than whether mental illness classifications 
are founded or not in nature (or in society). Hacking's account of kinds of people offers a view 
on historical epistemology and ontology, rather than a foundational or a social constructivist 
view of mental illness. By focusing on classification from a historicist stance, Hacking is able 
to reconfigure the philosophy of the sciences in a distinct and unprecedented manner. It is 
not one argument, but a comprehensive reconfiguration of the philosophy of the sciences, 
which allows Hacking to go beyond the divide between scientific realism and social 
constructivism.  
The idea that scientific objects are historical sociocultural entities is not entirely new, 
nor has it ever been free of polemics. T.S. Kuhn's view that the very world in which scientists 
work changes after a scientific revolution was perhaps the most radical idea presented in the 
philosophy of science during the twentieth century. Kuhn's shifting scientific worlds chiefly 
transfigured an old standing divide between realism and instrumentalism into the divide 
between scientific realism and social constructivism.  
Positions abound, but the basic intuition behind the divide is simple: the scientific 
realist picture does not admit transient objects, which come into being and cease to exist with 
scientific theorizing and practices. Objects are not historical entities; they exist and are what 
they are independently of our representations. The history of science follows the path by 
which objects are discovered, not the ways in which they are brought into existence. Past 
scientific representations may have been mistaken in their identification of some objects, but 
those objects are not granted any sensible existence. In the constructivist picture objects are 
thought of as being shaped through scientific representation and practices, just like artists 
create sculptures by modeling matter. In the social constructivist picture scientific objects are 
bound to reality in time and space. They are historical entities that are born into a social 
milieu and may also die when the social world that sustains them and brings them into 
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existence is significantly altered. The service that the history of science does to philosophy is 
not merely to account for the discovery of facts or scientific objects, but to expose the ways in 
which scientific objects are brought into reality.   
The view that scientific objects are historical entities has been recently discussed in 
the philosophy of science under the rubric of historical epistemology and ontology (e.g., 
Davidson 2001, Daston 2000, Hacking 2002a, Rheinberger 1997). The antecedent of this 
recently formed philosophical approach could be traced back, in the analytic tradition, to 
Ludwig Fleck's Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact and, more generally, to the 
historicist approach to the philosophy of science (Fleck 1979). The works of T. S. Kuhn, I. 
Lakatos and P. Feyerabend are remarkable antecedents of Hacking's general view of 
historical ontology (e.g., Kuhn 1962, Feyerabend 1974, Lakatos 1978). Hacking's version of 
historical ontology as it relates to the classification of people in the human sciences is 
additionally inspired and influenced by the work of Michael Foucault. It is from Foucault that 
Hacking gets the idea for the name for his own analysis of the classification of human beings 
and their generation of kinds of people, namely, Making Up People (MUP henceforth).2 
Hacking's project of philosophically analyzing scientific classifications of people, and kinds of 
people as the scientific objects of such classifications, has no precedent in the history of the 
philosophy of science. In my comprehensive reading, I link Hacking's account of MUP to his 
broader philosophy of the sciences, to appreciate more fully its philosophical significance in 
relation to the philosophical tradition.   
This work is primarily interpretative and systemic. In chapters 1 to 3, I introduce and 
articulate Hacking’s two projects - the MUP project and the styles of scientific reasoning - and 
interpret, synthesize, and systematize the philosophical background that undergirds them. In 
                                                            
2 Hacking acknowledges Foucault in several of his works on making up people. Hacking briefly 
elaborates on the label for his own analysis on "making up people" as directly related to Foucault's own 
works on "the constitution of subjects". Establishing the link, Hacking quotes the following passage from 
Foucault: "We should try to discover how it is that subjects are gradually, progressively, really and 
materially constituted through a multiplicity of organisms, forces, energies, materials, desires, thoughts, 
etc." (Hacking 1986, 226; Foucault and Colin 1980, 97).    
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chapter 4, the last chapter, I review some representative criticisms of Hacking's account of 
human kinds and offer a response to them on the basis of my interpretation. I conclude this 
work with a discussion on the epistemic and ontological view of kinds of people presented in 
Hacking's work and the picture of the human sciences that emerges from it.  
The first two chapters introduce Hacking’s MUP Project. Chapter 1 lays out the 
philosophical framework Hacking proposes for analyzing categories of people. The 
philosophical assumptions grounding his work include: 1) an understanding of categories of 
persons as relevant kinds—a notion developed by Hacking based on Nelson Goodman’s 
work, according to which the validity of a class is dependent on the interest involved in its 
grouping; 2) “dynamic nominalism,” a non-traditional view describing how naming practices 
interact with the objects named; 3) a Foucauldian view on power/knowledge and the ways in 
which people constitute themselves as subjects/objects of knowledge; and 4) the presence of 
the “looping effect,” or the mutual and dynamic interdependence between categories and 
objects of categorization, in which kinds of people are constituted as objects of scientific 
knowledge. Chapter 1 also elaborates on Hacking’s framework for analyzing categories of 
people, which integrates: “five vectors” of analysis (classifications, people, institutions, 
knowledge, and experts); seven “engines of discovery” (counting, quantifying, norms, 
correlations, medicalization, biologization, and genetization); and three social components 
(the normalization, bureaucratization, and reclamation of peoples’ self-identities).  
In Chapter 2, I synthesize the case studies comprising the MUP Project, emphasize 
their salient features, and highlight some additional notions in Hacking’s account. I 
reconstruct the genealogies of five cases of MUP: homosexuality, which paradigmatically 
exemplifies the looping effect; criminality, which suggests a clear connection between MUP 
and the statistical style of scientific reasoning; child abuse, which shows how the 
medicalization of people and the use of the laboratory style together legitimize a category 
both as a scientific entity and as a kind of person; fugue, an example of what Hacking calls 
“transient mental illness,” which incorporates the notion of the “ecological niche” into his 
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analytic framework; and multiple personality disorder, which illustrates the causal relevance 
of the scientific categorization of people and what it means to “act under a description,” as 
envisioned in the looping effect. Chapter 2 closes with a discussion of how Hacking’s views 
on categories of people play a part in the debates between scientific realism and social 
constructivism. To this end, I offer an interpretation of a particular polemic passage through 
the lens of my reconstruction of Hacking’s philosophical background, my characterization of 
his framework of analysis, and my analysis of his MUP case studies.  
Chapter 3 articulates the philosophical background for Hacking’s alternative project 
on the Styles of Scientific Reasoning (Styles Project henceforth), and reconstructs the 
genealogies he suggests for each of the six “scientific styles of doing and thinking”: the 
mathematical, the hypothetical modeling, the experimental, the statistical, the taxonomic and 
the historico-genetic styles. I subsequently review the most philosophically relevant notions 
characterizing the styles—self-authentication, techniques of stabilization, and ontological 
debates. Hacking provides a heterogeneous but parsimonious analysis of the various 
rationalities operating in the sciences, and as such, provides a somewhat limited framework 
for understanding the ways in which the human sciences participate in making up people. To 
address this, I draw out the implicit connections between Hacking's two projects in order to 
describe how kinds of people are constituted by and respond to scientific classification. I 
close this chapter with a discussion on the interconnections between the two philosophical 
frameworks of Hacking’s MUP and Styles projects.  
In chapter 4 I review some representative critiques against Hacking's account and 
respond to them on the basis of my interpretation. I first discuss Rachel Cooper's and 
Muhammad Khalidi's critique of Hacking's view of human kinds as distinct from other 
scientific objects due to the presence of looping effects, the former being characterized in 
terms of awareness. Second, I discuss Jonathan Tsou's criticism of Hacking's view of human 
kinds as unstable objects. Third, I discuss Dominic Murphy's criticism of Hacking's approach 
for overcoming the divide between scientific realism and social constructivism, as these relate 
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to the conflict between the competing explanatory agendas of the medical model and the 
biopsychosocial model of mental illness. In my response to these criticisms I emphasize 
Hacking's understanding of kinds of people as relevant kinds, his pragmatic understanding of 
causality and scientific ontology,3 and (less directly) the possible roles played by styles of 
scientific reasoning in MUP. I close this chapter with a discussion of the epistemic and 
ontological implications of Hacking's characterization of kinds of people as "moving targets" 
as a result of the presence of looping effects.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
3 It is worth noting that has been reluctant to endorse pragmatism or neo-pragmatism, or to 
acknowledge a direct lineage between his views and any major Pragmatist. There are two exceptions to 
this: Hacking's defense of "pragmatic realism" concerning entities postulated within scientific theories 
and his support of Goodman's view on relevant kinds. When I refer to Hacking's views as pragmatic in 
this work, I primarily mean pragmatic in a Goodmanian sense, as concerning the relevance of kinds of 
people and their putative causal knowledge to us, human beings. Hacking elaborates on his stance on 
pragmatism in Hacking 2007c.    
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Chapter 1 
Making Up People: Philosophical Background and Analytical Framework 
 
This chapter presents the philosophical background and analytic framework of 
Hacking’s MUP project. Hacking explores the “scientific” classification of people, whenever 
there is a presumed or implied class of personhood. Take, for example, the category 
“anorexic.” This label may suggest a set of behaviors exhibited by a class of people whose 
physiology is characterized by a type of organic pathology (of the mind or brain), which brings 
about such behaviors. The scientific classification of this group of people may suggest or 
assume that there is an anorexic type of man or woman. Hacking’s philosophical project 
contributes a heuristic toolbox for the philosophical analysis of such categories of people. 
Instead of reifying abstract or idealized categories,4 Hacking’s approach allows us to identify 
a multiplicity of factors and actors involved in the formation and vindication of specific 
categories of people. It is through the dynamic interaction of the multiplicity of factors and 
actors that kinds of people come into being, change, and, on occasion, cease to exist. By 
focusing on the dynamics of classification, Hacking's MUP framework allows us to put in 
perspective the reification of types of being by dominant theories.  
The first section of this chapter introduces the philosophical background undergirding 
my analysis and application of Hacking’s work, which comprises three complementary views 
on how classification works, especially as it concerns the classification of people: Goodman’s 
notion of relevant kinds, Hacking’s own earlier views of dynamic nominalism, and Foucault’s 
views of power/knowledge in relation to the constitution of subjects. These views enrich 
Hacking’s more recent analyses of how classification functions, how classifications of people 
relate to their objects of classification, and how the classifications of persons and the kinds of 
                                                            
4 As it might happen in a naive view of social constructivism or labeling theory.  
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persons that they presuppose or imply come about. These views inform the central notion of 
Hacking’s MUP: the looping effects of categories of people, or human classifications.5  
The second section of this chapter presents the analytical framework for the 
philosophical analysis of Hacking’s project. This framework is composed of a set of “vectors 
of analysis”: a set of “engines of discovery” and a set of “social components.” These sets 
specify the most prominent elements that may be involved in the looping effects of categories 
of people. The sets play a heuristic role; they are a conceptual aid in the analysis of these 
categories. 
 
1.1. Philosophical Background 
 Hacking’s MUP project offers a philosophical framework for the analysis of the 
classification of people, which presupposes or allows for the postulation of a type of 
personhood or (human) being underlying such categories.6 It is a project concerning human 
ontology, the classification of people according to scientific theories and practices of the 
human sciences. These include all disciplines with a scientific pretense that study aspects of 
the human. Examples include anthropology, sociology, psychology, biology, and the cognitive 
neurosciences. Hacking's work on MUP shows how in their classificatory practices, the 
human sciences introduce and legitimize new kinds of being and acting that have otherwise 
remained closed to the peoples so classified.  
Three concepts are of particular importance here: Nelson Goodman’s notion of 
relevant kinds; Hacking’s own views on dynamic nominalism and historical ontology; and 
Foucault’s analyses of power/knowledge and the genealogies of the subject. These three 
                                                            
5 In this work “categorization of people” and “human classification” are used interchangeably. In both 
cases, they refer to the grouping of human beings according to putatively scientific criteria. A central 
goal of this work is to make explicit what such grouping involves according to Hacking's MUP framework 
of analysis.  
6 It may be worth emphasizing that Hacking does not assume that there is such a type of personhood 
underlying these categories. Hacking's stance concerning the scientific realism and social 
constructivism divide are discussed at different junctures throughout this chapter. Hacking's defense of 
dynamic nominalism (discussed in section1.1.2) is particularly central to his stance on the relation 
between classifications and reality.   
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views provide MUP with a philosophical basis; they are indispensable for understanding 
some of its thorniest implications. 
Hacking’s views on categories of people fit with Goodman’s notion of relevant kinds, 
which encompasses both natural and social kinds. Relevant kinds of people are non-
essentialist and pragmatic, are devised for distinct purposes, and may be revised and 
transformed over time. Relevant kinds are examples of “dynamic nominalism,” Hacking’s 
version of nominalism. According to this, both classifications and the objects that they classify 
come into being through dynamic interaction. This implies an historical view of epistemology 
and ontology. Additionally, borrowing from Foucault’s views on power/knowledge and the 
subject, the MUP project encompasses a range of elements (and the interactions between 
them), since all play a role in the formation of categories of peoples. This multiplicity of 
elements is framed within what Hacking calls “vectors of analysis.” Like Foucault’s analytics 
of power, Hacking’s categories (and the kinds of people they categorize) “emerge” from the 
multiplicity of elements involved on a case-by-case basis. This contrasts with two-
dimensional analyses which center on opposites, such as subject-object, theory-experience, 
and doctor-patient.  
 
1.1.1. Relevant kinds 
Hacking’s account of MUP aligns with Nelson Goodman’s notion of relevant kinds, 
first suggested in Fact, Fiction and Forecast and elaborated on in Ways of World Making 
(Goodman 1978 and 1983). Goodman meshes well with Hacking since he treats a given 
class as an arrangement of cross-cutting definitions, subject to revision. 
Relevant kinds allow for some aspects in the definition of a given category to 
coincide even while others conflict (i.e., cross-cutting categories). The distinct and possibly 
conflicting items nonetheless share the same object of inquiry that mediates between the 
parts involved in the determination of the category. Categories of plants, such as marijuana, 
coca leaves, and peyote, are examples of cross-cutting categories; these are determined by 
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overlapping and contrasting taxonomies (e.g., ethnohistorical, ethnobotanical, 
psychopharmacological, and legal).  
One central issue with the metaphysics of science concerns the foundations of 
scientific taxonomies. Whether they are to be found in nature or elsewhere is open to 
question. In these debates, nature is understood to mean an external, mind-independent, 
and/or ready-made reality. If indeed there are such taxonomies, they would support claims to 
natural kinds. The notion of natural kinds implies that there are discrete types of entities 
underlying nature, and that these objects, powers, and capacities exist independently of what 
human beings think, imagine, or wish they are. A taxonomy based on natural kinds 
presupposes a monistic and natural organization of things in the world. This conflicts with 
alternate man-made taxonomies organized around something other than putative natural 
kinds.  
The framework of classification provided by relevant kinds accepts that some natural 
kinds, given certain purposes and contexts, may in fact be relevant kinds, and that some 
man-made taxonomies may also be relevant kinds. Whether the basis of classification is 
natural or otherwise does not determine that a given category is more apt than others. 
Attaching the term "natural" to a kind does not do any real work in scientific classification. 
Relevant kinds do not accept a fundamental metaphysical hierarchy; instead they suggest a 
pragmatic approach to classification, whose basis is found in the adequacy between 
categories and the goals of classifications. The notion of “relevance” that characterizes 
relevant kinds is a pragmatic one. The notion of "relevance", rather than "natural", plays a 
central role in Hacking's MUP.  
The roots of the notion of relevant kinds are found in Goodman’s treatment and 
reformulation of the problem of induction (Goodman 1983). This problem is part of a family of 
problematic and interrelated issues, including counterfactuals, natural laws, predictions, 
kinds, and, as noted more recently, model-building and mechanisms (e.g., Glennan 1996). 
Goodman addresses the problem of induction when he holds that "[a] rule is amended if it 
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yields an inference we are unwilling to accept; and inference is rejected if it violates a rule we 
are unwilling to amend. The process of justification is the delicate one of making mutual 
adjustments between rules and accepted inferences; and in the agreement achieved lies the 
only justification needed for either" (Goodman 1983, 64).  
 The issue with induction, according to Goodman, is that evidence itself does not 
suffice to justify inductive inference. Rather, inductive inferences are vindicated by 
harmonizing the application of a rule (or law-like statement) with the fulfillment of the 
expectations of its application (its induction or projection). Kinds in general and kinds of 
people in particular work as such inductive rules. People either do or do not fulfill the 
expectations presupposed in a particular classification (e.g., this type of person behaves in 
this manner). The category of a given kind of person is not merely justified by a body of 
evidence; it also entails certain expectations about how such a putative kind behaves. When 
such expectations are not met (i.e., when the evidence is against the category), there is room 
to amend or vindicate the category depending on what is at stake. Along these lines, 
Goodman’s “new riddle of induction” formulates the issue as a problem of projection: how to 
provide a criteria for selecting or vindicating adequate predicates (or hypotheses, rules, 
categories, etc.) while extending their extension (i.e., application to new instances), given the 
evidence available supporting them at a determinate point in time.  
To illustrate the problem of projection, Goodman posited “grue,” an imaginary 
predicate. An object is grue only in the case that it is observed before time t and it is green, or 
to all objects that are blue and were not observed before time t. Given the definition, the 
evidence available supports both that at time t—say, at the present time—a given object – 
say an emerald—may be inferred to be both green and grue. So, the problem goes, at t, all 
the instances of grue (e.g., a is grue, b is grue, etc., where a, b, and so on are individual 
instances) support the statement that “all emeralds are grue.” However, given the definition of 
grue, the same evidence also supports both (the prediction that) (a) all emeralds 
(subsequently examined) will be green, and that (b) all emeralds (subsequently examined) 
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will be grue. If an emerald is examined at time t, it is grue; however, by definition, it must be 
blue and hence not green (i.e., the predicate “grue” does not apply after t to things that were 
green before t). Thus, Goodman presents the challenge: “if we simply choose an appropriate 
predicate, then on the basis of these same observations we shall have equal confirmation, by 
our definition, for any prediction whatever about other emeralds – or indeed about anything 
else” (Goodman 1983, 74).  
Goodman’s basic point is that given a body of evidence, there is no basis to 
conclusively support either of the two (possibly inconsistent) statements. The new riddle of 
induction goes beyond the traditional challenge of providing a criterion for justifying the 
inference from the regularities observed up to a time t to future unobserved instances (this is 
a classical problem of induction). In fact, one could induce two distinct statements on the 
basis of the same evidence, leading to the challenge of determining which particular 
predicate would lead to the most accurate projections (e.g., “green” vs. “grue”). Goodman’s 
reorientation of the problem of induction consists of not “ask[ing] […] how predictions come to 
be made, but how – granting they are made – they come to be sorted out as valid and invalid" 
(Goodman 1983, 87).  
Goodman introduces “entrenchment” as the solution to the problem of projectibility. 
According to entrenchment, the projectibility of a predicate is based on its record of 
successful usage, rather than on purely logical considerations. The entrenchment of a 
predicate (or a given hypothesis or kind) refers to its “record of past projections.” Good 
predicates are distinguished from ill-formed predicates on the basis of their record of 
successful projections. For example, since “grue” is less entrenched than “blue” and is not 
used in as many projections, it must be discarded in favor of “blue.” Goodman says, “[p]lainly 
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‘green’, as a veteran of earlier and many more projections than ‘grue’, has the more 
impressive biography”.7  
The reorientation of the problem of induction in the problem of projectibility generated 
a new set of questions, reconsidered in Ways of Worldmaking. Fact, Fiction and Forecast 
provided the background for the elaboration of the notion of relevant kinds, insofar as the 
core of Goodman’s problem of projection is the absence of a foundational principle of classes 
(e.g., natural kinds, fundamental laws of nature), that is, a foundational criterion of 
membership for kinds. Goodman’s solution—entrenchment—evolved into a discussion of 
anticipated worlds, worldmaking, and relevant kinds: "Induction requires taking some classes 
to the exclusion of others as relevant kinds. Only so, for example, do our observations of 
emeralds exhibit any regularity and confirm that all emeralds are green rather than that all are 
grue […] The uniformity of nature we marvel at or the unreliability we protest belong to a 
world of our own making" (Goodman 1978, 10).  
Ways of Worldmaking picks up where Fact, Fiction and Forecast left off: “Without the 
false hope of a firm foundation gone, with the world displaced by worlds that are but versions, 
with substance dissolved into function, and with the given acknowledged as taken, we face 
the questions of how worlds are made, tested, and known” (Goodman 1978, 7). Contrasting 
them with natural kinds, Goodman conceived of relevant kinds as “habitual, traditional or 
devised for a new purpose,” having no “absolute categorical or psychological priority” 
(Goodman 1978, 10). Such a contrast, nonetheless, was not intended to undermine the role 
that nature plays in the formation of some kinds. Rather, his intention was to show that kinds 
that are relevant in too many contexts are not natural kinds, which may conform to only a 
                                                            
7 Goodman’s notion of entrenchment is rather conservative, privileging the old over the new. Whether 
he fully endorsed the notion is open to interpretation. It is hard to see how Goodman’s view allows for 
novelty: if the entrenchment of a predicate is the guide for projection, new predicates – lacking any 
record – would never be projected. What distinguishes successful from unsuccessful projections? 
Goodman only goes as far as saying that the selection between projectable and non-projectable 
predicates (or hypotheses) is based on how the world has been organized: “[t]he roots of inductive 
validity are to be found in our use of language [...] the line between valid and invalid predictions (or 
inductions or projections) is drawn upon the basis of how the world is and has been described and 
anticipated in words” (Goodman 1983, 121; See also Goodman 1983, 94). 
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very limited set of all the possible relevant kinds. Moreover, kinds may be relevant or 
irrelevant according to the purposes for which they are used and the system of description 
under which they are conceived: “If I ask about the world, you can offer to tell me how it is 
under one or more frames of reference; but if I insist that you tell me how it is apart from all 
frames, what can you say? We are confined to ways of describing whatever is described" 
Goodman 1978, 3). These systems of description constitute “world-versions,” which, being 
distinct in their respective interests, are irreducible to one more fundamental world. This, 
nonetheless, does not exclude the plausibility and value of some reductions, which in 
Goodman’s view are rather rare and only partial.  
The suggestion of different world-versions, distinct in interests and consequently in 
their relevant kinds, entails a pluralistic view, which nonetheless needs not compromise its 
rigor or standards. Moreover, some unity among diverse worlds can be reached by the 
formation of an all-encompassing comprehensive organization. According to Goodman, 
“…universes of worlds as well as worlds themselves may be built in many ways” (Goodman 
1978, 5). A large world comprised of many distinct and even contrasting worlds results in a 
complex ontology: "Motley entities cutting across each other in complicated patterns may 
belong to the same world. We do not make a new world every time we take things apart or 
put them together in another way; but worlds may differ in that not everything belonging to 
one belongs to the other. […] In other cases, worlds differ in response to theoretical rather 
than practical needs" (Goodman 1978, 9).  
Goodman’s notion of relevant kinds can be used to understand Hacking’s project of 
making up people.8 Being a flexible notion, which enlarges or compresses diverse world-
descriptions as diverse interests on the same motley entity coming in or out of consideration, 
                                                            
8 “[T]here are lots of kinds (and kinds of kinds), and no one has done more than Goodman to remind us 
of this. Yet, although he regularly writes of ‘motley entities’ even he, for his own ends, tends to put all 
kinds into one basket, precisely to de-emphasize absolute priorities and to emphasize how artificial 
kinds are as important to us as kinds of things that we find in nature. There is no harm in using one big 
basket tagged ‘relevant kinds’” (Hacking 1992a, 183). 
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the notion of relevant kinds makes it possible to examine the different and even conflicting 
perspectives on a given kind of people under analysis without granting categorical or 
psychological priority to any of them, and without needing to worry too much about 
reductions. Reductions may occur, but they are not to be dictated in a principled or a priori 
manner. As long as different world-versions are at play, they all make up the larger system of 
descriptions of a given kind of people. It is noteworthy that conceiving kinds of people as 
relevant kinds does not deny that under some descriptions, the motley entity may be 
described as a natural kind. What it does deny is that the description of that given motely 
entity as a natural kind has any foundational, categorical, principled, or psychological 
privilege over any other descriptions.  
 
1.1.2. Dynamic nominalism 
Hacking subscribes to nominalism, a philosophical tradition of classification dating to 
the medieval-era debate over universals. The realists maintained that general concepts are 
universal entities that pick out the essences of beings or things. The nominalists reject 
essences as grounds for the membership of entities within classes. Since then many 
philosophers have subscribed to variations of nominalism, including William Ockham, Duns 
Scotus, John Venn, J. Stuart Mill, William James, Charles S. Pierce, Bertrand Russell, 
Nelson Goodman, and W.V.O. Quine. Hacking adheres to this nominalist tradition (Hacking 
1991d).   
Hacking presents traditional nominalism as a view on the relation between the name 
(concept) and the named (its object of classification). Once in place, both the concepts and 
the objects remain permanently stable and fixed. Hacking reanimates the nominalist tradition 
by recognizing that the relation between the name and the named is dynamic. According to 
dynamic nominalism, concepts are not static. That is, they are not merely empty tags placed 
on things. Instead, once the tag is placed on an object, it becomes one with the object; 
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together, concept and object evolve in response to more knowledge as it becomes available 
through scientific study. Dynamic nominalism seems to cover all concepts (Hacking 1986).  
The term “dynamic nominalism” did not appear in Hacking’s work until the mid-1980a. 
For instance, it does not figure in the discussion of Thomas Kuhn’s and Paul Feyerabend’s 
distinct versions of nominalism offered in Representing and Intervening, which suggests that 
Hacking was still formulating the notion (Hacking 1983). However, the seeds were already 
evident in such work, when Hacking advances the theory of the historicity of knowledge9 and 
distances his position from Kuhn’s “revolutionary” paradigmatic changes. Conceptual change 
does not pose a threat to scientific rationality. Rather, Hacking notes that Kuhn’s threat to 
rationality only arises when one does not acknowledge the existence of a mind-independent 
world, and take fundamental conceptual changes, such as the change from classical 
mechanics to relativity theory, to occur in a vacuum of standards.10 One such irrationalist 
view, Hacking argues, results when scientific analysis focuses on theory at the expense of 
experiment, just like the philosophy of science up to that time had done. Switching the focus 
from theory to experiment brings to light a sort of normativity implicit in the experimental 
practices and a sort of realism which admits the (theoretical) independence of the world at 
the level of practices. These two major theses advanced in Representing and Intervening are 
further elaborated in Hacking’s dynamic nominalism, which represents a shift not only from 
static to dynamic concepts but also from abstract theories to concrete practices.  
Even though dynamic nominalism does not explicitly appear in Representing and 
Intervening, the following passage helps to clarify Hacking’s view: "Nominalism is about 
classification. It says that only our modes of thinking make us sort grass from straw, flesh 
                                                            
9 This is captured by Nietzsche’s epigraph that opens the introduction to the book: “You ask me, which 
of the philosophers’ traits are idiosyncrasies? / For example: their lack of historical sense, their hatred of 
becoming, their Egypticism. / They think that they show their respect for a subject when they 
dehistoricize it – when they turn it into a mummy.”  (Quoted from Nietzsche’s Twilight of Idols, Chap. 1, 
in Hacking 1983, I) 
10 It is worth noting that this was not intended as an attack on Kuhn himself, but on the reception of 
Kuhn, which Hacking believed implied a threat to both objectivity and rationality.  
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from foliage. The world does not have to be sorted that way; it doesn’t come wrapped up in 
‘natural kinds’. In contrast the Aristotelian realist (the anti-nominalist) says that the world just 
comes in certain kinds. That is nature’s way, not man’s" (Hacking 1983, 108). This passage 
makes plain three aspects: (i) the connection between nominalism and classification as well 
as its stance against universals; (ii) that what is at stake is the plausibility of a (monistic) 
natural system of classification; and (iii) that the idea of a natural classification implies an 
essentialist view of the organization of things into kinds. 
 By putting the contrast between nominalism and essentialism in terms of these three 
points, rather than holding that classification mirrors the discovery of the essences found in 
nature, the nominalist takes the essences out of the picture. This reconceives classification 
as the systematic organization of nature (or otherwise). The nominalist rejects the realist view 
that the things in the world have an intrinsic nature, which makes those things what they are 
and pre-establishes the way in which they are to be classified. Hacking notes, however, that 
this view does not imply a denial of the reality of a mind-independent world (i.e., that “there is 
real stuff”) but only a denial that “it is naturally and intrinsically sorted in any particular way, 
independent of how we think about it” (Hacking 1983, 108). In agreement with Goodman's 
view of relevant kinds, in Hacking's view, the sorting involved in scientific classification is 
framed according to interests that are relevant for the classifiers.  
Hacking identifies in Kuhn’s views on conceptual change a sort of nominalism that he 
dubs “transcendental nominalism” or “revolutionary nominalism,” in which a new system of 
classification “produces a new way of addressing some aspects of nature, […] [provides] 
models, conjectured laws, classes of entities, causal powers which did not enter into the 
predecessor science” (Hacking 1983, 109). The reason why this position is nominalist rather 
than idealist (i.e., everything that exists is mental or ideas) is because it implies “the 
imposition of a new system of categories upon phenomena, including newly created 
phenomena" (Hacking 1983, 109). However, such an imposition does not deny the existence 
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of a pre-existent world (e.g., of common-sense objects such as tables and chairs).11 In fact, in 
many respects, the old ontology translates into the new one, or continues to live outside of 
the new imposed worldview. The rise of a new conceptual system or system of classification 
does not necessarily negate a pre-scientific ontology (regarding entities such as cats, trains, 
people). That is, an independent world of objects that pre-exist and co-exist regardless of the 
imposition of a scientific system of classification. And yet, new systems of classification bring 
out “aspects of nature” that would not have shown up otherwise. This happens in time, 
insofar as the systems of classification available are the products of both the human mind 
and the resources available to make those unseen aspects of nature show up and conform to 
structures imposed on them. Hacking credits Kuhn with recognizing the possibility (and the 
actuality) of the alteration of systems of classification: "We can hardly avoid approaching 
nature with our present categories, problems, systems of analysis, methods of technology 
and of learning. We are in fact empirical realists: we think as if we are using natural kinds, 
real principles of sorting. Yet in the course of historical reflection we realize that the inquiries 
most dear to us may be replaced" (Hacking 1983,110). This implies that a system of scientific 
classification at any given time is not final. 
 The sort of nominalism that Hacking attributes to Kuhn, and the lesson that he 
extracts from it, is very close to one of the first characterizations of dynamic nominalism 
appearing in the context of Hacking’s discussion of kinds of people: 
 
Dynamic nominalism remains an intriguing doctrine, arguing that numerous kinds […] 
come into being hand in hand with our invention of the ways to name them. It is for 
                                                            
11 Dynamic nominalism involves a realist commitment. In at least one occasion, Hacking suggests that 
dynamic nominalism could have been labeled instead "dialectical realism" (Hacking 2002a, 2). The sort 
of realism it involves, however, is of a pluralist and pragmatic sort. The pluralist realism it involves is 
similar to Dupre's promiscuous realism. According to promiscuous realism, there are different ways of 
organizing organisms into classes, relative to distinct and equally valid scientific taxonomies responding 
to distinct concerns for classification (Dupre 1993, 36). The view that a plurality of taxonomies could be 
equally valid suggests that there is no privileged organization, and that there are distinct ways in which 
to establish "sameness" relations to natural classes. The pragmatic aspect of Hacking and Dupre's 
pluralist realism consists in their emphasis that the organization of things, natural or otherwise, into 
classes is relative to the concerns addressed in devising the classification. That is also Goodman's 
account of classification as relevant kinds.  
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me the only intelligible species of nominalism, the only one that can even gesture at 
an account of how common names and the named could so tidily fit together. It is of 
more human interest than the arid and scholastic forms of nominalism, because it 
contends that our spheres of possibility, […] are to some extent made up by our 
naming and what that entails. (Hacking 2002, 113) 
 
Three characteristics can be noted: (i) systems of classification are a product of human 
invention; (ii) there is a fit between classifications and the objects they classified (so that (i) 
does not equal idealism); and (iii) the new systems of classification bring about a new 
ontology with them. That characterization also implicitly affirms the temporality of the systems 
of classification. The most significant difference between the uses of relevant kinds by 
Hacking and Goodman consists in their relative focus (i.e., Goodman on the traditional and 
Hacking on the novelty): “I follow Goodman back to kinds, but where he strikes down old 
distinctions I attend to new differences” (Hacking 1992a, 183).     
Hacking’s dynamic nominalism seems at times to be described not only as a view on 
classification, but also as a way of doing philosophy. However, he states critically that "just 
because it invites us to examine the intricacies of real life, it [dynamic nominalism] has little 
chance of being a general philosophical theory” (Hacking 2002, 113). Nonetheless, Hacking 
has already provided us with a model for engaging in dynamic nominalism as a form of 
conceptual analysis throughout his works. Furthermore, his proposal on making up people 
offers us a vision of how dynamic nominalism could indeed become a systematic, if not 
general, philosophical theory.  
Dynamic nominalism provides us with a model to think philosophically about 
knowledge and reality (systems of classification and their objects of classification) and 
engaging in a form of philosophical analysis grounded on the socio historical development of 
knowledge and reality. Dynamic nominalism prompts us to reflect on the very idea of what 
thinking and practicing philosophy itself entails, – as it offers us an heterodox way to analyze 
the dynamics of knowledge production, its implicit ontology and its validity standards. 
Switching to Goodmanian language, one could conceive of dynamic nominalism as a 
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philosophical program on conceptual analysis – an analysis of the different ways of 
kindmaking through worldmaking in the context of the classification of people in the human 
sciences.  
 
1.1.3. Power/Knowledge and the Genealogies of the Subject 
Foucault’s influence on the MUP project cannot be overstated. Tracing the nodes 
that connect both projects falls beyond the scope of this work. However, it is vital to note 
some of the ways in which Foucault’s genealogical analysis—which is at the same time an 
analysis of power and knowledge—impacts Hacking’s work on how the human sciences, 
through the scientific classification process, create people’s identities.  
Foucault’s genealogical analysis revolved around the exercise of power (e.g., the 
histories of penal rights, psychiatric power, the control of infantile sexuality, etc.). He asked: 
“If power is exercised, what sort of exercise does it involve? In what does it consist? What is 
its mechanism?” (Foucault and Gordon 1980, 89) The goal of such analysis was “to create a 
history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects" 
Foucault 1982, 777). Human subjects, Foucault believed, are placed within relations of 
production, signification, and power. Foucault’s economic histories, which essentially were 
studies of power, focused on legal and institutional models. These models, however, did not 
address Foucault’s inquiries into the mechanisms and effects of the power relations in which 
human subjects are engaged. Foucault referred to these as “the rules of right that provide a 
formal delimitation of power” and “the effects of truth that this power produces and transmits, 
and which in their turn reproduce this power” (Foucault and Gordon 1980, 93). Social and 
political institutions (the state, capital, religion, tradition, etc.) assume normative standards 
(e.g., of truth and morality) that delineate both the behavior and the self-conception of the 
human subject. As such, these institutions have a role in shaping what people in a society 
consider "knowledge" or “socially permissible,” and thus true, useful, objective, factual, or 
moral. Foucault formulated his guiding question as follows:  
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What rules of right are implemented by the relations of power in the production of 
discourses of truth? Or alternatively, what type of power is susceptible of producing 
discourses of truth that in a society such as ours are endowed with such potent 
effects?  What I mean is this: in a society such as ours, but basically in any society, 
there are manifold relations of power which permeate, characterize and constitute the 
social body, and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, 
consolidated nor implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and 
functioning of a discourse. (Foucault and Gordon 1980, 91)  
 
Power and truth, in Foucault’s picture, are interwoven: truth is produced by the 
exercise of power, and power is exercised through the production of truth. In our global 
society, power is exercised through the institutionalization and professionalization of truth. 
“True discourses” confine human subjects to a social configuration in which the effects of 
truth are materialized when “we are judged, condemned, classified, determined in our 
undertakings, destined to a certain mode of living or dying” (Foucault and Gordon 1980, 93). 
Thus, the institutional force imposes truth through its power, and this same imposed truth 
goes on to justify its power. The two concepts are mutually dependent. 
In his genealogical analysis, Foucault focused on specific rationalities: the localized 
systems, strategic apparatuses, and techniques by which human beings are dominated and, 
ultimately, normalized (Foucault and Gordon 1980, 103).12 He claimed that since the 
nineteenth century, Western society has been characterized by a legislative discourse and 
disciplines based on the public right and social status of each citizen, whose goal is to 
preserve the cohesion of the social body it regulates (Foucault and Gordon 1980, 106). 
Foucault illustrated this in his analysis of the disciplinary power of state authority and 
psychiatric hospitals (Foucault 1979). Subjects must be shaped to see the world in the right 
way, and to work towards ends which are viewed as desirable. These social needs call for 
the application of disciplinary mechanisms which shape the subject such that they adopt, 
accept, and endorse certain valued norms. The overarching schema of the legislative 
                                                            
12 The notion of “normalization” is discussed in chapter 1 section 2.3, and in chapter 3 section 2.4.  
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discourse, however, does not subsume the heterogeneity of disciplinary mechanisms; they 
produce their own discourses and their own apparatuses of knowledge.  
Through disciplines, Foucault suggested, norms (rather than laws) are codified. The 
theoretical horizon of disciplines rather than the legislative discourse is the discourse of the 
human sciences; its mode of operation is that of clinical knowledge (Foucault and Gordon 
1980, 107). The discourses of laws and discipline are the two sides of the exercise of power 
in what Foucault called our “normalizing” society. The role played by the sciences in such a 
society is twofold: it mediates the conflicts between the legislative and disciplinary discourses 
by presenting itself as a sort of neutral discourse; and it weighs the disciplinary mechanisms 
by which society is controlled, such as the medicalization of behaviors, conducts, desires, 
and discourses. These two roles are important. First, due to the heterogeneous nature of 
power, a "neutral mediator" (provided by the sciences) is seen as necessary to ensure an 
“objective” standard that both sides of a conflict can agree on (although this breaks down 
when two different scientific discourses support two conflicting institutions). Second, science 
is able to provide a framework to understand certain kinds of "problematic" and "desirable" 
behaviors as determined “causally”; and to provide either a method for removing the 
problematic cause (treatment, therapy, punishment, or incarceration) or positive 
reinforcement for desired behavior. This can be seen, for instance, in the ways in which 
psychological views on child development are called upon to inform how we should both 
educate and discipline children. It also can be seen in those “sciences” long ago discredited, 
such as phrenology, which attempted to predict criminality by examining skull shape. The 
sciences used in this way vary greatly in their methodology, epistemological justification, and 
object of analysis—but all result in the societal attempt to control the body.  
In his analysis of power relations, Foucault used as a starting point the distinct forms 
of resistance against different forms of power. These resistances enabled him to locate and 
shed light on the methods used in the exercise of power. In Foucault’s view, power is not 
merely the imposition of a discourse over a determinate target (e.g., control of nature, control 
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of an exploited class by a dominant class, the control that a doctor exercises on the body or 
behavior of his patient). Rather, it is an arrangement of relations in which some (dominant) 
discourses are imposed and some (subjugated) discourses are opposed in resistance. These 
subjugated discourses comprise a whole body of knowledge disqualified by the scientific 
discourse. A genealogical analysis of the sort Foucault engaged in is thus concerned with the 
“local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledge against the claims of a unitary body 
of theory which would filter, hierarchize and order them in the name of some true knowledge 
and some arbitrary idea of what constitute a science and its objects” (Foucault and Gordon 
1980, 84). The opposition of this subjugated knowledge is centered on the effects, not the 
contents, of the dominant “true discourse.” Under these lines, a genealogy contributes to an 
historical emancipation of subjugated knowledge against the monopoly of a unitary, truth-
making, scientific discourse.  
Foucault's work on genealogy suggests that the "objective" views of the world upheld 
by various forms of scientific discourse shape the nature of subjects held as the objects of 
analysis—be they categorized as "homosexuals,” "criminals," "alcoholics,” etc. The subjects 
being analyzed have power to insist on their own narratives; they are not mere passive 
parties, even if dominant forces determine their fate. The Foucauldian influence on Hacking is 
evident in the central notion of the MUP project: the looping effects of categories of people. In 
looping effects, we see both the influence of dominant institutions (medical, scientific, judicial) 
and the forms of resistance, assimilation, and appropriation pursued by less powerful and 
even outright marginalized communities. 
 
1.1.4. Looping Effects  
 Hacking’s MUP project has consistently maintained that kinds of people are 
characterized by the presence of looping effects, defined as follows: 
(i) The interaction between classifications and their objects of classification brings 
about a change in the experience that the people classified have of themselves.  
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(ii) People’s awareness of their being classified in a given manner, or their 
experience of themselves as being of a certain kind, might produce a change in their 
behavior. 
(iii) This change in behavior may be such that it motivates the revision of the 
classification that brought about the changes indicated in (i) and (ii).  
Consider, for instance, the distinction between calling a dog “obese” and calling a 13-
year-old girl “obese.” Although some might argue that dogs exhibit a level of awareness, 
calling a dog “obese” would make no difference to the dog; it would fail to recognize itself as 
obese. However, labeling a girl “obese” could make a difference to her; she would perhaps 
question whether or not she is obese, or even begin to think of herself as obese. Moreover, 
as a result of her awareness of the way in which she is classified, she might try to lose weight 
or start feeling unattractive.  
Whatever the effect, there is some room for the girl’s experience of being classified 
as belonging to a certain kind to determine or influence her action. This space for possible 
action is closed to dogs: as they do not experience themselves as being of a certain kind, 
they thus cannot change their condition as a response to such an experience. While they 
might be forced to change their intake habits, for example, if their owners chose to feed them 
less, changing their constitution as a result of being classified as obese is open to them only 
through an outside agency –the actions of their owners. Dogs lack the sort of awareness that 
fuels human action (i.e., agency). Hacking elaborates on this in the following passage:  
 
Responses of people to attempts to be understood or altered are different from the 
responses of things. This trite fact is at the core of one difference between the natural 
and the human sciences, and it works at the level of kinds. There is a looping or 
feedback effect involving the introduction of classifications of people. New sorting 
and theorizing induces changes in self-conception and in behavior of the people 
classified. Those changes demand revisions of the classification and theories, the 
causal connections, and the expectations. Kinds are modified, revised classifications 
are formed, and the classified change again, loop upon loop. (Hacking 1995c, 370)  
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The looping effect highlights the changing and interdependent nature of the classifications 
under which human beings are conceived, insofar as the concepts that these bring about and 
the human beings who are their objects affect each other.  
During the late 1990s, Hacking contrasted his work on the classification of people, as 
informed by the notion of “human kinds,” with the contemporary philosophy of biology, heavily 
influenced by the notion of “natural kinds.” In this way, Hacking attempted to avoid 
metaphysical debates between scientific realism and social constructivism. Hacking situated 
the notion of human kinds in relation to this pair of contrasting notions: “interactive kinds,” 
which refer to classifications holding a distinct sort of relationship to their objects of 
classification, and “indifferent kinds,” which do not. Interactive kinds are distinguished by the 
capacity of certain objects of classification—human beings—to intentionally engage in their 
own process of classification.  
The purpose of differentiating interactive from indifferent kinds consists of highlighting 
the distinct role of concepts and objects in the formation of kinds. In the case of interactive 
kinds, the formation of categories is affected by the ways in which their respective objects of 
classification interact with their intended classification; but at the same time, without the 
intervention of a third party, indifferent kinds lack the capacity to contribute or react to their 
classification. The distinction between indifferent and interactive kinds provides an alternative 
way of presenting the looping effect: the idea that the reception of the categories given to a 
class of people may affect the ways in which the people so classified perceive themselves 
and the ways in which they behave.13 
                                                            
13 J. Tsou (2007) rightly noted an ambiguity in Hacking's treatment of his notion of interactive kinds 
(Hacking 1999), which at times seems to refer to classifications and at other times to the people picked 
out by the class. Such an ambiguity presents itself if we take interactive kinds as a distinct class, within 
which human kinds fall into (among, perhaps, other kinds). In the comprehensive reading I offer in this 
work, however, I understand the notion of interactive kind as an add-hoc construct which is identical to 
the notion of human kinds or kinds of people, and was intended to call attention to the unique 
interactions that present between human subjects and classifications. In contrast to Tsou, I offer a more 
charitable reading under the light of dynamic nominalism and the broader project of MUP. Tsou himself 
notes in a footnote of his 2007 paper that Hacking's subsequent reformulation of his treatment of kinds 
of people within his 5-vector framework may address the ambiguity. Classifications and objects of 
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Hacking offered one of his most famous illustrations of the distinction between 
interactive and indifferent kinds: human beings and quarks. Under any conditions, according 
to Hacking, “calling a quark a quark makes no difference to the quark;” not even in the case 
that these were somehow transformed through human intervention (Hacking 1999, 105).  
Given that quarks lack the experience of both themselves and their being classified as 
objects of a certain kind, on their own they cannot interact in response to their classification. 
The only scenario in which they can behave differently is through intervention: either the 
direct manipulation by a human being, or via a device set up by a human being designed to 
accomplish a purpose (e.g., a particle accelerator). Human beings, in contrast, can and do 
react in different ways to their classifications.  
The notion of interactive kinds was intended to acknowledge not only the peculiar 
fact that human beings, unlike other objects of classification, are aware of others and 
themselves, but that the ways in which they are classified have an impact on the way they 
interact with themselves and others. In other words, the ways in which human beings are 
treated according to their classifications in turn influences their experience of themselves and 
their behavior, which further affects their study and the subsequent classification that they are 
given.  
Interactive kinds are characterized by humans’ capacity for active awareness and 
their capacity to act upon it. The fact that the category of interactive kinds includes only 
humans is no surprise. From its introduction, the purpose of the category seems to be setting 
human kinds apart from natural kinds by emphasizing their differences in terms of the 
interaction that their respective objects hold with their classifications, rather than in terms of 
nature, artifice/artificiality, or otherwise.14 Hacking states: "This ugly phrase [interactive kinds] 
                                                                                                                                                                         
classification (kinds of people) inter-constitute each other in a dynamic interaction. In such a reading we 
can understand interactive kinds as bringing together classifications and people by specifying the type 
of interaction characteristic between them. 
14 As suggested by his rejection of an essentialist or definitional view of natural kinds, Hacking’s 
treatment of kinds of people is not so concerned with determining the natural basis for a given 
 
 
 
28 
has the merit of recalling actors, agency and action. The inter may suggest the way in which 
the classification and the individual classified may interact, the way in which the actors may 
become self-aware as being of a kind, if only because of being treated or institutionalized as 
of that kind, and so experiencing themselves in that way" (Hacking 1999, 104). What 
distinguishes the classifications of people is the interaction between classifications and 
objects of classification, not the basis of the classification itself (e.g., whether or not there is 
“natural grounds” for their classification). 
A close reading of the passage reveals the central aspects of the notion of interactive 
kinds that provide the bases for Hacking’s early account of human kinds. First, human kinds 
are characterized by a peculiar interaction between classifications and their objects of 
classification: human kinds are interactive kinds. Second, the interaction that characterizes 
interactive kinds is not only one between language (words) and entities (world), but also one 
between people, insofar as being classified in a particular way results in being treated by 
others in one way or another, according to available resources and institutional 
arrangements. Third, awareness is distinctive of the sort of interaction that characterizes 
interactive kinds. This might take place in a direct way, as in the recognition of oneself as 
being of a certain kind, or in an indirect way, as when people are identified and treated by 
others as being of a certain kind. Fourth, the subjects of the classification of interactive kinds 
are not merely receptacles of classifications, but actors. The classification is not just a top-
down labeling that fails to impact the self-understanding and behavior of the people 
classified. People are not merely objects to be classified; they are also agents. 
  Furthermore, it is worth reiterating three points that characterize Hacking’s theory of 
“the looping effect,” found in both his early work on human kinds and in his more recent 
formulation of his analytic framework:  
                                                                                                                                                                         
classification of people, but rather to account for the different forces that foster its creation and 
stabilization. The search for the natural basis of a given classification is just one force among many 
others. Accounting for such forces make it possible to determine the relevance of a given classification, 
and thus its aptness.  
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(i) The interaction between classifications and their objects of classification changes 
the experience that the people classified have of themselves;  
(ii) People’s awareness of being classified in a given manner, the experience of 
themselves as being of a certain kind, might produce a change in their behavior; and  
(iii) Their change in behavior motivate the revision of the classification that brought 
about the changes indicated in (i) and (ii) in the first place.  
 
 While distinct, the notions of interactive kinds and the looping effect also overlap. On 
the one hand, the concept of interactive kinds emphasizes that when it comes to humans, 
classifications and the classified people interact in a peculiar way: people experience 
themselves as being of a certain kind, and act or are treated accordingly. On the other hand, 
the looping effect highlights the changing and interdependent nature of human kinds, insofar 
as the classification of human beings and the human beings they classify change each other 
in their interaction. Without the sort of interaction that characterizes interactive kinds, no 
looping ensues.  
Given this fact, it is worth noting that the looping effect implies not only a revisionist 
view of knowledge about people but also a peculiar ontological perspective. The changes it 
foresees occur not only at the level of classifications but also at the level of the subject’s 
experience and behavior.15 That is, the objects are subjected to change: the experience and 
                                                            
15 Hacking also suggests that there are cases in which looping occurs at the biological level. He terms 
this "biolooping" and, differentiating it from classificatory looping, relates it to the phenomenon of 
biofeedback in yoga studies. Whereas biofeedback involves the conscious control of organic 
phenomena in the case of yoga, biolooping involves a correlation between a mental state, such as 
having an optimistic attitude, and a biological outcome, such as a better prognosis for breast cancer 
patients. In the case of biolooping there may not be a conscious control of the biological process, yet 
the state of the body is still altered. Hacking also considers as cases of biolooping the effects of 
psychobehavioral treatment on the increase of serotonin levels of depressive patients not treated with 
chemical interventions. On this Hacking states: " This phenomenon [biofeedback], which is well 
established but not understood, is distinct from the looping effect of interactive kinds. For lack of better 
nametags I shall call the mind/body effect biolooping, by analogy with biofeedback. The other is 
classificatory looping. I need the distinction because of course, in particular cases, both types of looping 
may be at work, and indeed mutually reinforce each other." (Hacking 1995c, 109-110). I thank Prof. 
Tsou for bringing the notion of biolooping to my attention. 
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behavior of people changes as a result of the classifications under which they are 
understood, and those changes in turn motivate the revision of the classifications by the 
experts who study or utilize them (e.g., bureaucrats, caregivers, educators). People and 
classifications change and constitute each other in a dynamic interaction, which makes kinds 
of people of a peculiar sort. This view of the dynamic constitutive interplay between 
classifications and people remarkably illustrates Hacking's dynamic nominalism. In Hacking’s 
analysis, the presence of looping effects is unique to human beings and their classifications, 
and the study of the making and the dynamics of kinds of people suggest the need for 
change in our views of ontology. According to the looping effect both classifications and 
people themselves play a role in the constitution of an "interactive kind". This also illustrates 
the sense in which Hacking's nominalism is dynamic. Dynamic nominalism does not merely 
entail a top-down labeling, but also a bottom-up effect contributed by the changing ontology 
that is labeled. Both classifications and ontology change in a dynamic inter-constitutive 
relation.   
Homosexuality is one of the clearest illustrations of Hacking’s looping effect. Since 
the category of “homosexuality” was first applied in a top-down manner by experts (mainly, 
psychiatrists), people classified as homosexual initially resisted the label. However, they 
eventually appropriated and redefined the term; that is, they took it away from the medical 
and legal discourse by reacting against its negative connotations, to the point of radically 
transforming its meaning. The most obvious of those transformations was the dissociation of 
homosexuality from mental illness.  
Although one may think, for the sake of simplicity, that there are two sides to the 
looping effect (concepts and people, which interact to change each other), the picture is more 
complex. It involves all the diverse elements that affect the making of the concept (e.g., the 
institutions and bureaucracies within which the notion is generated through the treatment of 
the peoples identified as being of a certain kind, as well as the theoretical or methodological 
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perspectives for studying the class), and the levels at which the people so classified may 
react (e.g., psychological, cognitive, social).  
Hacking's discussion on the ways in which Foucault and sociologist Erving Goffman 
may be brought together to analyze making up people effectively shows the complex 
character of the looping effect and its central role in MUP. The contrast that Hacking makes 
between Foucault and Goffman consists in their respective approaches to study the 
constitution of human identities. Whereas Foucault presents abstract "top-down" analyses 
which focus on the institutions under which kinds of people are fostered, Goffman presents 
groundwork "bottom-up" analyses which focus on the "face-to-face" interactions between the 
different actors involved in the constitution of human identities. The point of reference in 
Foucault's analysis is his accounts of The Birth of the Clinic and his study of the origins of the 
prison in Discipline and Punishment (Foucault 1994 and 1979). Those sites, whose origins, 
norms, spatial arrangements and so on, are studied by Foucault, are close to if not identical 
to what Goffman called "total institutions" - prisons, mental hospitals, concentration camps, 
monasteries, boarding schools, naval vessels (Hacking 2004b, 287). The point of reference 
for Goffman's face-to-face analyses are The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, Asylums, 
and Stigma (Goffman 1956, 1963 and 2009). Goffman primarily studied the interactions 
between the actors inhabiting total institutions, the roles that agents take within their 
constraints and possibilities, and the way in which agents challenge and change institutional 
norms, and in so doing also alter their identities.   
The distinction between Foucault and Goffman further clarifies Hacking's notion of 
the looping effect and the role it plays in MUP. In particular, it distinguishes Hacking's notion 
and the role it plays in MUP from both Foucault's and Goffman's studies as well as from 
labeling theory. First, Hacking reads Foucault and Goffman as offering distinct approaches to 
study MUP, one abstract top-down and focused on institution, the other down-to-earth 
bottom-up focused on everyday interactions. Hacking's MUP is interested in both institutional 
and everyday interactions. But Hacking's MUP does not only integrate top-down and bottom-
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up analyses, it also differentiates in its focus of analysis, namely, kinds of people in so far as 
these are the product of scientific classification. In this respect his work is closer to Foucault's 
philosophical history than to Goffman's sociological theory. Second, Hacking reads both 
Foucault and Goffman as offering dynamic accounts of MUP, just like his own account, which 
differentiates the three of them against labeling theory. Here I am not particularly concerned 
whether Hacking's interpretation of Foucault and Goffman fits his dynamic nominalist 
framework, as he claims, but on how he differentiates himself from labeling theory in terms of 
his underlying philosophical commitment to dynamic nominalism. Whereas labeling theory, 
Hacking contends, assumes a static nominalism in which the introduction of labels - whether 
scientific or in general cultural - makes up identities, under Hacking's dynamic nominalist 
such identities are not fixed labels. At this point the last step in the schematic formulation of 
the looping effect is relevant: for the looping to take place, the classifications which were 
introduced in the first place are also transformed in response to people's roles and agency. 
The looping effect, differently from labeling theory, does not make up realities 
through labeling, but also suggest that the introduction of scientific classifications fosters the 
transformation of reality itself (i.e., the people they categorize) and in turn people also 
transform their classifications. 
The looping effect is, in a way, just the outer layer of a variety of aspects that make 
distinct kinds of people. However, the notion of the looping effect has two particular aspects 
worth highlighting. First, it emphasizes the key role played by the reception of the 
classifications on the part of the people classified in the development of the classification 
itself. Second, it emphasizes the dynamic and changing nature of the classes, both 
classifications and human beings (the objects of classification). Hacking’s framework of 
analysis in MUP hints at the diverse elements at play in the making and looping.  
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1.2. Making Up People: An Analytic Framework  
In “Kinds of People: Moving Targets” (Hacking 2007a), Hacking presents the most 
elaborate and systematic version of his MUP project.16 He introduces a framework for the 
analysis of MUP comprised of three sets of elements: one set of five vectors of analysis, one 
set of six “engines of discovery,” and one set of three elements with a more social character. 
These three sets identify:  
i) the diverse elements which play a role in the formation of classifications advanced 
within the human sciences, whose objects of classification are people (five vectors) 
ii) the procedures involved in the research and discovery of knowledge about the 
intended target objects and the phenomena involved in those categories (six 
engines), and  
iii) the social aspects which are impacted by the application of the categories, which in 
turn also impact subsequent applications of and inquiries on the kinds of people in 
question (three extra elements).  
 
1.2.1. Five-Vector Framework    
In his most recent work, Hacking presents a five-vector framework for the analysis of 
MUP: 1) classification, 2) people, 3) institutions, 4) knowledge, and 5) experts. These vectors 
are central elements of MUP and the looping effect, and thus also enrich their 
characterization. Through the interaction of these five, MUP takes place; new kinds of people 
are brought into being.  
                                                            
16 Hacking abandons the terminology used during the late 1990s and adds new elements to the 
framework. Some of his commentators and critics have suggested that Hacking’s reformulations are 
substantive enough that some of the early criticisms may no longer be applicable. I argue that there is a 
continuum between his two formulations: the same philosophical background presented in section 1 of 
this chapter underlies both versions. However, there are some important differences between his work 
in the 1990s and his current work, which do address his critics; I indicate these by the end of chapter 2 
section 2. 
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The first two elements of the framework – classification and people – have been 
noted in the sections on relevant kinds, dynamic nominalism, and the looping effect. At this 
point, a few caveats are necessary. Hacking’s work on MUP conceives of human 
classifications as cases of relevant kinds. This implies that there are no foundational 
principles for classes of people, and there is no description of given kinds that is privileged in 
a principled manner.  
A classification consists of one linguistic and one extra-linguistic (i.e., ontological) 
component. The linguistic constituent is divided into names and descriptions. A diversity of 
descriptions of an entity identified under a single name could be given at any given point in 
time. Some of these descriptions may differ and take part in distinct systems of classification; 
yet at the same time, all of them constitute part of a class of people understood as a relevant 
kind. People are sorted under these diverse descriptions, and their associated labels 
constitute the extension of the class. In other words, each and every individual tagged as an 
“x” (name) under a given set of associated descriptions is his or her object of classification. It 
is worth emphasizing that the object of the classification of kinds of people is thus a plurality 
of objects – a plurality that is, furthermore, both motley (i.e., characterized in terms of 
overlapping and diverse descriptions) and changeable (i.e., people – their experiences, 
behaviors, treatments– change in response to the descriptions under which they are 
categorized). The categories of people are subjected to change in response to the change 
they bring about in the objects that they categorize.     
As previously noted, institutions, implicit in looping, are explicitly acknowledged as 
the third element of Hacking’s five-vector framework. These are described as “organized and 
structured entities” as a way to distinguish them from “mere practice and custom” Hacking 
2007, 296). For example, Hacking observes that the people who experience themselves as 
being of a certain kind might do so as a result of the treatment they receive within institutions. 
Along those lines, “…actors may become self-aware as being of a kind, if only because of 
being treated or institutionalized as of that kind, and so experiencing themselves in that way” 
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(Hacking 1999, 104). Classifications exert influence on people through institutions, for not 
only are people identified as being of a certain kind, their identities are socially enforced and 
reinforced.  
Three sorts of institutions fill this role: those within which knowledge of the 
classification is studied (e.g., academic institutions), those within which knowledge is 
implemented (e.g., schools, clinics, governmental programs, asylums), and those by which 
the classifications and/or their implementations are challenged (e.g., social movements and 
organizations like the anti-psychiatry coalition, Mind Freedom, Mad Pride, and the 
neurodiversity movement).17 The exercise of the classifications through institutional practices 
contributes to the legitimization of the classifications and the kinds of people they bring about; 
other institutions challenge such legitimacy. 
The fourth element in the framework is “knowledge,” which is directly linked to 
institutions insofar as they confine its practice. Claims to knowledge generate and legitimate 
the classifications put into practice. Hacking himself endorses a rather relaxed notion of 
knowledge: all of the descriptions of a given kind which are taken to have some causal 
import—that is, all the descriptions which could be selected for the sake of explanation or 
interventions.  
Later in this chapter, I discuss what Hacking means by “causal knowledge” in his 
analysis of kinds of people. At this point, however, it is sufficient to note some of its basic 
features and commitments. In contrast with “justified true belief,” Hacking explains, “causal 
knowledge” is 
 
…something more like Popper’s sense of conjectural knowledge. More specifically, 
there are the presumptions that are taught, disseminated, refined and applied within 
the context of the institutions. Especially there are what are presented as the basic 
facts […] Basic assumptions that we later regard as ghastly mistakes interact with 
                                                            
17 There are more organizations ranging from local small self-help and advocacy groups around 
different labels than I can give credit in here. Further information about the mentioned groups could be 
found in: mind freedom, http://www.mindfreedom.org/; mad pride, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mad_Pride; and neurodiviersity, https://autisticuk.org/neurodiversity.  
 
 
36 
people and classifications just as much as the facts that we hold to be stable, true, 
and beyond controversy. (Hacking 2007a, 297)  
 
This view of knowledge is congruent with both relevant kinds and dynamic nominalism. As a 
conception of knowledge it embraces a type of fallibilism, wherein the institutions in which 
knowledge is produced, reproduced, and transmitted legitimize what we know at a given time. 
As pointed out previously, the institutions that Hacking has in mind in the third point of his 
analytic framework includes both academic and research settings, as well as institutions with 
a more practical role such as the state, the private sector, philanthropic and non-profit 
institutions.  
Whereas some of the knowledge that is accepted in that context remains within 
specialized circles of experts, other knowledge is popularized among the masses. 
Furthermore, everything comes together: both legitimate knowledge and mistaken views are 
taken as legitimate at given points in time. The epistemic resources available at a given time 
provide the conditions for establishing what is and is not the case. Moreover, what counts as 
relevant knowledge and problems depends upon place, time, and epistemic conditions. 
Evidently, Hacking’s view on knowledge recognizes and even emphasizes the social 
dimension in knowledge production. However, there is more to that level of analysis. It also 
entails a deeply philosophical view of the nature of knowledge, its change, and its 
legitimization. Knowledge about kinds of people is not static; it is fallible and dynamic. Such a 
fallibilist commitment, nonetheless, also assumes that there are also some facts believed to 
be “stable,” “true,” and “beyond controversy.” Providing an account of the stabilization of 
these facts is one of the central goals of the philosophical analysis of a given kind. Dynamism 
and stability do not exclude each other; they coexist. Logically, therefore, we must ask how 
can we distinguish legitimate from illegitimate knowledge? The analytic framework suggests 
at least one answer: the experts, the fifth element in the framework.  
Hacking intuitively includes the experts within his framework, attributing to them the 
roles of “[generating] or [legitimating] the knowledge (d), [judging] its validity, and [using] it in 
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their practice… [working] within (c) institutions that guarantee their legitimacy, authenticity, 
and status as experts…. [and studying], [trying] to help, or [advising] on the control of the (b) 
people who are (a) classified as of a given kind” (Hacking 2007a, 297). Thus, according to 
Hacking, experts play both an epistemic and a practical role. On the epistemic side, they 
generate and validate knowledge about kinds of people. This, of course, also implies the 
production and standardization of the strategies for the generation of knowledge and the 
norms and techniques for its validation. On the practical side, the communities of experts set 
the objectives for the generation of knowledge and lay down paths for present and future 
interventions (which, by its very definition, changes their object, i.e., people, in the very 
interaction). The experts do not need to agree all of the time on what counts as the norms of 
validation, legitimate knowledge, or the most favorable paths of intervention. They might be 
members of communities that endorse competing principles, theoretical assumptions, and 
objectives.  
 
1.2.2. Engines of Discovery 
The second set in Hacking’s account of MUP consists of seven “engines of 
discovery”: counting, quantifying, norms, correlation, medicalization, biologization, and 
genetization. While acknowledging that some readers may consider these obvious, Hacking 
points out that they have been ignored in the philosophical literature. Each engine specifies a 
different dimension of analysis of kinds of people. Together, they comprise the heuristics in 
what the post-positivist philosophy of science would have called “a logic of discovery.” They 
can be subdivided in two subsets, one concerning the identification, quantification, and 
generalization of groups of peoples (i.e., the first three engines), and the other concerning 
their pathologization and the associated search for causal markers for the sake of 
normalizing.  
 In MUP analysis, counting is not just of any sort. For example, it is not conducted for 
strictly instrumental reasons, such as taxation and recruitment, which have been recorded in 
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historical sources since ancient times. Rather, according to Hacking, the sort of counting 
which is relevant is a relatively recent phenomenon: the scientific counting first developed in 
terms of probabilistic theory, which was taken up by the social sciences in the form of 
statistical techniques. Hacking’s work on the origins and evolution of this sort of counting is 
remarkable. He has identified a name, time and location for this phenomenon – the 
avalanche of printed numbers – which took place in Europe from around 1820 to 1840. It is 
not that no counting had taken place previously. However, before the avalanche of printed 
numbers there was no systematic counting of the kind that is vital for the study of social 
patterns, such as that used in Durkheim’s 1897 study on suicide that marked the birth of 
sociology (Hacking 1975b, 1990, 1992c).  
This sort of systematic counting generates the conditions for the development of 
systems of classification on the basis of the quantification of (“raw”) data, which presupposes 
the creation of standards or norms, i.e., standards for counting, and demands that they be 
used in subsequent counting and quantification. Quantified data allows the identification of 
patterns and relations, which are established in the form of correlations. Hacking’s view here 
may be summed up as follows: the less knowledge there is about the quantified phenomena, 
the less informative and weaker the correlations; the more knowledge there is about the 
quantified phenomena, the more sophisticated and informative the correlations.  
The fourth, fifth, and sixth engines of discovery highlight the tendency, illustrated in 
many debates, to medicalize and naturalize kinds of people. This stems from the conviction 
that many of the characteristics around which people are grouped into classes are the result 
of medical conditions, that there is something pathological about the conditions under study 
which has to be modified in order to normalize a given individual. Such pathology or disorder, 
it is generally believed, may have as its cause a biological condition (e.g., a brain 
mechanism, a hormonal imbalance, a genetic predisposition). Clinical studies, which also 
count and systematize, sort people according to the possible causes of those general health 
conditions. People and their conditions are subsequently studied by biological scientists, who 
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search for more than correlations – namely, causes. This causal program aims to locate the 
mechanisms at the genetic level. As Hacking puts it, this is almost an act of faith; these 
hopes are supported by the success of well-established results, which in turn are expected to 
extend to new cases. 
 
1.2.3. Social Components 
The last three elements in the framework of analysis are normalization, 
bureaucratization, and the reclamation of peoples’ self-identities. These are differentiated 
from the other two sets in that they have a more social and practical character, derived from 
both the interactions among the other elements in the framework and the search of 
knowledge and interventions through the use of the engines of discovery. The additional 
aspects highlight the role of the implementation of the knowledge produced and established 
by the whole range of both vectors and engines of discovery; and in doing so they link 
knowledge production to society.  
Knowledge about kinds of people is produced with the objective of not only 
understanding or explaining but also devising strategies of intervention and “normalization” 
(e.g., the modification of the pathological behaviors associated with a kind of people under 
study). Therapies, pilot educational programs, drugs, exercise routines, and the like are 
designed for the sake of modifying behaviors, bodies, and minds. The aim of normalizing 
people’s behaviors presupposes an idealized type to which people’s deviant behaviors must 
conform. Presumably, the knowledge of this ideal type is derived from the norms established 
by means of the engines of discovery. The goal of normalizing people’s behaviors belongs to 
the human sciences, and to society at large. Generally, the interventions are not confined to 
the lab or academic institutions, but are implemented within bureaucracies such as schools, 
hospitals, jails, support groups, and independent and governmental services. All of these 
entities undertake the task of determining who needs help (and who does not), which implies 
the determination of who does and who does not fall under a given classification. The 
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implementation of the strategies of intervention through these bureaucracies constitutes the 
third element in the third set under consideration. 
In their reception of the classifications assigned to them within the bureaucracies, 
people play a critical role in the formulation of these classifications. As suggested by the 
notion of the looping effect, people may accept, reject, reinforce, or transform their 
classifications. This happens at the level of the individual, as well as, more importantly, 
through associations of individuals that may transform into well-organized collectives and 
bureaucracies visible in society as public actors. Through these associations, people may 
contest the alleged knowledge of a given kind of people, the pathologization of some of its 
associated behaviors, the strategies of intervention in their normalization, and the very 
characterization of the condition (e.g., their behavior and experiences). In this, the people 
reclaim their own self-identities.  
The last three points highlight the sociological dimension of Hacking’s MUP project. 
The last two, furthermore, acknowledge the epistemic role played by the people who are 
classified. The three sets (i.e., the five elements in the analytic framework, the six engines of 
discovery, and the three additional elements) provide insight into the epistemological, 
ontological and, to some extent, the methodological implications of Hacking’s account of 
kinds of people. They also make explicit his acknowledgement of the indispensability of a 
social dimension in the philosophical analysis of the classification of people.  
 
 In this chapter, I introduced the views on classification undergirding Hacking’s MUP 
project and the framework of analysis suggested by it. The MUP project integrates 
Goodman’s views on relevant kinds, Hacking’s own views on dynamic nominalism, and 
Foucault’s views on the genealogies of subjects. In combination they support a view on 
classification as it applies to people. We thus arrive at the following views. First, there is 
neither metaphysical or epistemic priority nor exclusivity in the classification of people at 
lower levels of analysis (e.g., the physiological or genetic), but a multiplicity of organizational 
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criteria which are relevant or irrelevant according to a diversity of goals for their organization. 
Second, the categories under which people are conceived of are subjected to revisions 
resulting from the interaction between these categories and the people classified by them. 
Third, the interactions among categories and the people they classify do not merely occur in 
the abstract, but are negotiated through social institutions and media (e.g., schools, prisons, 
civil movements; books, pamphlets, media, protest). These interactions are complex in both 
the number of elements participating in the determination of a given category and in the 
directionality in which power is exercised.  
Hacking’s analytic framework provides a heuristic toolbox for the philosophical 
analysis of categories of people. It serves in the identification of common aspects, which may 
play a role in the determination of a category of people. Hacking insists that no two identical 
cases of MUP can be found. Some elements in the three sets envisioned – the analytic 
framework, the engines of discovery, and the three social elements – may or may not be 
found in a given case, and yet they would serve well to advance the analysis of any category 
of people of interest.  
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Chapter 2 
Making Up People: Examples and Complementary Notions 
Hacking elaborates on several cases of MUP, some in lengthy detail (Hacking 1995a 
and 1998), and others relatively briefly, as illustrations of his overall project (Hacking 1988d, 
1992b, 2001a). In this chapter, I review Hacking’s analyses of homosexuality, criminality, 
child abuse, fugue, and multiple personality, emphasizing how these categories emerged, 
and how they may illustrate some of the notions in Hacking's general account of MUP. His 
studies also exhibit the conceptual shifts (and their philosophical import) that result from the 
dynamic interaction between the classifications and the people they classify, through the 
institutions and distinct social settings within which they are implemented.  
In section 2.1, I discuss Hacking’s case studies aforementioned and in section 2.2, I 
discuss some additional concepts which further enrich Hacking's analytic model of MUP:  
action under a description, causal knowledge, transient mental illness and ecological niches. 
In the last section of this chapter 2.3, I offer an interpretation on the basis of my 
reconstruction of Hacking's MUP of one of Hacking’s most polemical passages on the 
semantic resolution between scientific realism and social constructivism.  
 
2.1. MUP Exemplars 
 The case studies that I discuss in this section exhibit some elements of Hacking's 
MUP analytic framework and its complementary notions, each in a distinct manner. Some 
case studies illustrate more clearly some notions; for instance, the notion of looping effect is 
remarkable in the cases of homosexuality and multiple personality disorder (MPD). No case 
study exemplifies each of MUP's notions. For example, the notion of an ecological niche only 
figures explicitly in the case of fugue. The purpose of this section is not to provide a full 
analysis of how each of MUP's notions appear in each of the case studies, since they play 
only an heuristic role in the analysis MUP's cases. Rather, my goal in reviewing Hacking's 
case studies is to highlight the character of the sort of analysis suggested in MUP. 
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2.1.1.  Homosexuality 
Hacking uses the case of homosexuality to illustrate the notion of the looping effect, 
building on the work of Michel Foucault and Kenneth Plummer (Foucault 1990 and Plummer 
1981). He argues that homosexuals —as type of man engendered by scientific 
classification— emerged and came into existence in the mid nineteenth century. First 
described (and prescribed) within medical and legal contexts, eventually “the people 
categorized as homosexuals took over the ownership of the concept, and changed names, 
changed meanings, changed the world” (Hacking 2002a, 105). Reacting against the negative 
connotations of the associated medical and legal descriptions, the very first men classified as 
“homosexuals” detached the notion from the medical and legal discourse and radically 
transformed the meaning of the category. The most obvious of the transformations was the 
disassociation of homosexuality from the psychiatric taxonomy.  
According to Foucault, homosexual behaviors, together with other forms of deviant 
sexuality (e.g., adultery, rape, incest, infidelity, marriage without parental consent, bestiality), 
were perceived to be “unlawful” acts under both religious and civil law. The shift from this 
religious and legalistic conception of homosexuality to a “psychological, psychiatric and 
medical category” was due to the transposition of the practice of “sodomy” from the juridical 
subject of a set of forbidden acts to the person of the freshly characterized homosexual. 
Foucault located this transposition in Carl F. Westphal's article on “contrary sexual 
sensations” in 1870, which offers an attempt to medicalize homosexuality. This change 
marked the transformation of a category for a set of illegal acts, sodomy, to a category for a 
type of person, the homosexual. In Foucault’s words, “[t]he nineteenth-century homosexual 
became a personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood, in addition to being a type of 
life, a life form, and a morphology, with an indiscreet anatomy and possibly a mysterious 
physiology” (Hacking 2002a, 105). 
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 Two aspects of the medicalization of both homosexuality and other forms of deviant 
sexuality became a part of its conceptual matrix.18 First, formerly unlawful sexualities began 
to be seen as pathological, conceived under a category for a type of human being and 
studied under the technologies of health. Second, the very study of these pathological 
sexualities provided a rationale for their continued pathologization. Once the medical shift 
was made, deviant sexualities were identified in the bodies of the deviant “as a lesion, a 
dysfunction, or a symptom—in the depths of the organism, or on the surface of the skin, or 
among all the signs of behavior” (Foucault and Gordon 1980, 44).  
The shift in medical views on homosexuality gave rise to a series of discourses on 
the diverse species and subspecies of homosexuality and other forms of deviant sexualities, 
making possible their social control. Foucault called this biopower, or the “normalization of 
the deviant” by means of the regulation of the births, deaths, reproduction, and illnesses of 
populations.19 The generation of the discourses on and the regulation of deviant sexualities 
took place within diverse social institutions, most remarkably the penitentiary system, 
psychiatric hospitals, schools, and the family. Heinrich Kaan’s Psychopathia Sexualis (Kaan 
and Heyness 2017), according to Foucault, juxtaposed an “orthopedics” of sex with an earlier 
analysis of heredity and an associated sense of “biological responsibility.” Sex must be 
controlled for the sake of protecting not only the deviant but also his descendants from 
transmitting the associated perversions and diseases. In Foucault’s view, “[t]he medicine of 
perversions and the programs of eugenics were the two great innovations in the technology 
                                                            
18 Considering that the notions of medicalization and pathologization may be understood in different 
manners, it is worth clarifying the sense in which I use them in this work. By the term ‘medicalization’ I 
understand the treatment of a given phenomenon as a medical condition. Some of these conditions 
may have, previous to its medicalization, been treated as religious, moral or more generally as social 
issues. By pathologization I understand the postulation of a disease entity, an organic pathology, as an 
underlying correlate to a given condition or behavior. I used both terms interchangeably to the extent 
that the medical treatment of a condition or behavior may explicitly or implicitly assume the presence of 
an underlying organic pathology in its understanding of such condition or behavior. 
19 “A visible continuity, therefore, but one that did not prevent a major transformation: from that time on, 
the technology of sex was ordered in relation to the medical institution, the exigency of normality, and – 
instead of the question of death and everlasting punishment – the problem of life and illness. The flesh 
was brought down to the level of the organism” (Foucault 1990, 117).  
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of sex of the second half of the nineteenth century” (Foucault and Gordon 1980, 118). 
Moreover, the orthopedic and hereditarian approaches, merged together with the even more 
comprehensive degeneracy program, formed the solid nucleus of “perversion-heredity-
degenerenscence.”  
The discourses on deviant sexuality, their associated technologies of normalization, 
and their implementation in diverse social institutions also afforded a space for the formation 
of a counter-discourse. Homosexual men broke their silence and spoke on their own behalf; 
their slogan “silence equals death,” invoked during the 1980s AIDS epidemic, dramatically 
captured this turn. Homosexual men began to demand the acknowledgment of both the 
legitimacy and “naturality” of their sexuality, appropriating the medical vocabulary generally 
used to disqualify it.  
In addition to the homosexual movement, Foucault pointed to the women’s liberation 
movement as a discursive counterbalance to contemporary normalizing technologies and 
discourses. According to Foucault, the strength of these two movements primarily came not 
from the reclamation of their sexual practices as such, but from appropriation of the very 
discourses and institutions (what Foucault called the “apparatuses of sexuality”) that they 
opposed, and in the process, they legitimized homosexuals as a type of person. Both 
movements’ demands for sexual specificity resulted in a de-sexualization of discourse, 
displacing its focus from specific sexual behaviors to ways of being. In so doing, they 
achieved the recognition of “forms of culture, discourse, language, and so on, which are no 
longer part of that rigid assignation and pinning-down to their sex which they had initially in 
some sense been politically obliged to accept in order to make themselves heard” (Foucault 
and Gordon 1980, 220).  
Although Hacking himself referenced the homosexual movement only briefly, the 
case of homosexuality is paradigmatic of the looping effect. Remarkably, the looping effect 
does not merely result from the self-awareness of an individual. It also occurs in the collective 
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action of appropriating and transforming the meaning of a category of person, a category that 
has been legitimized by a scientific discourse and implemented within social institutions.  
If we understand homosexuality merely as the practice of men and women having 
sexual relations with the same gender, the significance of the looping effect is lost. However, 
if we understand homosexuality as a more robust concept involving a kind of pathological 
sexual desire, then the historical consequences of the social response to homosexuality are 
evident. When homosexuality was defined in that manner, those classified organized around 
the notion that their desires were not, in fact, pathological. They were able to bring their 
lifestyle into the open by legitimating it through social and political action. Eventually, this 
reshaped the scientific understanding such that the notion of homosexuality was no longer 
viewed as a pathological type. The kind of looping mentioned here was dependent on the 
characterization of homosexuality as pathological by the scientific and medical community.20  
 
2.1.2. Criminality.  
 Hacking examines the case of criminal behavior in his article “Degeneracy, Criminal 
Behavior, and Looping,” included in Genetics and Criminal Behavior (Hacking 2001b). Crimes 
and criminals, Hacking notes, are of the oldest themes to be systematically studied 
suggesting the existence of a type of person – the criminal. The roots of the “scientific” view 
of the criminal extend back to the origins of the social sciences, which, Hacking argues, 
                                                            
20 In a comment to this work Prof. Tsou noted that the case of homosexuality might not illustrate the 
looping effect as clearly as I suggest in this section, since " If homosexuality is understood as 
individuals who engage in same-sex practices, the classification has arguably remained the same". This 
considered, he notes it might be more appropriate to discuss this case in terms of "the medicalization 
and then de-medicalization" of homosexuality. My understanding of the notion of Hacking's account of 
kinds of people is more robust that what is suggested in the understanding of homosexuality suggested 
in Tsou's observation. I take the case of homosexuality to be particularly remarkable because it shows 
the active role of people as social actors in responding to the introduction of a scientific or medical 
taxonomy and the pathologization of what they deem as a rightful mode of being. Through such active 
engagement the meaning of the notion of homosexuality was transformed, opening new possibilities of 
being (a kind of person). Tsou's observation, however, does raise some question concerning the scope 
of the looping effect, since the result of the transformation of the notion of homosexuality was not 
contained within the confines of scientific/medical category. I am inclined to the view that the notion of 
the looping effect could serve as a heuristic of analyses of scientific categories of people, but does not 
limit to them, bridging between the scientific and the cultural. 
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began “by counting and classifying crimes, criminals, types of crimes, and rates of conviction, 
and recidivism,” alongside the study of suicide. By 1820, statistical laws about crimes were 
abundant.21 
Hacking points in particular to Charles Gorgin’s 460-page statistical study, published 
in 1913, which posited a notion of criminality that remained paradigmatic within scientific 
discourse well into the twentieth century. In The English Convict (Gorgin 1913), Gorgin 
presented a typology of “the criminal”—a type of man—based on physical constitution (e.g., 
skin colors, height, hair texture), mental constitution (e.g., temperament, intelligence, mental 
defects), and other “etiological” influences (e.g., nationality, employment, family life, 
alcoholism, social class). Gorgin intended to establish that 1) convicts are characterized by a 
poor health condition (e.g., weaker and smaller, less intelligent), which differentiates them 
from non-convicts; 2) there is a significant correlation between parental and filial criminality; 
3) every adult is susceptible to committing crimes; and 4) the “degree of susceptibility is 
normally distributed in the population, and is strictly heritable, in the broad sense” (Hacking 
2001b, 149). 
Gorgin’s most influential assumption was that criminality, like other heritable 
diseases, runs in families. By 1900, Karl Pearson, an early eugenicist and biostatistician, 
following in Gorgin’s footsteps, had found that heritable diseases, such as tuberculosis, follow 
a normal distribution—a distribution also followed by criminality. Pearson later on went on to 
study intelligence in “the convict.” He introduced the idea that rather than a defect in 
intelligence, what characterized the criminal was his “social ineffectiveness” or lack of “social 
or moral responsibility”—a trait Pearson also thought to be heritable (Hacking 2001, 150-
151). Criminal behavior thereby became the area of expertise of the criminologist, 
                                                            
21 At this point the MUP project and the Styles project intersect. Chapter 3 elaborates on the emergence 
of the statistical style. The statistical study of criminality during the early 1800s was one of the first of 
their kind (Hacking 2001b, 143). 
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psychologist, sociologist, statistician, and, later, the biologist, and not merely a matter for the 
police, lawyers, and prisons.  
 Echoing Foucault’s analysis of homosexuality, Hacking noted that the scientific view 
of “the criminal” – as kind of person – that emerged during the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries merged with the larger framework provided by the degeneracy program. 
Other sets of “deviant” human behaviors also were included, including hysteria, epilepsy, 
madness, mental retardation, suicide, prostitution, and vagrancy. The degeneracy program 
conceived of all these as both interrelated and hereditary (Hacking 2001, 144). Although 
some of its assumptions have been abandoned—such as the idea that homosexuality would 
appear in one generation, alcoholism in the next, and mental retardation in the next—Hacking 
suggests that the degeneracy program still exists, if in a mitigated version (Hacking 2001, 
147).22    
The case of criminality does not fully illustrate Hacking’s notion of the looping effect, 
although it does show how introducing new ways of thinking within scientific discourse 
transformed the target of study. As in the case of homosexuality, the key step in such 
transformations is found in the switch from focusing on criminal behaviors to focusing on the 
criminal himself. This switch was made possible by the emergence of first statistical and then 
hereditary (though not yet genetic) thinking. Assessing whether there has been a looping 
                                                            
22 Although Hacking does not elaborate substantively on the notion of degeneration, he suggests it as a 
common thread in some of his case studies on making up people (remarkably, the cases of 
homosexuality and criminality). Although it may be a long stretch from the degeneracy program to 
current views on criminality as psychopathy or antisocial personality, the degeneracy program appears 
to have impacted the early developments in the scientific understanding on mental illness, psychopathy, 
criminality among other notions. Hacking suggests that contemporary scientific understandings of 
psychopathology might be able to be genealogically traced back to the “Degeneracy Model” of the 19th 
century identified by Daniel Pick (Pick 1989). The degeneracy model provided the space for and was 
reinforced by the proliferation of statistical studies and the biologization of various social anxieties often 
exacerbated by increasingly urban lifestyles, such as concerns over crime, hysteria and alcoholism. 
Social Darwinism, alongside Mendelian notions of inheritance, informed the concerns and approaches 
of social scientists and policy makers who sought to fix or alleviate the social ills associated with 
“degeneracy”. While current understandings of psychopathology differ greatly from those held by the 
19th century advocates of the degeneracy model, concerns over inheritance of these conditions 
continue to this day, not to mention anxieties over the need to protect society from the mentally ill 
through psychiatric institutions and legal interventions.    
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effect of the sort envisioned by Hacking falls beyond the scope of this work. However, it is not 
unreasonable to posit that during the late 1800s and early 1900s, prison reform movements 
motivate a looping effect in the category of “the criminal.” Several organizations have long 
advocated against prisoner mistreatment and fought for the improvement in their life 
conditions and the defense of their rights. The ways in which the actions of these 
organizations have impacted the scientific views of “the criminal” is unclear at this moment; 
however, it is a fascinating path for additional inquiry. 
 
2.1.3. Child Abuse 
Hacking elaborates on the case of child abuse in several pieces (Hacking 1988e, 
1991b, 1992a, 1995a, 1999). Mistreatment of children has been recorded since ancient 
times. However, Hacking argues that the contemporary concept of child abuse came into 
being in 1962, with an X-ray-driven study of how bones heal in toddlers. This moved abuse 
from a legal to a medical focus. Two legal notions preceded the medicalization of child abuse: 
“cruelty to children” and “neglect.” Such children became the cause of such philanthropic 
societies as the New York´s Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, and inspired 
the foundation of the Children’s Bureau in 1912. Nonetheless, children who were victims of 
cruelty or neglect were not conceived of as distinct kinds of persons; they received the same 
medical treatment as victims of any other injury. The mid-twentieth-century shift from the 
legal conception of cruelty toward children to the medical conception of child abuse was 
driven by the identification of a type of child who presented with what came to be called the 
“battered child syndrome.” This was a condition characterized by the presence of healing 
bones in the absence of current fractures or other trauma. Denver pediatricians presented 
their findings on battered child syndrome in the Journal of the American Medical Association 
in 1962.  
The change of conception brought attention not only to the children with battered 
child syndrome, but also to the “sick” adults, presumably their parents, who abused them. A 
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series of features became associated with the phenomenon of child abuse. Rather than being 
the product of a certain social class, child abuse is found in the constitutions of abused and 
abusers; child abusers are likely to have been abused children themselves; and the study of 
child abuse belongs to the medical profession.    
Since 1962, the medical view of child abuse has undergone a series of radical 
changes resulting in the extension of its domain. Cases not initially considered as child abuse 
are now included under its purview: in addition to physically and sexually abused children, 
those who were not given the proper care to promote “optimal development” also require 
attention. This extension is reflected in the increased cases of child abuse. In 1967-68, 7,000 
cases of abused children were reported in the United States’ first abuse survey. Fifteen years 
later, 1.2 million instances were reported to the National Center for Child Abuse and Neglect, 
only 69,000 of which were cases of physical abuse or neglect (Hacking 1991a, 58-59).  
Such a dramatic change has been both the source and the product of the interaction 
between classifications, their application through institutions, and the changes they bring 
about in the behavior and experiences of the people they classify. Hacking argues: “We have 
found out more about child abuse, not just by uncovering horrible facts but also by clarifying 
our ideas and sharpening our moral sensibilities.” Moreover, as the conception of child abuse 
has evolved, people have also changed: “Children experience their hurt differently. […] 
Likewise the abusers' own sense of what they are doing, how they do it, and even what they 
do is just not the same now as it was thirty years ago¨ (Hacking 1992a, 254). 
Several actors have been involved in the formation and articulation of the category of 
child abuse. From its original location in the legal system, the field of social work, and 
charitable and philanthropic associations, it has moved to the clinical and medical 
professions, schools, and society at large via media coverage. Strategies for the protection of 
abused children and the prevention of child abuse have been implemented in all of those 
settings. In turn, the dissemination of the knowledge about child abuse has made space for 
the creation of “Parent Anonymous” groups and a generalized awareness of the agencies in 
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place for “reporting” child abusers (Hacking 1988e, 61). The reinterpretation of the 
experiences of those who were once abused children has turned out to be both cathartic and 
liberating, transforming not only the past but also the present lives of those involved. The flip 
side of the story is played out in groups of pedophiles; they also have found room in print for 
expressing their own views, siding with their own “courageous group of ‘experts’” who argue 
that there is a diversity of types of relationships, and that not all adult-child relations are 
damaging for the children and require intervention (Hacking 1999, 142).  
The case of child abuse illustrates both ends of the looping effect: the ways in which 
scientific thinking brings about a conception of a type of being—abused children—and the 
ways in which the experiences, behavior, and treatment of the children so classified changes 
in response to the implementation of such a view. Additionally, it illustrates how the category 
of “abused children” directly and indirectly affects the people so classified. On one hand, the 
knowledge associated with child abuse may provide a framework of reference for making 
sense of certain experiences, past and present (e.g., apparent irrational fears, sadness, 
stress response, etc.). On the other hand, the recognition of a category of person (such as an 
abused child) may also motivate the creation of organizations around such an identity, which 
in turn may transform the category that brings them together. 
 
2.1.4. Fugue 
In his book Mad Travelers: Reflections on the Reality of Transient Mental Illnesses 
(Hacking 1998), Hacking elaborates in detail on another of his MUP analyses, the case of 
fugue. Fugue is a presumed disorder characterized by “strange and unexpected trips, often in 
states of obscured consciousness”. It entered the medical taxonomy of insanity by 1887, 
originally in Bordeaux, France, and then in Italy, Germany, and Russia. Hacking focused 
primarily on the story of the first fugueur, Albert, and his doctor, Philippe Tissié (1852-1935), 
who opened “the possibility of fugue as a diagnosis in its own right” through their doctor-
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patient interactions. These interactions served as an “an exemplar for thinking about a whole 
group of mental illnesses, past and present” (Hacking 1998, 31).  
Between 1888 and 1895, the fugue epidemic inaugurated by Albert and Tissié came 
to be assimilated into the two “great but mysterious mental pathologies of the day,” hysteria 
and epilepsy. The assimilation initially took the form of a debate between one group of 
experts who associated fugue with hysteria, conceived of as a “psychogenic” condition, and 
another group who associated fugue with epilepsy, which at that time was believed to be the 
result of a brain injury. Jean-Martin Charcot, one of the most influential neurologists of the 
time, advanced the revolutionary claim that both women and men exhibited hysteria (in 
opposition to the contemporary view that hysteria was gender-specific, affecting only women 
and “effeminate men”). Because of Charcot’s work, the conception of hysteria was 
extrapolated from its gynecological and obstetric background, and increasingly conceived of 
as also affecting “burly laborers.” However, although Charcot believed certain individuals 
were predisposed to the condition due to their lineage, he advanced a fundamentally different 
etiology for male and female hysteria: he cited moral triggers for women; but for men, he 
blamed physical trauma, shock at a very early age, or industrial or alcoholic poisoning 
(Hacking 1998, 32-33).  
As the conception of trauma transformed from physical to psychical (today’s view, 
and one that was suggested but not embraced by Charcot), so grew the debate over whether 
psychogenic hysteria or physiogenic epilepsy was the source of fugue. Moreover, a similar 
transformation of the conception of epilepsy also took place, which in turn heightened the 
debate even further. Later on, a third theory of fugue as a type of “neurasthenia,” a condition 
of the nerves, was added to the debate. Neurasthenia supporters did not necessarily reject 
the other two classes, but rather added the third as a distinct type of fugue.  
The hysteria, epilepsy, and neurasthenia frameworks all shared the view that fugue 
ran in families. Neurasthenia was more descriptive than theoretical, while hysteria and 
epilepsy provided the theoretical space for describing fugue as a medical condition. However, 
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all three conceptions were subsumed under the even larger theoretical space of the 
degeneracy program. As Hacking points out, “[d]egeneracy was deeply implicated in both 
hysteria and epilepsy. Doctors, novelists, and the population at large imagined that when 
hysteria showed in one generation, epilepsy might show in the next, exemplifying the terrible 
prospect of racial degeneration” (Hacking 1998, 35).  
Hacking then describes the conciliatory view that emerged in 1895, promoted by 
Fulgence Raymond. Raymond claimed that whereas some cases of fugues were epileptic, 
the great majority were hysterical—but that it was not necessary to exclude one view in favor 
of the other. Moreover, Raymond also suggested that a person could have two subtypes of 
fugue at once, as long as the fugue demonstrated three characteristics: an “irresistible 
compulsion to travel,” acting “intelligently, in a regular and apparently normal way, without 
violence,” and amnesia (Hacking 1998, 47). Raymond distinguished hysteric and epileptic 
fugues from neurasthenic fugues depending on whether or not amnesia presented. The 
presence of amnesia, in his view, indicated the presence of trauma (both psychical and 
physical). In contrast, neurasthenic fugues were not characterized by trauma. Furthermore, 
and in line with Charcot, Raymond differentiated epileptic from hysteric fugues on the basis of 
the response to potassium bromide (as suggested by Charcot), a medication widely used by 
the psychiatrists of the time to treat epilepsy, hypnotic therapy, whose purpose was to 
retrieve the forgotten memories of what took place before and during the compulsive 
wandering (Hacking 1998, 49). 
Hysteria and epilepsy were only two of the elements precipitating the emergence of 
fugue in the late 1880s. The beginnings of mass tourism, the criminalization of vagrancy, the 
degeneracy program, the French system of conscription/control of desertion, and the 
transformation of the conception of trauma from the physical to the mental each played a role 
in creating the space for the mad to become a kind of person. Hacking points out that an 
“exceptional combination of circumstances,” what he calls an ecological niche, is required “for 
any particular species to emerge in a habitat” (Hacking 1998, 55). Extrapolating from this 
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biological metaphor, he claims that in order for a kind of person to come into being, a 
combination of exceptional circumstances also must be in place. He calls us to “[enlarge] our 
view to the niche in which fugue thrives as a kind of madness” and look for “new 
environments where fugue is found and similar environments where fugue is not found” 
(Hacking 1998, 56). To illustrate, Hacking considers the case of runaway slaves in the United 
States in the mid-1880s. This phenomenon gave rise to a short-lived diagnosis established 
by an appointed commission for the study of the (so-then-called) “Negro race.” The 
commission came up with the label “Drapetomania,” whose Greek root means “to run away,” 
to identify the presumed insanity of the slaves who had a tendency to escape their masters.  
The emergence of multiple personality as a kind of people provides another 
illustration of the ecological niche. Multiple personality, like fugue, was characterized by 
amnesia and an associated loss of a sense of identity. Like fugueurs (sic., Hacking 1998, 90), 
multiples had no recollection of their whereabouts under one or more of their alternate 
identities, and they underwent hypnosis in order to bring back their memories. Fugue, which 
emphasized a different set of symptoms, did not become a diagnosis in the United States; but 
multiple personality did, and some of the multiples in the United States had been qualified as 
fugueurs in France. This suggests that what counts as a legitimate kind of person at a given 
point in time and space depends upon a diversity of conditions, which create a socio-
epistemic space for the categories to emerge.  
The fugue epidemic lasted twenty-two years, beginning in 1887 and ending with the 
1909 presentation of “last fugueur” at a major public event in France. Being identified as an 
hysteric or epileptic condition initially helped fugue be accepted as a legitimate psychiatric 
classification. However, it also ultimately led to fugue’s rejection as a medical condition, since 
over time hysteria ceased to be recognized as medically legitimate and epilepsy was 
reconceptualized as a condition under which fugue no longer fit. Hacking points to the 
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disappearance of hysteria—a vital element of fugue’s ecological niche—as one key aspect in 
the extinction of fuguers.23  
 
2.1. 5. Multiple Personality  
A third example of MUP is multiple personality disorder. Hacking has dedicated a 
complete book, Rewriting the Soul (Hacking 1995a), to this topic. The narrative of multiple 
personality disorder overlaps with the narratives of child abuse and fugue, and, like the case 
of homosexuality, provides an almost perfect example of the looping effect. Most of the 
elements Hacking considers in his analytic framework for the analysis of MUP are exhibited 
in the case of multiple personality, including the underlying but key philosophical notions I 
explore in the next section.24  
Although cases of people with double consciousness have been reported since at 
least 1791, Hacking argues that multiple personality as a kind of person did not emerge until 
1980, the year in which the American Psychiatric Association recognized it as an official 
diagnosis in the DSM III. In the 50 years prior to 1980, only 12 cases were documented, but 
by 1982, psychiatrists were referring to multiple personality disorder as an exponentially 
growing epidemic. By 1986, six thousand people had been diagnosed, and by 1992, “there 
were hundreds of multiples in treatment in every sizable town in North America” (Hacking 
1995a, 8). The American Psychiatric Association voted to change the name of the disorder, 
and “multiple personality” as an official diagnosis was discontinued with the 1994 publication 
                                                            
23 It is worth mentioning that Hacking’s notion of ecological niche is akin to his proposal of the 5-vector 
analytic framework, of which I shall say more later on. It’s interesting to note that looping effects do not 
clearly play a role the rejection of the category of fugue. I thank Prof. Tsou for bringing this point to my 
attention. 
24 These includes the notions of “actions under a description”, prototypes, causal knowledge, ecological 
niche, and transient mental illness.  
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of the DSM IV, which re-identified it under the broader category of "dissociative identity 
disorder."25 
Hacking illustrates multiple personality first by using the description established in the 
DSM III, and then by providing an example (an “exemplar”) of someone with this disorder.26 
The DSM III’s category includes three items:  
i) The existence within the individual of two or more distinct personalities each of 
which is dominant at a particular time, ii) the personality that is dominant at any particular 
time determines the individual’s behavior, and iii) each individual personality is complex and 
integrated with its own unique behavior pattern and social relationships (Hacking 1995a, 10).  
Hacking’s exemplar of multiple personality is Sybil, a woman identified as a multiple 
with 16 distinct personalities. Sybil’s doctor, Cornelia Wilbur, was one of the leading figures 
who defended multiple personality as a genuine category. Like the mad travelers of the late 
1800s, Sybil would wake up without knowledge of her whereabouts in the antecedent hours 
or days, although she was aware that she had been in places that she could not remember. 
Before submitting to Wilbur, who identified her as a multiple, Sybil had been diagnosed with 
other conditions like anxiety and depression. Unlike previous doctors, Wilbur was aware of 
multiple personality disorder and in the interaction with her patient, was able to identify the 
different personalities inhabiting Sybil. As Sybil reassembled and recalled recent episodes in 
her life, memories of childhood abuse also came back in flashes. By corroborating the 
evidence of the stories Sybil narrated to her, Wilbur’s work strengthened the view of multiple 
personality as a mechanism originated to cope with the painful experiences of sexual abuse 
suffered as a child: when the violence is too traumatic for the host, a new alter ego emerges 
and take over.  
                                                            
25 Here I use “multiple personality disorder” insofar as Hacking’s case concerns such a short-lived 
diagnosis. Multiple personality is an instance of what Hacking identifies as “transient mental illness”, 
which is discussed later in this chapter.  
26 It is worth noting that he does the latter while emphasizing in an apologetic manner that what is at 
play are the lives and experiences, too many of which are very painful, of the people who serve as 
exemplars.  
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Wilbur prescribed therapy to uncover the source for the diverse alters, promote 
awareness of the diverse selves, and reinterpret those experiences. In her model, the distinct 
selves of a multiple can fit two general forms: they can be found out to be frozen in time and 
remain children within the bodies of their adult hosts, and they can be brought out as grown-
ups when their host experiences situations similar to those which first brought them about. 
Sybil’s alters took both forms.  
According to Hacking, Sybil’s case played two key roles in how the category of 
multiple personality was shaped. It promoted the dissemination of those associations to a 
general audience. Sybil’s story has been presented in a best-seller novel written by Flora 
Rheta Schreiber,and a film directed by Daniel Petrie (Petrie 1976). It also established some 
basic knowledge that then became associated with the category. Besides its association with 
sexual childhood abuse, Sybil’s story established multiple personality disorder’s gender-
specificity (i.e., most multiples were female) as well as a general prototype:  
 
[A] middle-class white woman with the values and expectations of her social group. 
She is in her thirties, and she has quite a large number of distinct alters—sixteen, 
say. She spent a large part of her life denying the very existence of these alters. The 
alters include children, persecutors, and helpers, and at least one male alter. She 
was sexually abused on many occasions by a trusted man in her family when she 
was very young. She has suffered many other indignities from people from whom she 
needs love. The needs are, among other things, part of her class values, which may 
be abetted or taken advantage of by her abuser. She has previously been through 
parts of the mental health system and has been diagnosed with many complaints, but 
her treatments have not helped her in the long run until she came to a clinician 
sensitive to multiple personality. She has amnesia for parts of her past. She has the 
experience of “coming to” in a strange situation with no idea of how she got there. 
She is severely depressed and has quite often thought about suicide. (Hacking 
1995a, 33).  
 
All the elements included in this prototype are not to be taken as necessary and sufficient 
conditions of multiplicity; some multiples may exhibit some but not others, and most multiples 
will exhibit many.  
Another key aspect in the stabilization of multiple personality as a kind of person was 
the creation of a language for the describing the signs and experiences of these persons. 
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Once the terminology and associated description of multiple personality were in place, the 
category progressively became standardized among both experts (who studied it) and 
laypeople (who in some way or another are related to the classification, e.g., family, friends). 
The jargon established for the condition—including “switching,” “alter,” “personality fragment,” 
“coming out,” “going to another place,” and even the use of the plurals “we” and “our” as self-
referencing pronouns (i.e., rather than “I”, “my”, or “me”)—was shared by all those versed in 
or affected by it and differed from ordinary uses of these words (Hacking 1995a, 236).  
In addition, the formation of self-help groups, with the help of non-multiple facilitators, 
and the attention they received in the media, particularly television, also greatly contributed to 
the establishment of the short-lived category. Debbie Davis, a multiple and a member of the 
International Society for the Study of Multiple Personality, formed the Multiple Personality 
Consortium in the early 1990s. She organized diverse gatherings where members told their 
stories and participated in activities promoting the emergence of childhood alters.  
Disagreements among the communities of experts and practitioners regarding both 
the definition and characterization of multiple personality soon emerged. The first critique 
reflected a more comprehensive opposition that questioned the very adequacy of psychiatric 
categories. One side of the debate viewed psychiatric categories as collections of symptoms; 
the other side characterized these categories on the basis of necessary and sufficient 
conditions (generally expected to be established in terms of biological causes). In the case of 
multiple personality, this was a debate between people who accepted Hacking’s prototype 
and people who believed that the identification of child abuse was a necessary condition for 
the disorder.27  
                                                            
27 It is worth emphasizing that Hacking himself does not reject underlying biological causal mechanisms. 
Both hypotheses accept the association between child abuse and multiple personality disorder. They 
also accept a putative (unspecified) underlying psychobiological correlate, which is suggested on the 
basis of lab rats exhibiting depletion of important brain neurotransmitters when exposed to repetitive 
electric shocks (i.e., an animal model of trauma). 
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The second type of disagreement was about the characterization of multiple 
personality itself, specifically the description of the alters identified in a multiple. Some 
conceived of them as distinct personalities, in which case one could say that many persons 
inhabit the body of their host; others believed that alters are disconnected fragments of the 
personality of single person, in which case one could say that the self of a single person is 
fragmented. These two contrasting ways of conceiving multiplicity were reflected in both the 
name of and treatment favored for the condition. “Multiple personality disorder” reflected the 
idea that multiple persons inhabited the same body; “identity disassociation disorder” 
emphasized the view that multiplicity was a problem of broken identity rather than 
personhood. Accordingly, when conceived of as multiple personality, the associated 
intervention consisted of facilitating the space for the different alters to come out. Proponents 
of identity dissociation, however, suggested that the host dissolve those fragments by 
integrating them as mere phases of herself.   
These alternative strategies for intervention that Hacking considers were mutually 
exclusive. One encouraged the person identified as a multiple to recognize the different 
personalities within her and relate her experiences to the experiences of the other alters, with 
the ultimate goal of unifying the fragmented experiences. The other promoted the dissolution 
of the alters by denying that their reality and experiences are different from those of the 
multiple herself. The multiple was prohibited from talking about her experiences in the third 
person (i.e., as an alter), and thereby was encouraged to accept the expression of traumatic 
or hard-to-acknowledge experiences as her own.  
The debate over the name was officially resolved with the revision of the category in 
DSM IV, but the debate over the characterization of the condition and its strategies for 
intervention has not yet been resolved. Along these lines, Hacking states:  
The name change, from multiple personality disorder to dissociative identity disorder, 
does matter. A few years ago professionals were advising that one should never, in therapy, 
eliminate a single alter personality, for that would be akin to murder. Now the message is, get 
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rid of the personalities altogether. Dissociation has become the name of the game, of the 
disorder, of the journal, and of the organization (Hacking 1995a, 53).  
The disagreements over multiple personality were not limited to whether it is 
constituted of identity fragments of a single self or of multiple persons inhabiting one body. 
Some other aspects of the characterization, including the most well-established (i.e., its 
association with child abuse and females) were also contested, and some multiples and their 
supporters, such as Debbie Davis’ group, were uneasy with the very characterization of 
multiplicity as a disorder, regardless of how the notion was construed.   
 
2.2. Complementary Notions 
In addition to his case studies, Hacking has introduced a set of philosophically 
relevant notions that clarify his conceptual analysis of categories of people. These notions, 
introduced before Hacking had schematized his MUP project (see Section 3), both enrich and 
constitute a precursor of the proposal. Four are particularly significant: 1) the notion of an 
“action under a description,” which provides a background to the notion of the looping effect; 
2) the notion of “causal knowledge” as it relates to the notion of “prototypes”; 3) the notion of 
an “ecological niche,” which highlights the centrality of context for the analysis of the 
emergence of kinds of people; and 4) the notion of a “transient mental illness,” which 
highlights both the interdependence between knowledge and ontology as well as the 
ontological implications of the fallibility of our knowledge about kinds of people. In this 
section, I make explicit these notions and link them to the analytic framework. 
 
2.2.1. Action Under Description  
Hacking’s analysis of the emergence and decline of multiple personality disorder 
includes theoretical and contextual considerations as well as a phenomenological component 
(i.e., a component concerning the subjective experience of the people diagnosed with MPD). 
It suggests that the knowledge advanced about multiple personality, legitimized in the DSM III 
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and implemented in diverse settings ranging from the medical establishment to the media, 
transformed the ways in which the people who are described as multiples came to see 
themselves as being of a kind. This transformative aspect of the proposal is central to 
Hacking’s view of MUP, particularly as it relates to the role of the looping effect, and it reveals 
the rationale for limiting the application of the looping effect solely to human beings.  
In clarifying the role played by the phenomenological aspect in the looping effect 
characteristic of MUP, Hacking borrows from G.E.M. Anscombe’s characterization of 
“intentional actions” as “actions under a description” (Anscombe 1957). According to 
Anscombe, intentional actions understood as actions under a description are only one of 
three different forms by which intention can be understood (the other two forms are “intention 
to act” and “intention in acting”). Anscombe rejected the view that intentionality can only be 
attributed to an agent if one has access to his mental content, regardless of his actions. 
Rather, she believed that intentional actions answer the question of why in terms of “reason-
giving”—i.e., the agent who performs an intentional act has knowledge of what she is doing 
and has some non-observational causal knowledge of the action she performs.28 For 
example, suppose that an agent “Albert” gives up drinking cow’s milk. In Anscombe’s 
account, such an action is intentional if, when questioned, Albert both knows that he stopped 
drinking milk and has some non-observational, causal knowledge as to why he did so, e.g., 
he realized that he is lactose-intolerant or he disagrees with the mistreatment of cows on 
dairy farms.  
Anscombe acknowledged that there are many instances of non-observational causal 
knowledge that are involuntary (and thus non-intentional), such as “bodily movements like the 
peristaltic movement of the gut” (Anscombe 1957, 8). However, the sort of non-observational 
                                                            
28 Anscombe would have disagreed, for instance, with the view that the only way to attribute the 
intention of, say, improving our skill at playing guitar is by expressing such intentions. Although it is the 
case that some intentions are never realized (e.g., one may never learn to play the guitar, even if one 
has the intention), a great deal of intentions are; the former correspond to what she calls “intention to 
act,” while the latter are identified as “intentional actions” (Anscombe 1957, §4-5).  
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causal knowledge involved in intentional action can be expressed in terms of reason, rather 
than in terms of mere physical evidence. To put it succinctly, neither theoretical nor evidential 
knowledge of an event count as the sort of causal knowledge required for intentional action 
on their own; these bring about intentional actions only in cases where they provide a 
rationale for action, i.e., reason-giving. Thus, Anscombe is able to exclude involuntary events 
such as bodily movements from her definition. This understanding of intentional action as 
action under a description is in agreement with Hacking's use of Goodman's notion of 
relevant kinds in characterizing kinds of people. Like Goodman, Anscombe rejects that there 
is “a fundamental description” that accounts intentional action at a lower level of scientific 
description, such as a complex description of motor control or a molecular description. In her 
view “the only events to consider are intentional actions themselves, and to call an action 
intentional is to say it is intentional under some description that we give (or could give) of it” 
(Anscombe 1957, §19). Just like there is not an essential or fundamental basis for 
classification in Goodman's account, there is no essential or fundamental basis for intentional 
action in Anscombe's account.  
Borrowing from Anscombe’s theory of intentional action, Hacking claims that in order 
for looping to occur, the agents involved must have knowledge of the performed action and 
some non-observational causal knowledge for acting in such a way. As the case of multiple 
personality disorder shows, the formation and legitimization in theory and practice by the 
pertinent experts of a given kind of person help provide the non-observational causal 
knowledge that serves as a rationale for action. If no such description is available, no change 
in the experience of people follows, and no looping takes place. Once the terminology and 
associated description of a given condition are in place, it progressively becomes 
standardized among the experts who study it and the laypeople who relate to the 
classification in some way (e.g., family, friends, patients). The new language introduced with 
the taxonomy of a condition allows the practitioner to identify the condition, the expert to 
study it further, and the people who are diagnosed with the condition to make sense of their 
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experience and act accordingly—even if this is only through the ways in which they are 
treated.29  
 
2.2.2. Causal Knowledge and Prototypes 
In the human sciences, there is a lack of definitive knowledge about kinds of people. 
Despite this, Hacking conceives of such knowledge as causal. Such a view is at odds with 
both the commonsense understanding of causality and a very influential philosophical view 
that conceives of causality in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. Causality, as 
previously noted, is part of a problematic family of terms that have been accounted for in 
terms of each other and which have been contested since at least Hume. Other members of 
this problematic family include kinds, laws of nature, and counterfactuals, as noted in 
Goodman’s Fact, Fiction and Forecast (Goodman 1954). Along with rejecting natural kinds, 
and essential kinds more generally understood in terms of necessary and sufficient 
conditions,30 Hacking also rejects one such view regarding causal knowledge about kinds of 
people. Particularly in chapters 6 and 7 of Rewriting the Soul, Hacking links this rejection to 
the prototype theory of concepts (Lakoff 1987). In this section, I elaborate on the notion of 
causal knowledge regarding kinds of people suggested by Hacking, highlighting the role 
played by prototypes in such a view.     
Hacking uses the case of multiple personality disorder to illustrate his discussion of 
causal knowledge about kinds of people. He begins by presenting a taxonomy of types of 
causal knowledge, highlighting the distinction between a definitional account of causal 
knowledge, which emphasizes necessary and sufficient conditions, and a more relaxed view 
emphasizing prototypes. According to the classical view of the philosophy of science, 
“statements of individual causes are warranted only when there is a general causal statement 
                                                            
29 The knowledge established in a prototype for a given condition provides such knowledge.  
30 Hacking's treatment of natural kinds is found in Hacking (1991d). Although Hacking rejects an 
essentialist treatment of natural kinds, he is more sympathetic to other accounts, remarkably, Richard 
Boyd's view in terms of cluster properties.   
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in the background” (Hacking 1995a, 81). Hempel upheld this view, for example, on the 
elliptical character of causal explanation, which he conceived of as ultimately dependent on 
theoretical explanations (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948).  
In Hempel’s model, the general statements required to account for event causation 
are natural laws, i.e., statements of a general form which are true, universal, and unlimited in 
scope. Hacking roughly agrees with the traditional view in so far as event causation can only 
be understood in terms of some background knowledge of a general sort. But he does not 
believe that general statements required to account for causal knowledge of events (and in 
general) must be conceived of as “strict universals.” He is more sympathetic to (although 
ultimately rejects as inadequate) the view that general background knowledge is a "fairly 
necessary condition" for causal claims (a notion introduced by Hacking). While the strict 
generalizations view holds that “whenever there is an event of kind K, then there results an 
event or condition of kind J,” the fairly necessary conditions view holds that “[w]ithout events 
or conditions of kind K, events or conditions kind J are unlikely to occur” (Hacking 1995a, 82).  
In the history of psychiatry, Hacking observes, the etiology of a condition has often 
been created in the weakest possible way: by calling upon fairly-necessary-conditions. This is 
exemplified by the etiology of multiple personality disorder: “[w]ithout severe and repeated 
childhood trauma, typically of a sexual sort, multiple personality is not likely to appear” 
(Hacking 1995a, 82). The etiology of the fairly-necessary-conditions view of multiple 
personality disorder, understood as a “post-traumatic dissociative disorder of childhood 
onset,” nonetheless has evolved side by side with the very characterization of the condition 
(Hacking 1995a, 82). One must be cautious since the fairly-necessary-conditions view 
suggests that the definition of the condition (i.e., the statement of the fairly-necessary-
conditions view) antecedes the search for a cause; for instance, the characterization of 
multiple personality antecedes the search for its cause  (e.g., childhood trauma). But neither 
a childhood onset nor the presence of trauma is a necessary element in the background 
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generalization. These two items of knowledge, in Hacking’s view, are simply parts of the 
authors’ understanding of multiple personality disorder, or what he identifies as its prototype.  
Hacking believes that the background knowledge required in causal claims is better 
understood as a prototype than as a definition. Not all abused children become multiples, and 
not all multiples have been subjected to child abuse. Nonetheless, the observation that 
“without severe and repeated childhood trauma, typically of a sexual sort, multiple personality 
is not likely to appear” provides crucial knowledge about the condition, which helps experts 
and laypeople to both make sense of and deal with it. In other words, the description 
associated with MPD, conceived of as a prototype, plays a heuristic role for diverse 
purposes, including but not limited to the explanation, prediction, and identification of the 
condition. It provides a reference point, a “best example” against which one may look further 
into practice for subsequent inquiry and intervention. “[I]f you were giving a best example of a 
multiple,” Hacking states, “you would include child abuse as one feature of the example” 
(Hacking 1995a, 83). Prototypes play a causal role by providing a heuristic guide for dealing 
with experience; they allow and facilitate the identification, treatment, and subsequent study 
of kinds of person.  
Hacking has not thoroughly elaborated a view on prototypes and their role; however, 
he does point to the work of at least two philosophers and a linguist—namely, Wittgenstein, 
Putnam, and Lakoff (Wittgenstein 1997, Putnam 1975, and Lakoff 1987). In his book Women, 
Fire and Other Dangerous Things, Lakoff claimed that the prototype effects of concepts are 
best understood in terms of cognitive models. Lakoff contested the folk view of categories, 
according to which concepts are defined in terms of a basic set of common properties (in 
philosophical parlance, necessary and sufficient conditions). Lakoff, in turn, cites 
Wittgenstein, who used the “game” concept to illustrate his theory of family resemblances.  
Wittgenstein argued that the members of many concepts share no set of basic 
properties, but are better understood as resembling each other. This is similar to how 
members of a family resemble each other: although they share some distinctive features 
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across the group (e.g., eye color, hair color, and hair texture), no members have the exact 
same collection of features. Wittgenstein challenges the view that concepts have clear and 
fixed boundaries determining the membership; his view allowed new additions to extend the 
category on the basis of appropriate resemblances. Using games as another example, 
Wittgenstein also showed that while no member of a concept (e.g., a game like chess or 
hide-and-seek) has any logical or epistemological primacy (i.e., all are equally members of 
the category), some members have psychological or pragmatic priority. For example, if 
someone was asked to “show the children a game” and he taught them dice, he might be 
told, “I didn’t mean that sort of game” (Wittgenstein 1953, 1-70, quoted in Lakoff 1987, 17). In 
other words, and in contrast to classical theory, given a context, some members of a class 
are in practice considered as better examples than others. With this, Wittgenstein showed 
against the classical theory that, given a context, some members of a class are in practice 
considered as better examples than others.31 
Hacking's use of prototypes for kinds of people is better understood as “best 
examples.”32 The knowledge contributed by prototypes is causal in the sense that they 
provide the background knowledge upon which experience is organized, thus playing a 
heuristic role for both epistemic and instrumental purposes (e.g., devising strategies for 
intervention, theory articulation). Without them, inquiry into new experience would proceed 
blindly. Prototypes may not provide ultimate knowledge about a kind’s constitution, 
                                                            
31 The Prototype theory calls on the ideas of Lakoff and Zadeh. Lakoff suggests a view held by 
Wittgenstein and Austin that the meaning of a category is not united by a single essential property, but 
that the relationship held between the different senses of a word explains why such a word expresses 
all of its diverse senses. These two roles correspond to what Lakoff calls “metonymy” and “metaphor” in 
his taxonomy of prototypes. In cases of metonymy, there is a central member in the category from 
which other members are extended; “the part stands for the whole,” which he explains using the 
example of the adjective “Healthy”. Zadeh, on the other hand, introduces the idea of “fuzzy sets”. Unlike 
traditional “sets” of which one is either a member or not a member, “fuzzy sets” do not have hard 
boundaries but instead have gradients. An example of this is found in categories like “short” and “tall”, 
where a 6” tall man and a 7” tall man are both in the “tall” category but to varying degrees (Lakoff 1987, 
18-22). 
32 “Just as people, at least those who live in Atlanta or the Bay Area, do not say ‘ostrich’ when wanting 
to mention an example of a bird, so it seems that clinicians do not casually give nonabused patients as 
examples of multiples. Of course ostriches are birds, and known to be so, and there are nonabused 
multiples, but they are not prototypical” (Hacking 1995a, 83). 
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capacities, and properties, but in practice, they are the best guide for organizing, predicting, 
and intervening—all objectives in the traditional pursuit of causal knowledge.   
 
2.2.3. Transient Mental illness and Ecological Niches  
While elaborating on his MUP case studies, Hacking highlights the occurrence of 
diagnosis categories that were in use for a relatively short period of time in the history of 
Psychiatry. Hacking identifies the putative conditions that these categories were intended to 
capture as "transient mental illness".  The conditions captured by such categories were 
considered as mental illness only for a limited period of time, relative to the acceptability of 
the medical taxonomy within which they were conceived. Fugue (or ambulatory automatism), 
multiple personality disorder, and homosexuality, which were considered mental illnesses for 
a brief period of time by the medical establishment, are examples of transient mental 
illnesses. In Hacking's account transient mental illnesses come into being, are sustained, and 
come out of existence within the context of an ecological niche. An “ecological  niche” is a 
concept borrowed from ecology, which situates a specific species within a larger context, 
namely, its ecosystem, taking into account both the species’ habitat and the role that such 
species play within it. Species actively modify their habitats though their interactions and their 
use of resources, evolving side by side with other species and their habitats. The series of 
conditions specified within an ecological niche makes it possible for a species to thrive within 
an ecosystem. Similarly, Hacking argues that a given set of conditions, present at a given 
point in time and society, have allowed for a certain putative mental illnesses to emerge and 
be sustained. Specifying the relevant conditions under which the categories for such 
conditions thrived is tantamount to specifying its “ecological niche.”  
Although the metaphor of an ecological niche clarifies the notion of transient mental 
illness in particular, it also is a valuable image for understanding the emergence and 
persistence of kinds of people in general. It highlights the complexities of the emergence and 
evolution of kinds of people relating both to the distinctive resources and needs of a given 
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society and such characteristics as geographic location, cultural and social history, and 
values. The concept also highlights both the plasticity and instability of kinds of people: when 
a key resource or need within an ecological niche vanishes, the kind of people it sustains also 
becomes extinct. In other words, “[t]he concept of an ecological niche […] reminds us that 
there must be many relevant vectors in play. To postulate a niche for an illness is to make 
two kinds of claim – one positive, one negative. In the presence of the relevant vectors, the 
illness flourishes; in their absence, it does not” (Hacking 1998, 82). Given this fact, 
understanding a given kind of person requires studying the conditions that provide the space 
for this kind of person to emerge—and studying other similar environments in which such a 
kind of person is absent.  
In Mad Travelers (Hacking 1988, 80), Hacking discusses the four “vectors” present in 
an ecological niche: “medical taxonomy, cultural polarity, observability, and release.” In 
mechanics, a vector refers to a force acting in a given direction. In a similar way, Hacking 
conceives of the ecological niche vectors as four forces acting in distinct directions, whose 
sum accounts for the emergence of a kind of person. According to Hacking, “…the metaphor 
[of a vector] has the virtue of suggesting different kinds of phenomena, acting in different 
ways, but whose resultant may be a possible niche in which a mental illness may thrive” 
(Hacking 1998, 82). 
Hacking uses fugue to illustrate the four vectors. Fugue fits within the medical 
taxonomy of hysteria, epilepsy, and a combination of the two. Corresponding to the cultural 
polarity vector, Hacking notes two opposing (French) social phenomena between which 
fuguers were trapped: the popularization of tourism in the middle class, and the increasing 
numbers of criminal vagrancy among the poor. The former was perceived as a positive social 
development, while the latter were perceived as a social threat. Being a fugueur, Hacking 
suggests, “was an option that for the less fortunate lay between affluence and crime” 
(Hacking 1998, 82). The vector of observability was present in France’s surveillance system. 
Primarily intended for detecting deserters and draft dodgers, it also made fugueurs visible, as 
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travelers were systematically scrutinized and required to carry identifying documents. And 
finally, fugue provided release for the tension created by the cultural polarity vector. Tourism 
and vagrancy were the two alternatives open to people wanting to escape their homes. 
French fugueurs could not access these options: tourism was financially out of reach, and 
they rejected vagrancy. In the United States and England, vagrancy was not perceived as a 
social malady to be controlled, tourism had not become trendy among middle-class people, 
and identifying documents were not required for itinerants. Hence, the fugue phenomenon did 
not occur. 
Hacking compares and contrasts his own notion of an ecological niche with 
Foucault’s discursive formations. Both highlight the complexities involved in the emergence of 
a category under which people are conceived as being of a kind. However, Hacking argues 
that Foucault’s notion falls short because it ultimately focuses on language, while his 
(Hacking’s) own analysis also addresses “the larger world of the material existence” that 
people inhabit (Hacking 1998, 85). Foucault himself moved on from his notion of a discursive 
formation to the notion of an “apparatus” in an effort to capture a more heterogeneous picture 
of the analytics of power, one that included both linguistic and non-linguistic elements 
(Foucault 1977b, 198). Foucault’s influence on Hacking is great; however, further comparison 
of their notions of discursiveness and the ecological niche fall beyond the scope of this 
dissertation.  
Hacking uses the metaphor of an ecological niche almost exclusively in Mad 
Travelers, perhaps because the cases of fugue and multiple personality are a better fit, and 
because, since they are matters of the past, they are less controversial than current 
categories. The notion of an ecological niche, nonetheless, provides a tool for the analysis of 
present categories as well, and creates some doubts regarding their permanence. 
Complexity and instability are the two cautionary lessons suggested by the notion of an 
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ecological niche in the analytics of the emergence, thriving, and decline of categories of 
people.33  
 
2.3. Retractions and Revisions: Hacking’s Semantic Resolution to the Problems of 
Kinds  
In this section, I review the central changes in Hacking’s terminology. On the basis of 
this exposition, I provide an interpretation of a polemic passage that has been targeted by 
some of Hacking’s critics.  
The most well known account of Hacking’s philosophical proposal of the classification 
of people is found in his discussion of psychiatric categories presented in The Social 
Construction of What? (Hacking 1999). Although Hacking has retracted some of these 
notions, reviewing his original position is worthwhile for several reasons. First and foremost, 
Hacking’s statement of retraction provides a better understanding of the philosophical 
commitments contained in his original terminology. Second, despite the fact that some of the 
criticism of Hacking reflects a limited reading of his work, it nonetheless motivated Hacking to 
abandon his original terminology. Third, accounting for these changes provides a more 
comprehensive understanding of Hacking’s MUP project, particularly as it relates to the 
traditional debates between scientific realism and social constructivism emerging in the 
philosophy of psychiatry. Fourth, it provides some insight into the open paths for the further 
development of the ideas presented by Hacking.  
                                                            
33 The notion of transient mental illness could be understood as a special case of kinds of people. 
Hacking uses the notion of ecological niches to account for what makes possible short lived categories 
of mental illness to come in and out of existence. Hacking's "four vectors" of an ecological niche as a 
tool of conceptual analysis and his "five-vector" framework for the analysis of kinds of people suggests 
an overlap with his account of kinds of people more generally. Perhaps the four vectors noted in relation 
to the ecological niches in which mental illness thrive were a precursor of the more robust 5-vector 
analytic framework of kinds of people. In contrast to the notion of ecological niches, the 5-vector 
framework could account for the legitimacy of categories. Furthermore, the notion of kinds of people 
does not imply that all kinds of people are transient. For instance, the case of schizophrenia may be 
understood as a kind of person, but not as a case of transient mental illness (at least not yet). This last 
point may be subject to further discussion in relation to the implications of the notion of looping effect 
concerning conceptual change. In the last chapter I discuss the extent to which Hacking's account of 
kinds of people in terms of looping effects imply a substantive conceptual and ontological change 
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In an influential passage in The Social Construction of What?, Hacking presents a 
“semantic resolution” of the debate between scientific realism and social constructivism as 
related to categories of mental illness. With this resolution, Hacking calls attention to what he 
considers a richer and more philosophically relevant analysis of the dynamics of MUP, which 
he had been elaborating ever since the early 1980s. Although Hacking has abandoned the 
nosology used at the time, this passage on the semantic resolution has inspired some of the 
most insightful criticisms of Hacking’s account of kinds of people.34  
Hacking frames his intended semantic resolution between scientific realism and 
social constructivism in terms of the nosology of human kinds, interactive kinds, and 
indifferent kinds. The dilemma, so understood, emerges from the contrast between interactive 
and indifferent kinds, and the recognition of some human kinds as comprising both an 
interactive and an indifferent kind. Hacking resolves the dilemma by showing how some 
human kinds—childhood autism, for example—can be adequately characterized as both 
indifferent and interactive, without falling into a contradiction:  
 
Suppose that childhood autism is at bottom a biological pathology P, namely what 
has traditionally been called a “natural” kind and what I here call an indifferent kind. 
What then happens to the claim that childhood autism is an interactive kind? […] 
Here we want to say both that childhood autism is (is identical to) a certain biological 
pathology P, and so is a “natural” kind or an indifferent kind. At the same time, we 
want to say that childhood autism is an interactive kind, interacting with autistic 
children, evolving and changing as the children change. (Hacking 1999, 119)  
 
The apparent contradiction can be stated as follows: if X (e.g., childhood autism) is a brain 
pathology, then it is an indifferent kind (i.e., a brain pathology does not fit the criteria for 
interactive kinds). However, X (e.g., again, childhood autism) arguably is an interactive kind 
(i.e., the category and the set of objects it describes interact in the manner specified in the 
previous section on interactive kinds). Therefore, how can X (e.g., childhood autism) be both 
                                                            
34 For instance, Cooper 2004, Murphy 2001, and, in a more attenuated way, Tsou 2007.  
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an indifferent kind (exhibiting no interaction) and an interactive kind (exhibiting interaction)? 
How can it interact and not interact at the same time? 
Hacking borrows from Hilary Putnam’s semantic views on meaning and reference to 
answer this dilemma. In "The Meaning of 'Meaning'" (Putnam 1975, 269). Putnam asserted 
that the meaning of a particular term is better understood in terms of a “normal form 
description” consisting of a “finite sequence,” or “meaning vector,” among whose components 
are syntactic and semantic markers (e.g., “noun” and “animal,” respectively) as well as the 
description of its prototypical features (i.e., a stereotype) and its extension.35 Putnam 
defended a realist view in which both the real world and society play an indispensable role in 
the determining the meaning of a word. Putnam’s realistic account of meaning determination 
was characterized by two general positions, (i) the indexicality of terms (in particular, natural 
kind terms, e.g., ‘water, ‘tiger’ and ‘lemon’), and (ii) the hypothesis of the “social division of 
linguistic labor.” Both are central to Putnam’s view of meaning as a vector. Both aspects 
support each other.36 
In his famous Twin Earth argument, Putnam presented two notions: (i) that the 
meaning of a term (understood as intension) does not determine its extension, and (ii) that 
the actual stuff which one intends to refer to with a term is indispensable to the determination 
of meaning. Terms like “water’” (i.e., natural kinds terms) are better understood if they are 
                                                            
35 He opposed what he called “traditional theory” (TT), which combined two views: that the (i) meaning 
(understood as intension) determines the extension of a term, and that the (ii) meaning (understood as 
intension) is determined by the psychological state of an individual. Rejecting the traditional 
psychologism suggested in the second point. Putnam claimed that the meaning of a term is not 
determined by a psychological state (i.e., the concept of a term, which is known by competent 
speakers)—that “meanings ain’t in the head”—and made room for an alternative account of meaning 
(more generally speaking, of the concept of a term). 
36 Putnam’s position on this was very close to Saul Kripke’s, who claimed that names, in contrast to 
descriptions, are better conceived of as rigid designators which designate the same object in all 
possible worlds, i.e., “a possible state (or history of the world)” or “counterfactual situation”  (Kripke 
1980, 16). For example, “Aristotle” (i.e., a name), in contrast to “the last great philosopher of antiquity” 
(i.e., a description), is a rigid designator; that is, it picks out the same thing in all possible worlds. 
Aristotle could have not been “the last great philosopher of antiquity,” but he would still have been 
"Aristotle," the person designated by such name (Kripke 1980, 16). Putnam extended the treatment of 
proper names as rigid designators to the case of natural kind terms. So Putnam states: “Kripke's 
doctrine that natural-kind words are rigid designators and our doctrine that they are indexical are but 
two ways of making the same point” (Putnam 1975, 234). Hacking notes, however, that how their views 
were distinct in important ways (Hacking 2007d). 
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treated as having “an unnoticed indexical component,” just as other clearly indexical terms, 
such as proper names and personal pronouns, do (e.g., “Oscar,” “Aristotle,” “I”, “he”). 
In addition to defending the indexicality of terms, Putnam also opposed the traditional 
view of meaning with “the hypothesis of the universality of the division of linguistic labor,” 
according to which the meaning of a term is not exhausted by the cognitive state of a single 
individual but rather extends to a larger “semantic” community. He captured the basic idea in 
the following metaphor: "[T]here are two sorts of  tools in the world: there are tools like a 
hammer or a screwdriver which can be used by one person; and there are tools like a 
steamship which require the cooperative activity of a number of persons to use. Words have 
been thought of too much on the model of the first sort of tool" (Putnam 1975, 229).  
Putnam urged us to think of words as steamships, “tools” requiring the cooperation of 
a diverse number of persons in order to be “used.” He offered the term “gold” as an example. 
If the linguistic community is a “factory,” different individuals have different jobs concerning 
gold: for instance, some buy it and wear it as wedding rings, others sell it for the production of 
wedding rings, others determine whether or not a wedding ring is truly made out of gold, 
others sell wedding rings, etc. Each of these individuals do not have to perform each of these 
activities, including determining whether or not a given ring is made of real gold or not. In fact, 
it is not uncommon that those who buy rings are unable to tell for themselves whether a given 
ring is made of gold; they instead rely on an expert who can do so for them.37  
                                                            
37 Along these lines, Putnam put forward his hypothesis of the universality of the division of linguistic 
labor: "Every linguistic community exemplifies the sort of division of linguistic labor just described: that 
is, possesses at least some terms whose associated 'criteria' are known only to a subset of the 
speakers who acquire the terms, and whose use by the other speakers depends upon a structured 
cooperation between them and the speakers in the relevant subsets" (Putnam 1975, 228). In other 
words, in a given linguistic community, as the division of linguistic labor associated with a given term 
becomes more complex and specialized, fewer speakers who have acquired the term (i.e., some aspect 
of the meaning of the term) also know the method for fixating its extension. However, they would know 
those aspects of the meaning that are relevant to them. Therefore, “it is only the sociolinguistic state of 
the collective linguistic body to which the speaker belongs that fixes the extension” (Putnam 1975, 229). 
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Putnam envisioned the determination of a term’s meaning as a vector, integrating the 
diverse aspects contributed by different subgroups of the linguistic community.38  Such a 
meaning vector would formally include syntactic and semantic markers (e.g., “noun” and 
“animal,” respectively), and the description of its prototypical features (i.e., a stereotype)39 as 
well as its extension (according to the thesis of the indexicality of terms) (Putnam 1975, 269). 
In a sense, the world itself, at the most basic level currently known, must be included in the 
meaning vector of a given term, as well as all of the objects which have the appropriate 
similarity relation to it (i.e., all of the Xs that are known to possess the same “hidden 
structure,” in case the knowledge of such structure is available to a subset of experts within 
the linguistic community). Thus Putnam concluded:  
 
[T]he grotesquely mistaken views of language which are and always have been 
current reflect two specific and very central philosophical tendencies: the tendency to 
treat cognition as a purely individual matter and the tendency to ignore the world […] 
Ignoring the division of linguistic labor is ignoring the social dimension of cognition; 
ignoring what we have called the indexicality of most words is ignoring the 
contribution of the environment. Traditional philosophy of language, like much 
traditional philosophy, leaves out other people and the world; a better philosophy and 
a better science of language must encompass both. (Putnam 1975, 270)  
 
Putnam’s view of meaning as a vector was an attempt to bring together the contributions of 
both the social world and the world itself in the determination of the meaning of general 
                                                            
38 According to Putnam, this sort of mundane division of labor also involves a “division of linguistic 
labor.” Although all of the features generally thought to be associated with a term such as gold “are 
present in the linguistic community considered as a collective body,” and although “everyone to whom 
gold is important for any reason has to acquire the word ‘gold,’” not everybody has to acquire the 
method of recognizing gold. Instead, the linguistic community “divides the ‘labor’ of knowing and 
employing the various aspects of the ‘meaning’” of the term (Putnam 1975, 227-228). This division of 
linguistic labor increases as a result of scientific development. This is exhibited in the example of 
“water,” which required no great division prior to 1750, i.e., before its molecular structure was known. 
Although most speakers in our linguistic community would know the necessary and sufficient condition 
of water, namely, H20, not all of those speakers would be able to distinguish water from other liquids 
with a similar appearance.  
39 Instead, all competent speakers in a linguistic community would be able to associate a given term 
with a stereotype, a conventional idea about how an X looks and behaves. The ideas associated with 
stereotypes need not be, and often times are not, completely accurate. A stereotype merely indicates 
the features that a “normal” individual of the class would exhibit, according to a linguistic community (or 
a subset of a linguistic community, in which case one could say that there may be alternative 
stereotypes of an X). 
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terms, and natural-kind terms more specifically. The first of these contributions is provided by 
the linguistic community as a whole, and the second by the hidden structure shared by the 
set of objects of a class, when the knowledge of such a kind is available. Thus, Putnam also 
intended to reconcile the two contrasting intuitions underpinning the debate between social 
constructivism and scientific realism: he acknowledged the contribution of the linguistic 
community at large, and at the same time, he stresses the indispensable role played by the 
actual thing as it gets to be known at its most fundamental levels. This is precisely what 
Hacking finds appealing in Putnam’s semantic account, and what he borrows for his own 
intended semantic resolution.  
Hacking points out two multi-layered dimensions that play a part in the formation of a 
given class of person: the descriptions associated with the class (including a stereotype), and 
its intended extension. In the case of a class of people, this is constituted by both the flesh-
and-blood set of people so classified, as well as by the “hidden structure” presumably shared 
by all individuals (if the knowledge of one such “hidden structure” is known by the appropriate 
subset of experts belonging to the pertinent linguistic community) (Hacking 1999,120). That is 
what would amount to a Putnamian description of the class and its extension.  
Hacking uses a Putnam-style framework to shift his own analytical focus from 
semantics to the dynamics between the distinct dimensions involved in the determination and 
transformation of a given class. This also captures an idea suggested by the notion of the 
looping effect. Along those lines, Hacking states:    
 
[W]e have several values for the X in the social construction of X = childhood autism: 
(a) the idea of childhood autism, and what that involves; (b) autistic children, actual 
human beings, whose way of being is in part constructed. But not (c) the 
neuropathology P, which, ex hypothesis, we are treating as an indifferent kind, and 
which Putnam would call a natural kind. […] For us, the interest would be not in the 
semantics but in the dynamics. How would the discovery of P affect how autistic 
children and their families conceive of themselves; how would it affect their behavior? 
Which children, formerly classified as autistic, would now be excluded, and what 
would that do to them? (Hacking 1999, 121)  
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Hacking now says that when it comes to the classes of people formed on the basis of 
psychiatric conditions, a brain pathology known to the community of experts would serve to 
fix the reference of the class (given a concrete case, the classification would pick out the 
hidden structure of the class; i.e., the thing itself, not just the description). This does not, 
however, override other aspects contributed by other members of the linguistic community 
(e.g., other experts, practitioners, caregivers, the people so classified, their families). 
Moreover, as suggested in the hypothesis of the universality of the division of linguistic labor, 
the knowledge of the hidden essence of a class, even if available at a given time, might be 
known only to a small subset of the whole linguistic community. After all, not all of the 
members of a linguistic community need to know every single bit of information about a class; 
only those to whom the knowledge is relevant to the job they have to perform in the “social 
fabric” of an X (i.e., a class of people).  
 A Putnam-style view of meaning plays two roles in Hacking’s “semantic resolution” 
between social constructivism and scientific realism in the context of the classification of 
people on the basis of mental illness. First, the inclusion of the reference of a kind-term in the 
determination of its meaning is explicitly suggested in Hacking’s discussion. This captures his 
basic intuition that there is a role to be played by the world itself in the constitution of a kind. 
There is something real in the world that makes an X be what it is and excludes other things 
or peoples. This is a realist commitment.  
Second, just as Putnam rejected a definitional approach for the determination of the 
meaning of kind-terms and introduces and gives support to a notion of stereotypes, so 
Hacking welcomes the notion of stereotypes in his own treatment of the descriptions 
associated with mental conditions. A given stereotype of an X belongs to either a linguistic 
community as a whole or to a specific subset. At a given point in time, distinct stereotypes 
can be in use in distinct subsets of the linguistic community. The knowledge of a given 
stereotype indicates the minimum knowledge required for linguistic competence within a 
linguistic community or one of its subsets. The knowledge of the “hidden structure” of a class 
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may or may not be, at a given time in history, a part of its stereotype; alternatively, when 
available, the knowledge of such a “hidden structure” may appear in the stereotype of a given 
subset of the linguistic community and not in the stereotype of another subset. Stereotypes 
lay down the common lore of a linguistic community (or one of its subsets): they contribute to 
the social aspect (or social constructivist aspect) of the account.  
Moreover, a version of a causal theory of reference influences Hacking’s views on 
ontology, as suggested in the pragmatic realism of his interventionist philosophy of science, 
as well as in his views on “historical ontology.” Hacking’s focus is, however, on the dialectics 
of the two elements: the realist and the social constructivists elements—namely, the finding 
of neuropathology for a given condition or class—and the ways in which such knowledge 
impacts the experiences, behaviors, treatment, and the rest of knowledge about the people 
so classified. He concentrates on the “dynamics” between the different actors and the 
“semantic” levels involved in the delineation of a “human kind,” or class of people. Putnam’s 
semantics serves Hacking insofar as they bring together two more general dimensions that 
constitute a kind: a set of associated description(s) of the class, and the class’s putative 
extension (the aggregate of individual people, their behaviors, and experiences, as well as 
their brain pathology).  
The language Hacking used to formulate the initial version of his analytic and “partial 
framework” for the analysis of MUP also suggests the influence of Putnam’s theory of 
meaning (Hacking 1986). This initial formulation consisted of two vectors: the “labeling from 
above, from a community of experts who create a reality that some people make their own,” 
and the bottom-up reception and reaction of that labeling, as exhibited in people’s 
“autonomous behavior [...] which presses from below, creating a reality every expert must 
face” (Hacking 1986, 111). The idea of “vectors” still shapes Hacking’s most recent 
reformulation of his account of kinds of people (Hacking 2007a), although he has increased 
the number of vectors from two to five.  
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Hacking’s case studies illustrate the different ways science has provided the space 
for thinking about certain “conditions” (like MPD or fugue) as types of persons. Scientific 
discourses contribute to such transformations in a variety of ways; the looping effect also 
takes place in a variety of ways. In each case, however, it is clear that through its 
implementation in diverse social institutions, scientific discourse transforms the views of 
those classified as being of a certain kind, and also the ways in which they are treated under 
such presuppositions. In some cases, the people classified reclaim the category and 
transform its very meaning. Fugue and MPD further enrich our understanding of the 
philosophical implications of Hacking’s MUP project.  
My analysis of MUP also shows how the classifications crafted within the sciences 
interact with the people they classify through a diversity of social institutions, how the people 
they classify benefit or are damaged by them, and how, in response, these people resist or 
appropriate them to their own benefit. This back and forth between classifications and the 
people they classify is rooted in our social life, and yet its implications go beyond the social. It 
has to do not only with the way in which we see other fellow human beings and our own 
selves, but also with what types of human beings we believe or assume there are. The 
implications are both epistemic and ontological. The scientific status of categories of people 
does not merely add to them the cachet associated with the scientific enterprises, but 
dissects human beings into “real types.”  
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Chapter 3 
The Styles of Scientific Reasoning 
Parallel to the philosophical project of MUP, Hacking develops his Styles Project. A 
complementary reading of both projects suggests some interesting overlaps, and perhaps 
even a comprehensive philosophical background for MUP. Hacking analyzes traditional 
problems within the philosophy of science, such as truth, reason, and scientific ontology, 
approaching them from an original philosophical framework of scientific styles.40 In this 
chapter I review Hacking's styles project and its philosophical background. After laying down 
the basic philosophical underpinnings of the styles project, I offer a brief account of the 
origins of each of the styles and their criteria of validity, followed by a discussion of the two 
key notions: the self-authentication, and the techniques of stabilization of the styles. I 
subsequently discuss the ontological import of the styles and conclude the chapter by relating 
the Styles and MUP projects.      
Building on the work of A. Crombie, an historian of science, Hacking identifies a set 
of six styles of scientific thinking and doing and turns them into a unit of philosophical 
analysis of the sciences. Hacking argues that these six styles are grounded in the actual 
development of scientific practices, as shown in the historical records of the cultural milieu 
within which scientific research is produced, and the cognitive capacities of the peoples who 
have contributed to its development. Despite traditional divisions (e.g. natural sciences vs. 
                                                            
40 By using these styles, Hacking contributes an alternative unit for the philosophical analysis of the 
sciences. Other units used in the philosophical literature include scientific theories, hypothesis and laws 
(logical empiricism, e.g., Nagel 1961; Hempel 1965), models (Cartwright 1983; Morgan and Morrison 
1999; da Costa and French 2000; Giere 2010), research programmes (Lakatos 1978), mechanisms 
(Glennan 1996; Machamer, Darden and Craver 2000; Craver 2007), scientific traditions (Laudan 1977), 
comprehensive theories (Feyerabend 1974 and 1981), and famously, scientific paradigms (Kuhn 1962). 
It is worth nothing, however, that Hacking does not intend the styles as criteria for demarcating between 
science and non-science. Rather he abstracts the styles from what are arguably well-established 
sciences. Hacking is not particularly concerned with distinguishing between science from non-science, 
but accounting for the rationalities at play in works that are generally acknowledged as scientific. His 
point of departure is a well-established history of the sciences in the Western Tradition (Crombie 1994) 
Additionally, Hacking's appeal to emblematic figures to exemplify each style of reasoning, also play a 
key role for supporting his account of the styles. In subsequent pages I elaborate on these legendary 
figures.  
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social sciences, exact sciences vs. inexact sciences, etc.), Hacking argues that the styles of 
scientific thinking and doing can be—and, in fact, are—used across scientific disciplines. His 
styles project offers a comprehensive view of the sciences, which fall within the general 
philosophy of the sciences.    
Hacking began his Styles Project at least three decades ago, and to date, it is still 
under development. The most complete versions of the proposal were published in 2009 and 
in 2012, and even in these articles, only half of what Hacking has projected is presented in 
any detail. Over the years, the proposal has undergone changes in terminology, described by 
Kusch and Hacking (Kusch 2010 and Hacking 2012). One of these changes is reflected in the 
alternative name for the project: “Styles of Scientific Reasoning and Doing” has been 
replaced by “Styles of Scientific Thinking and Doing.” Hacking has cycled between each 
name in an attempt to capture their distinct aspects. “Reasoning” captures the traditional 
philosophical theme of scientific reason, which allows Hacking to forward a novel perspective 
on the basis of “cognitive history.” “Thinking” is a more comprehensive notion; however, it 
could suggest that only cognitive operations, of a mental order, are involved. Hacking adds 
“and doing” to the label in order to emphasize the practical aspect of his analysis. Moreover, 
Hacking has expressed ambivalence about the very notion of “style” (Hacking 1992d). 
because of its connotations. Consequently, he has considered “Ways of Thinking” and “Ways 
of Finding Out and Doing” as alternative descriptions for his project. Despite the variability in 
its terminology, most of the items that appeared in the first formulation of the project are still 
present in its current incarnation.41  
 
 
                                                            
41 Although Hacking has only published about half of his projections to date, he has laid out the 
complete picture schematically and has made some advances on the second part of the project. The 
following presentation of Hacking’s styles project is based on its latest formulations (Hacking 2009 and 
2012), as well as a two-part seminar on the styles offered by Hacking at the UCSC Philosophy 
Department in Winter 2007 and Winter 2009.  
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3.1. Background 
Hacking builds on the work of historian of science A. Crombie and philosopher 
Bernard Williams in articulating the philosophical framework of his styles project. In particular, 
he uses Crombie’s analytic structure and Williams’ basic philosophical notions as points of 
departure.   
Hacking adopts Crombie’s six styles, laid out in Styles of Scientific Thinking in the 
European Tradition (Crombie 1994), in his own project. Crombie’s styles, (i) mathematical, (ii) 
hypothetical, (iii) experimental, (iv) taxonomic, (v) statistic, and (vi) historico-genetic (clarified 
below), give Hacking “a new vision of truth and reason” (Hacking 2009a, 7); he identifies 
Crombie’s template as a useful “starter kit” to “rethink the entire structure of scientific 
reasoning” from a “Leibnizian” and “anthropological” point of view. By this Hacking 
understands “a study of the human species, its innate powers and its current practices” (i.e., 
its anthropological component), while endorsing a “strong conviction about reason” (i.e., its 
Leibnizian component) (Hacking 2009, 13 and Hacking 2012, 605). At odds with orthodox 
philosophy of science, Hacking’s project doesn’t target the “products” of science per se (e.g., 
discoveries, theories, models, mechanisms). Rather, it provides an account of how the 
human species has managed “to find out” (Hacking 2009, 4).  
Another potential description for Hacking’s styles project might be “A Logic of 
Scientific Discovery”—except that the “logic” or “rationality” of scientific discovery that the 
project targets is understood in a comprehensive and unprecedented manner. Although he 
acknowledges that diverse cognitive abilities and sociohistorical pathways have made it 
possible to get to know what we do, Hacking contends that cognition and culture provide the 
analytic space for the logic of discovery (Hacking 2009, 5). These two dimensions 
traditionally have been thought of as being in tension: on the one extreme, cognition suggests 
biological underpinnings (e.g., innate capacities passed on evolutionarily), and on the other 
extreme, culture suggests very localized communities working together to study a given 
phenomenon (e.g., Fleck’s “thought collectives”; Fleck 1979). Hacking attempts to integrate 
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both aspects into a background for his styles. They are grounded in human cognitive 
capacities, which are developed evolutionarily; they require a specific sociohistorical context, 
in the absence of which they would not emerge (i.e., despite the potential for such cognitive 
capacities to be evolved and actualized).   
Over the years, Hacking has presented the styles alternatively as a “sensible list of 
modes of investigation” and as “genre[s] of scientific inquiry or investigation” (Hacking 2012).  
He emphatically rejects the identification of the styles with either methodologies or scientific 
disciplines; diverse scientific disciplines use a single style while at the same time 
implementing diverse methodologies. Although Hacking does not offer a criteria for 
distinguishing styles from methodologies, he does suggest looking at their number: whereas 
there are innumerable varieties of methods within the sciences, and many of these can be 
used within a single scientific discipline, the number of styles is limited to the six considered 
in the template (and their combinations). Although it is possible to do so in principle, a 
scientific discipline rarely makes use of two or more styles.42  
Like Crombie, Hacking characterizes a style of scientific thinking in terms of two 
components: (i) the type of objects of its inquiry (an ontological component) and (ii) its 
method of reasoning (an epistemic component). The styles of scientific reasoning establish 
both a way of thinking about and approaching phenomena, as well as a model for its 
justification. They envision a domain of phenomena that organizes experience in a certain 
manner, particularly as it concerns the individuation of phenomena into kind of entities. The 
styles of scientific reasoning introduce the kind of objects that they are concerned with (e.g., 
abstract numbers, such as numbers and classes, by the mathematical style; species and 
genera by the taxonomic style; non-observable or theoretical entities by the hypothetical 
                                                            
42 For example, hypothetical modeling is equally important for sciences as different as astronomy, 
psychiatry, cognitive sciences, and economics. A single science such as Psychiatry makes use of the 
hypothetical modeling, experimental, statistical and taxonomic styles. These are distinct to the myriad of 
research methods that are also used within Psychiatry, to mention some, such as clinical trails, rating 
scales, surveys, interviews, inventories and other qualitative approaches. 
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modeling) (Hacking 2012, 601). The styles also introduce the types of sentences that 
describe knowledge claims about the entities with which they are concerned. This aspect of 
the styles resembles formal languages, which specify the vocabulary and rules for the 
formulation of their well-formed-sentences. The only sentences that are candidates for a 
truth-value (or validity) are those that follow the schema established by a style and that refer 
to the type of entities they introduced.  
The styles do not help find “the truth,” but they define what is going to count as such: 
proofs in mathematics, the creation and manipulation of phenomena in experimental inquiry, 
the representation of aspects of nature through theoretical models, the analysis of data and 
their generalization through statistical and probabilistic equations, and the principles for the 
hierarchical classification of living things. The sentences produced within a given style can 
only be evaluated using the terms established for that style—just as a statistical claim cannot 
be judged on the same grounds as a mathematical proof, even though it may make use of 
mathematical language. In Hacking’s view, the methods of reasoning and the kinds of 
scientific objects of a given style come into being hand in hand. This does not imply that the 
styles emerge prior to the introduction of their methods of reasoning and their objects of 
inquiry; and yet, these constitute the styles.   
Crombie conceived of the history of the sciences as a continuous series of events 
developing during long periods of time that brought about slow and gradual transformations. 
For example, Crombie argued that the Scientific Revolution was not an isolated or even 
identifiable occurrence. Instead, he claimed that what occurred in seventeenth-century 
Europe represented the culmination of a series of events traceable back to the ancient 
Mediterranean world, which began to prosper by the twelfth century (Hacking 2009a). The 
long duré contests other philosophical views of the history of the sciences as characterized 
by profound conceptual breaks. Hacking integrates Crombie’s long duré with the Kuhn’s 
revolutionarianism, and claims that a gradual and continuous progression in the history of the 
sciences is marked by certain events at certain points in time which bring into being new 
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ways of thinking and doing. Such punctuations mark the origins of a new style of scientific 
thinking and doing.43 The styles do not originate from a vacuum, but through the slow and 
long development of ideas and epistemic resources, and the mastery of a way of thinking and 
doing about a domain of knowledge that proves to be better suited to deal with problems and 
advance solutions to questions.  
Employing an historical framework, Hacking introduces a set of notions, 
crystallization and trailblazers, to account for the emergence of styles. Crystallization is a 
metaphoric notion that highlights the transformation of a pre-existent set of practices, which 
at a certain point in time acquire a form of their own. Just as water freezes at zero Celsius 
degrees, a style “solidifies” as its use extends through time and space. Each style is 
associated to an emblematic figure or trailblazer, who is in time recognized as a scientific 
legend and exemplifies in a prototypical manner the use of its associated style.  
Hacking identifies crystallizations in the history of the development of each style (with 
the exception of the historico-genetic style), whose origins are represented by a legendary 
founding figure (and event). Thales was the trailblazer for the mathematical style; Boyle for 
experimental exploration; Galileo for hypothetical modeling; Pascal for statistics; Linneaus for 
the taxonomic style; and Darwin for the historico-genetic. Unlike the chemical crystallization 
metaphor may suggest,44 the crystallization of a style is irreversible. However, when a style 
emerges from a variety of scientific practices, these practices begin to be seen from within 
the framework provided by the style. A style cannot go back to being the collection of 
practices that gave rise to it.  
                                                            
43 Lakatos's "research programmes" are also a good point of reference for the time frame of the styles. 
A research programme for Lakatos could last centuries, and their development is better understood by 
its sequence of theories, some of which constitute the indispensible hard core of the programme, 
alongside a dispensable belt of protective auxiliary hypotheses (Lakatos 1970). However, Hacking 
integrates slow gradualism (e.g., Crombie's and Lakatos' timeframes) with a revolutionarianism (e.g., 
Kuhn's and Feyerabend's). 
44 “When water freezes, it becomes a completely new substance, ice” (Hacking 2009)—but it still can 
turn back to its liquid form, given the appropriate temperature. 
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Trailblazers do not accurately capture a historical event or even a person, but identify 
a mythical founding figure associated with the inauguration of a style. Scientific folklore 
recognizes such legendary figures from very early on in the emergence of the style, and in 
turn, they establish and foster the style by using it in an exemplary manner. Although they 
may have historical value in their own right, according to Hacking, the accuracy of their 
historical character is not their primary value to the style. Trailblazers do not necessarily 
correspond to real characters, but the legends around them make them into symbols of the 
style. They do not become symbols because of the style; they are already legends 
recognized by scientific folklore, who give a “face” to the styles.   
To further characterize the styles of scientific reasoning, Hacking borrows two 
aspects from Bernard Williams’ Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy (Williams 
2004), the distinction between truth and truthfulness, and a general schema establishing how 
a statement can be true at a given point in history. Williams intended to provide an account of 
the historicity of truth. Although he did not believe that truth is an historically contingent 
concept, at the same time, he acknowledged that what counts as truth depends to some 
extent on what is logically, epistemologically, and technologically accessible at a given point 
in time. Hacking has incorporated William's insights on truth and truthfulness into his own 
project, in elaborating his account of the historical origins of the styles and the introduction a 
criterion to determine the truth-value of the statements associated with them. By adapting 
Williams’ views on truth and truthfulness, Hacking can show the extent to which the styles 
imply a historically contingent view of truth, how truth is style-dependent, and how these 
two—historical contingency and style relativity—do not imply rampant relativism.45 
Take, for example, the following statement about the constitution of airplanes: “When 
the aircraft travels forward, air flows over the wings which are shaped to create lift.”46 If it had 
been articulated in 1650, such a statement could not have been true or false; in fact, it could 
                                                            
45 A brief discussion on the styles and relativism is offered by the end of section 3.3.1. 
46 "Airplane", Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airplane, accessed September 16, 2016.  
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not have even been formulated since no airplane existed at that time. Today, in the year 
2017, it is a true statement. Such a statement can now be determined as true or false 
because of the fact that airplanes have been created and knowledge about them has been 
established; that is, the conditions for that statement to be true or false have been in place 
since the early 1900s. Williams and Hacking would note, nonetheless, that the truth of this 
claim does not have a history; the statement is true in an important sense because there 
exists in the world a kind of object about which these statements are true or false.  If the 
same conditions allowing airplanes to come into being had been in place in the 1650s, the 
statement would have been equally true then. Moreover, if this statement is actually true 
today—that it is not mistakenly believed to be true—Williams and Hacking agree that it will 
continue to be true in the future.  
In a sense, the truth of such a statement is “eternal.” However, this does not negate 
the fact that the claim made by the sentence is embedded within an historical time. Although 
the “eternal” sense of truth, i.e., its sentential concept, has no history: <<“X” is true iff X>>, 
this schematic view is semantically empty. For sentences like the one about airplanes to be 
true or false, the conditions (social, epistemic, technological, etc.) and the criteria for 
determining its truth-value have to be available. The eternalist schema of truth is not sufficient 
to account for its truth-value. According to Williams, truth has no history and thus no 
genealogy, but truth-telling (i.e., truthfulness) does. Hacking borrows this distinction from 
Williams, presenting his styles as criteria for determining which statements are candidates for 
truth-value and what it is that makes them true (or false). This task reflects what he refers to 
as truthfulness. Moreover, when it comes to the history of the sciences, Hacking believes that 
there is no single genealogy of truthfulness, but rather a variety concerning different domains 
and standards. 
Williams influenced Hacking’s analysis of the genealogy of truthfulness as it concerns 
the past and the self in two significant ways. First, he observed that the possibility to tell the 
truth about the past is historically grounded. In other words, the origins of objectivity as it 
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concerns the knowledge of the past has a genealogy. Following Williams, Hacking 
distinguishes between truth and truthfulness to get around the divide between the “timeless 
facts” view of truth and the view that rejects the existence of objectivity (i.e., an unbiased, 
interest-free achievement). This corresponds to the divide between scientific realism and anti-
realist social constructivism in the philosophy of the sciences. The Styles Project provides an 
account of the genealogy of the styles of scientific reasoning, which presumably establish the 
criteria of objectivity associated with their domain. Hacking accepts that truth is timeless, but 
switches his analytic focus to studying truthfulness in the sciences.  
Second, Williams laid out a schema for characterizing what it means to be truthful. 
Hacking uses this framework to locate two independent aspects of truthfulness: accuracy and 
sincerity. A truthful person possesses both features. A genealogy of truthfulness in a given 
domain ideally includes an account of both aspects, although the sciences prioritizes the 
former and generally does not take the second into account explicitly. These two have been 
synchronized or desynchronized at different points in the development of the sciences. 
 
3.2. The historical emergence of the styles 
Borrowing from Williams’ account, Hacking characterizes the origins of the six styles of 
scientific reasoning as historical occurrences corresponding to a shift in the conception of 
what it means to tell the truth about the objects of study within a given domain of experience. 
The introduction of objects of knowledge and criteria of validity for telling the truth about them 
by the styles transforms experience itself and brings about an increase in understanding and 
explanatory power. In brief, the origins of each of the styles as proposed in Hacking's account 
is as follows. The origin of the mathematical style is marked by the development of 
diagrammatic proofs of geometrical relations in Greece, in the sixth century BCE. In the 
seventeenth century, the hypothetical modeling style introduces hypothetical models to tell 
the truth about nature, and the experimental style introduces the use of experiment and 
theoretical or non-observational objects. The statistical style introduces first probabilities, in 
 
 
88 
the 1650's, and later on populations during the 1800s. The taxonomic style introduces a way 
to tell the truth about species and genera in 1735.  The historico-genetic emerges in the 
nineteenth century introducing a way to tell the truth about originated entities.  
 It matters little for Hacking's project that every detail about the origins of the styles is 
historically correct. The relevance of Hacking's account lies in the historical character of the 
styles as a philosophical account of the introduction of types of scientific objects and their 
criteria of validity. Furthermore, instead of developing detailed accounts of the origins of the 
styles, Hacking has pointed out some works as a point of reference to grasp the sense in 
which a style of scientific reasoning might come into being, as exemplars of the style. In the 
case of the mathematical style we are referred to Reviel Netz's The Shaping of Deduction in 
Greek Mathematics: A Study in Cognitive History (Netz 2003). For the hypothetical modeling 
style we are referred to Galileo's use of thought experiments, Steven Weinberg's 
cosmological work and Noam Chomsky's work on linguistics. For the experimental style the 
point of reference is Shapin and Schaffer's Leviathan and the Air-Pump, Hobbes, Boyle and 
the Experimental Life (Shapin and Schaffer 1985). For the Statistical style, Hacking's books 
The Emergence of Probability and The Taming of Chance offer an account of the 
development of probability and statistical reasoning (Hacking 1975b and 1990). For the 
taxonomic style the point of reference is Atran's Cognitive Foundations of Natural History: 
Towards an Anthropology of Science and Peter Stevens’ The Development of Biological 
Systematics: Antoine-Laurent de Jussieu, Nature, and the Natural System (Atran 1990 and 
Stevens 1994). For the historico-genetic style the point of reference is Darwin's Origin of 
Species and Crombie's work on what he called the "the historical derivation of genetic 
development" or the "historical derivation: the genetic method."  
 
3.2.1.The Mathematical Style 
Hacking regards Netz’s work on the development of proofs in Ancient Greek 
mathematics as an outstanding "cognitive history of the sciences" and a model for a 
 
 
89 
genealogy of the styles. Netz offers a historically detailed account of how human beings 
advanced their cognitive potential in their development of geometric deductive proofs, and of 
how this achievement was made possible by the development of cultural practices -
remarkably, diagramming and argumentation.47 Netz’s cognitive history addressed more than 
the achievements of a single individual (e.g., Thales). It analyzed the achievement of a large 
community of people (e.g., Athenian geometricians) as well as the result of “built in” human 
capacity (i.e., a biological fact). Such history emphasizes the cultural developments that 
made it possible for the ancient Greeks represented by the figure of Thales to develop a 
novel way to tell the truth which consisted of a priori proofs of relations between mathematical 
objects.48 This method went beyond the calculations that had been developed in North Africa 
and Mesopotamia, in that their theorems are conceived of as necessary truths accompanied 
by an associated understanding of why that is so.  
 
3.2.2. The Hypothetical Modeling Style 
Galileo's use of highly abstract hypothetical models in the representation of nature 
and the universe epitomizes the crystallization of the hypothetical modeling style in the early 
                                                            
47 Netz reconstructed a collection of diagrams presumably used in ancient Greece, and then showed 
how the actual elaboration of the diagrams (i.e., the practice of doing them) constituted an 
indispensable aspect in the development of deductive reasoning. This elaboration involved more than 
mere thinking; it had to be performed before an audience of students, either on sand or slate. This was 
a practice similar to what some professors still do nowadays while teaching, namely, write with chalk on 
blackboards. The ancient Greek geometer engaged in his study not only by using his mind, but also by 
embodying his thinking in the doing of diagrams. In other words, doing the diagrams constituted an 
indispensable part of his thinking. Moreover, the results obtained were not only pedagogical, since the 
performance of the proofs for the exploration of shapes and equivalences also served as a strategy for 
discovering new knowledge. 
48 Innumerable cultural accidents have activated certain human capacities that otherwise might not have 
developed. Netz analyzed many of the central accidents occurring between 440 BCE and 360 BCE that 
expedited the growth of early mathematical demonstrations. These, in turn, made possible the 
development of mathematical proofs in Euclidean geometry. In particular, the Athenian culture of 
argumentativeness, the innovative use of diagrams, and the development of a precise form of 
accompanying text together gave rise to the “shaping of generality”—or mathematical proofs. 
Argumentation provided the seed for the enterprise, insofar as it was desirable to come up with a 
secure method (or at least, a prototype of one) for settling disputes. Diagrams and their accompanying 
texts gradually led to the realization of a structure for generalization (i.e., a proof). Hacking endorses 
Netz’s account for stressing the action of diagramming as opposed to the final product, i.e., the 
diagrams. Drawing and performing, Hacking emphasizes, were central to the discovery of mathematical 
proofs.  
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seventeenth century. Although mathematical models have been constructed since at least 
the twelfth century, as exemplified by Ptolemy or Archimedes, Galileo represents the highest 
peak of “an increasing mathematization of nature on earth” (Hacking 2009a). Galilieo's 
thought exhibits a transformation in the human capacity for understanding nature through 
mathematical representation and systematic observation.  
 Galileo's use of observation differs from that of both his precursors, who seek to fit 
their understanding of nature to a preconceived view established by authority, and 
subsequent developments in the study into nature (i.e., experimental style). Galileo's 
approach is captured in the metaphor of God as the architect of the universe and "the Book of 
Nature" as the ultimate arbiter for knowledge. Nature and the universe are seen as an all-
encompassing book opened before our eyes, but could only be understood if one first learns 
to understand the mathematical language in which it is written (Galileo 1623, 183). Galileo’s 
models were mostly theoretical, and many of them were only thought experiments. Even in 
cases where he presumably performed an actual experiment, systematic observation 
provided the evidence for establishing the results.  
 The experiment of The Leaning Tower as evidence for the "Laws of Falling Objects" 
illustrates the hypothetical character of Galileo's work. The "experiment" was intended to 
show that if two bodies, equally shaped and made out of the same material but distinct in 
weights and sizes, are dropped from a considerable height (such as the summit of the 
campanile of the Tower of Pisa) they would land simultaneously. Galileo continued 
developing his position after the statement of the experiment, which culminated in the 
formulation of the laws of free fall presented in his final work, Discourses and Mathematical 
Demonstrations Relating to Two New Sciences (Galileo 1638, 183). 
 The following passage exemplifies a typical Galilean argument. In it Galileo 
establishes that uniformity of accelerated motion of objects in free fall (Galileo 1638, 336): 
 
When the velocities are in proportion to the spaces traversed or to be traversed, 
these spaces are traversed in equal intervals of time; if, therefore, the velocities with 
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which the falling body traverses a space of four cubits were double the velocities with 
which it covered the first two cubits (since the one distance is double the other), then 
the time intervals required for these passages would be equal; but for one and the 
same body to move four cubits and two cubits in the same time is possible only in the 
case of instantaneous motion; but observation shows us that the motion of a falling 
body takes time, and less of it in covering a distance of two cubits than of four cubits; 
therefore, it is false that its velocity increases in proportion to the space. (Galileo 
1638, 341)  
  
Galileo presented a hypothetical scenario in which an object such as a stone or a canon 
projectile (or a pair of them, of different size and weights) is placed at an elevated height and 
released in free fall. After describing the Aristotelian interpretation (Galileo 1638, 341), 
Galileo went on to hypothetically argue against it on the basis of the consequences that 
would follow it taken as true. First, it presents an accepted conception about a hypothetical 
situation (e.g., free fall, movement of the earth, sunspots). Then it explores the empirical 
implications for and against the principles used by the accepted theory (e.g., Aristotelianism, 
Copernicanism). Finally, it presents an alternative interpretation that better fits the situation 
under consideration, using observation accompanied by a series of mathematically modeled 
implications.   
 Steven Weinberg's cosmology and Noam Chomsky's views on grammar are two 
contemporary examples of the hypothetical modeling style (Hacking 2009a, 103). Although 
the models created by both of these scholars generally are well informed by a great deal of 
experimental results, Hacking notes, their evaluation consists of the comparison between 
model and observation, which is the mark of the hypothetical modeling style.  
 
3.2.3. The Experimental Style  
The experimental style also emerged in the seventeenth century, differentiating itself 
from the hypothetical modeling style by its postulation and measurement of unobservable 
phenomena and/or entities. Although in many respects the distinction between the 
hypothetical modeling and the experimental styles is blurred, the distinctive feature of the 
experimental style is the creation of phenomena which otherwise would have not been found 
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in nature. Robert Boyle's demonstration of the existence of the vacuum through the 
construction of the air pump is presented by Hacking as the exemplar of the style.  
Boyle’s experiments produced matters of fact (rather than only hypotheses), through 
the collective work within a social and discursive order. The epistemological and ontological 
status of the “facts” produced through experiment depended upon the acceptance or rejection 
of the social structure in which these facts were originated.49 Boyle’s experimental program 
extended the role of human agency onto reality itself. The ability of human beings to create 
and recreate facts became the basis for establishing the validity of knowledge about nature. 
Boyle and the experimentalists saw themselves as providing the foundations of knowledge of 
empirical matters by fact making (Shapin and Shaffer 1985, 80-81). 
Boyle used three inter-reliant technologies, or “knowledge-producing tools”. The first 
was a material device constructed and operated for producing phenomena, the air pump. 
This was the central figure since its design integrity was key to establish the existence of the 
vacuum. The machine’s engine needed to be capable of producing the desired effects 
(Shapin and Shaffer 1985, 135). The second technology was a mechanism for passing the 
knowledge of the phenomenon created to those who could not directly witness its creation. 
The presentation of the experiments in a public space, the Royal Society's assembly rooms, 
was indispensable since the presence of multiple witnesses provided reliable testimony and 
conferred authority to the claims.50 The third technology consisted of social mechanisms for 
                                                            
49 Hobbes contested Boyle’s analysis, pointing out that the experimentalist program created the very 
phenomenon to be demonstrated (e.g., the vacuum) by utilizing apparatuses (i.e. the technologies of 
fact-making), both material and social, devised for that very purpose. Hobbes also protested that access 
to allegedly public experimental phenomena was restricted to a selected elite, namely the members of 
the Royal Society of London. In fact, according to Hacking, the very aspects that Hobbes criticized 
became hallmarks of the experimental/laboratory styles: “Boyle …made a device that produced a partial 
vacuum in a container, thereby defeating nature… [and] also convinced everyone that that was what he 
had done” (Hacking 2009a, 119).  
50 Boyle and Hooke, moreover, established a procedure for registering experiment results of at The 
Royal Society; a number of qualified persons (whose credibility depended upon their expertise and 
credentials) invited to witness the performance provided “undoubted testimony” by signing the report. In 
addition, the reports had to be written according to protocols designed to enable the replication of the 
experiment and their results, which in turn multiplied the witnesses and the consistency of the results. In 
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mediating the interactions between experimenters and their knowledge-claims. Discursive 
procedures were established for the presentation and diffusion of experimental results, as 
well as for the collective organization of those participating in their production. The Royal 
Society, a public but rigorously controlled institution, provided the social structure for 
standardizing the conventions for the communal generation and evaluation of experimental 
facts (Shapin and Schaffer 1985, 135). 
Here again Hacking emphasizes cognition and culture as the two levels at which the 
origin of a style takes place, which are captured in Shapin and Schaffer’s account. It is not 
one man or the vacuum, but about a series of practices that allowed the collective operation 
of an instrument, as well as the interpretation and evaluation of the phenomena it generated. 
Boyle and his air pump are merely emblems of the collective sum of forces required to 
establish the creation of phenomena as an adequate form of knowledge.   
 
3.2.4. The Statistical Style 
 Hacking elaborates on the origins of probabilistic and statistical thinking in The 
Emergence of Probability and The Taming of Chance (Hacking 1975b and 1990), in addition, 
“Statistical Language, Statistical Truth & Scientific Reason: The Self-Authentication of a Style 
of Scientific Reasoning” (Hacking 1992c). These works present a genealogy of the statistical 
style (Shapin and Shaffer 1985, 113).51 Hacking traces the origins of the statistical style back 
to the Pascal-Fermat correspondence in 1650, in which Pascal offered a solution to old 
gambling problem, by introducing “a completely new standard of excellence for probability 
calculations” (Hacking 1975b, 60). Pascal's solution fostered the systematic study and 
development of the mathematical theory of probability. Here again, Hacking emphasizes the 
communal aspect of Pascal's findings, as these emerged from discussions held by a group of 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Shapin and Shaffer’s view, these procedures created a “a technology of trust and assurance that the 
things had been done and done in the way claimed” (Shapin and Shaffer 1985, 116). 
51 See also Hacking 1965 and 2001a. 
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mathematicians and Parisian gentlemen formed under the patronage of Duke of Roannez, a 
gifted mathematical amateur who provided his salon for the meetings. Huygens, one of the 
members of the group, was studying probability when the Fermat-Pascal correspondence 
took place, and it was he who published the first probability textbook that included Pascal’s 
solution to the famous gambling problem.  
 Pascal transformed the subsequent understanding of the notion of probability by 
integrating two aspects. One was epistemological, dealing with the “degree of belief 
warranted by evidence.” The other was aleatory, concerning “the tendency, displayed by 
some chance devices, to produce stable relative frequencies” (Hacking 1975b, 1). The 
problem in the Pascal-Fermat conversation was entirely aleatory, concerning the division of 
stakes in an interrupted game of chance. A few years later, Pascal applied probabilistic 
reasoning more widely. Pascal’s wager is one such remarkable application.52 In his Pensées, 
Pascal showed that “aleatory arithmetic could be a part of a general ‘art of conjecturing’”, 
extending the inference used in chance games to cases that were not previously thought of 
as involving chance, offering a model for problems involving decisions under uncertainty 
(Hacking 1975b, 63).  
 The concept of probability developed from the end of the seventeenth century to well 
into the eighteenth, by such scholars as Huygens, Laplace, Bernoulli, Spinoza, Hume, and 
Condorcet. A turning point, that prompted the rise of statistics, came with Paul Graunt and 
William Petty’s “Political Arithmetic,” which may have been the first systematic study of public 
statistical data. Quantitative facts about London’s inhabitants were recorded since 1603, but it 
was only after the plague that people began to think it “necessary to set figures in a more 
regular way” (Hacking 197b5, 102). After Petty published his 1667 revision of Graunt’s work 
demonstrating the value of the systematic study of statistics, other European cities followed 
                                                            
52 Hacking writes, “It is not a matter of chance whether or not God exists, but it is still a question of 
reasonable belief and action to which the new probable reasoning can be applied” (Hacking 1975, 12). 
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London’s lead and began keeping more exhaustive records (Hacking 1975b,102). Earlier 
records, such as annuities, began to be seen with new eyes.  
 In The Taming of Chance, Hacking presents a metaphor of the transformation from a 
deterministic to a probabilistic worldview and of the emergence of statistics that followed the 
development of epistemic probability: the avalanche of printed numbers that caused the 
erosion of determinism. This transformation culminated in the nineteenth century. The 
creation of new institutions for counting people and the public availability of records, allowed 
the development of pioneering statistical studies, such as Graunt and Petty’s studies. The 
erosion of determinism was marked by the transformation of the notion of probability, in such 
a way that the world started to be seen as "regular and yet not subject to universal laws of 
nature” (Hacking 1990, 1). Furthermore, the rise of “a new kind of indeterministic law” 
displaced the idea of “human nature by the idea of normality” (Hacking 1990, 179). Locke’s 
and Hume’s inquiries into human nature were replaced by Durkheim and Galton’s studies on 
normal people and societies. 
 By 1827, probability theory had already advanced the notion of a normal distribution 
or curve of error, graphically represented as the Gaussian “bell-shaped curve.” By 1835, 
Quetelet transformed further the understanding of the bell curve in his Treatise on Man. 
(Quetelet 1842). Extending the application of the bell-curve to biological and social 
phenomena, Quetelet advanced the notion of “the average man,” a “man” who is not an 
individual but a “homme type,” e.g., a racial type obtained from the characteristics of a 
nation.53 The “reality” of the quantities of the average men were not “real” for a singular 
person but for the whole (idealized) population.54 Quetelet’s move to an ideal type was 
                                                            
53 “Quetelet introduced a new objective measurable conception of a people. A race would be 
characterized by its measurements of physical and moral qualities, summed up in the average man of 
that race” (Hacking 1990, 107). 
54 Quetelet established his observations based on two data collections: the height and chest 
measurements of eleven Scottish regiments, and the heights of 25,878 American Civil War volunteers. 
In the first case, Quetelet obtained a distribution for 5,738 chests of 39 inches with a maximum at 1073 
soldiers, and 40 inches for 1079 soldiers. He concluded that the average Scottish soldier’s chest is 
nearly 40 inches, with a probable error of 33.34 millimeters; Quetelet thus “gave us the mean and the 
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central for the development of statistical laws, as opposed to the mere collection of facts and 
apparent constancies.55  
 The notion of “normal people” came into being intertwined with considerations of 
value, swinging between the “is” and the “ought to.” Durkheim’s and Galton’s views on the 
normal exemplify this contrast. Durkheim opposed “the normal” to “the pathological”. The 
normal is average; the pathological is deviance. Around 1800, the notion of the pathological 
was associated with disease. There were no pathological people; there were pathological 
organs. Pathology, as a discipline, involved the study of the composition of human tissues, 
organs, and secretions. A sick organ and the secretions it produced were considered 
pathological, rather than people or populations. The normal was understood as the opposite 
of the pathological. Being healthy was ‘good’ and being sick was not. Comte turned this 
around by defining the pathological as a “deviation from the normal” (Hacking 1990, 164), 
and variation became defined in terms of a “normal state.” There are two aspects to this latter 
notion: the distinction between the normal and the pathological is continuous rather than 
discrete, and deviation is a departure from the norm (rather than the other way around). 
Although a similar drive toward standardization had been present elsewhere in society, as 
demanded by industrialization, Hacking contends that “our modern usage of the very word 
‘normal’ evolved in a medical context.” This made the law of variability “the basis for social 
science and it became part of its political agenda” (Hacking 1990, 165).  
 Durkheim’s notion of normal aligned with Comte’s view of the pathological as a 
deviation from the norm with a negative connotation. "The normal", however, suggested a 
                                                                                                                                                                         
bell-shaped curve as fundamental indices of the human condition” (Hacking 1990, 110). Quetelet’s 
strategy quickly spread; “[e]very sort of physical attribute of humans and then of all the animal and 
vegetable kingdom was investigated and plotted as if according to the law of error” (Hacking 1990, 110). 
By exporting the law of errors from the astronomical realm into human affairs, Quetelet put forward a 
new sort of law on the basis of statistics.  
55 By 1844, "[Quetelet] transformed the theory of measuring unknown physical quantities, with a definite 
probable error, into the theory of measuring ideal or abstract properties of a population. Because these 
could be subjected to the same formal techniques they became real quantities. This is a crucial step in 
the taming of chance. It began to turn statistical laws that were merely descriptive of large-scale 
regularities into laws of nature and society that dealt in underlying truths and causes" (Hacking 1990, 
108). 
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tension, since it connoted both a figure of perfection and the average. At the other extreme, 
Galton saw positive excellence instead of negative pathology. For Galton the goal should not 
merely be to pursue the average but to improve it (Hacking 1990, 169). These two views 
suggested distinct views on progress: normalcy and the perfection of the normal. The two 
senses, Hacking argues, still lie at “the core of our conceptions of the normal” (Hacking 1990, 
171). 
 
3.2.5. The Taxonomic Style 
The taxonomic style introduces a new type of statement about the hierarchical 
organization of living things and taxa as a new type of object of inquiry, but distinguishes from 
the previous styles in that it does not introduce a criterion for truth. Classifications are not true 
or false, but apt or inapt.56 Hacking identifies the origin of the taxonomic style in a 
transformation in the organization of living entities represented in Linneaus' work (1707-
1778). With Linneaus, species became understood as historical entities, subjected to 
transformation, degeneration, and evolution over long periods of time. Before this 
transformation, species were studied as if they were outside of time (as having fixed natures) 
and only incidentally in space (habitat, geography, climate). The field of natural history, which 
started around Linneaus’ time, became a study of the regularities of populations (although 
they were not called that at the time) organized in space and time.57 The term “taxonomy” 
                                                            
56 A system of classification orders a domain of experience according to particular principles and goals 
other than truth. Foucault's account of Borges's Chinese encyclopedia in The Order of Things may 
serve to illustrate the point. The passage describes the following classification of animals: "  (a) 
belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) suckling pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray 
dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine 
camelhair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look 
like flies" (Foucault 1970). In other words, this classification is one part of a constellation of principles 
that makes a system of classification apt, as an inventory of the Emperor. It shows that systems can 
have other important merits than truth. A similar point could be made by reference to Goodman's 
defense of relevant kinds over natural kinds presented in Chapter 1.  
57 This is a characteristic of the second set of Crombie’s and Hacking’s styles.   
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was introduced at the beginning of the nineteenth century (around the same time as the term 
“biology”), replacing the 200-year-old term “natural history”.58 
Two related events mark the origins of the taxonomical style. First, world explorers 
brought a large amount of “samples” to Europe, specimens collected from sub-Saharan 
Africa, the Americas, the Spice Islands, India, China, Polynesia, and Australia. This prompted 
the development of a classification system, modeled on the already existent botanical garden 
system. Second, Linnaeus established a binomial system of classification for plants. 
Although newly imported plants were classified with techniques already used in 
botanical gardens, it took time for the binomial system to be developed and for the Linnaeus’ 
taxonomic system to crystallize. Linnaeus developed a binomial system along with a series of 
other people. In particular, Pierre Magnol (1638-1715), a ‘demonstrator of plants’ at 
Montpellier's garden,59 in an attempt to clarify some of the confusions generated by the 
scholastic view, introduced the idea of the family of plants. Departing from the scholastic 
genus/species framework,60 Magnol suggested a higher order category in which plants were 
organized according to a manageable number of characters or points of resemblance. 
Although Magnol’s category was not widely used immediately after its introduction in 1689, 
Michael Adanson revived it sixty years later. Perhaps an even more crucial figure than 
                                                            
58 Hacking separates from Crombie's account of the taxonomic style, following instead Foucault’s 
analysis (Foucault 1971). Hacking observes that William Whewell may have been responsible for 
introducing the word “systematics” into English as an alternative to “taxonomy.” The term became 
confined to biological classification. 
59 Belleval was personal physician to Henry IV, and received Louis XIII’s patronage to re-establish 
Montpellier’s botanical garden (destroyed in 1622). Botanical gardens were a profitable enterprise; at 
stake was the ownership of the named plants, many medicinal, at home and abroad. Botanical gardens 
equally served the state and private enterprise.  
60 Hacking notes two different notions of “genus” and “species.” Whereas these are relative notions in 
Aristotelian (scholastic) logic, in Natural History, a genus cannot be regarded as a species. Porphyry’s 
(c. 233-304) introduction to Aristotle’s Categories, Isagoge, illustrates this point. The genus “substance” 
includes the body; the body includes the animate body, an animal. Under animal there is man, and 
under man there are particular men, Socrates and Plato for instance. Body, animate body, and animal 
are all genus or species depending on the occasion. For example, animate body is a species of body 
and a genus of animal. The only exception is man, which is a species of rational animal but not a genus 
of particular men. Genus and species are longstanding notions whose traces are found in 
“commonsense classification,” a hierarchical, three-level system, e.g., bird (more general), owl (type of 
bird), barn owl (type of owl. Although it initially conceived of these categories as more systematic 
versions of the previous system, Natural History eventually introduced the tree structures used in 
modern Systematics. 
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Magnol was Joseph Pitton de Tournefort (1656-1708), who organized over 7000 species 
according to 700 genera.  
Neither Tournefort nor Magnol were aware of their contribution to a new way of 
thinking about classification. They saw themselves as simply clarifying the scholastic system. 
Their work, however, generated a rupture that engendered a larger hierarchy. So as genus 
became absolute over species, other absolute ranks were envisioned, e.g., species, genus, 
order, class. As more plants were brought to Europe from different parts of the world, which 
did not exhibit as many apparent similarities than known plants, new categories of 
classification were developed and the hierarchy of taxa increased. 
The new system of hierarchies of taxa generated a problem: how to rank taxa? 
Following Aristotle, Andrea Cesalpino (1569-1603) had classified plants on the basis of 
modes of reproduction: their fruits and flowers. But by 1735, Linnaeus saw more clearly how 
to resolve the problem. Also focusing on reproduction, he classified plants according to the 
number of stamens and pistils, which published in a 12-page folio, entitled Systema Naturæ. 
This work culminated in A General System Of Nature: Through the Three Grand Kingdoms of 
Animals, Vegetables, and Minerals, fully completed by 1758.61 Linnaeus understood his 
system as a precursor for better ones but it lasted up to date.  
Linnaeus is representative of the taxonomic style chiefly because of two of his 
contributions to the system of binomial nomenclature. The first was syntactic. He made the 
system canonical and added fuller names on the basis of a sequence of limited attributes 
summarizing the central characteristics of a species. The nomenclature system consisted of 
two Latin words, one of which indicated the genus and the other a characteristic of the 
species. The second aspect was mnemonic. Binomial nomenclature made it easy to recall 
the location of plants and animals within a general scheme of organization. Although the 
system initially was applied to botany and was meant only for the organization of organisms, 
                                                            
61 Systema Naturæ. This work culminated in A General System Of Nature: Through the Three Grand 
Kingdoms of Animals, Vegetables, and Minerals, fully completed by 1758. 
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it soon functioned as a classification model for other fields. For instance, Boissier de 
Sauvages de la Croix (1706-1777) modeled a disease classification system on the botanist 
system in 1731.  
 
3.2.6. The Historico-Genetic Style 
Like the taxonomic style, the historico-genetic style lacks its own object of inquiry and 
criteria for truth-telling. Hacking has expressed some contempt in this regard, not because he 
considers the style invalid but because there is no good theory to account for its soundness 
and validity. This style is concerned with historical derivation; it examines the origins of 
“something” that exists in the present or at some point in the past, and explains the way in 
which it became what it is or was.   
 Although cosmological models of the origin of the universe have been generated 
since ancient times, Hacking considers Charles Darwin to be the emblem of the historico-
genetic style. Marx and Buffon were contenders, but Hacking picks Darwin due to his 
legendary standing within the scientific literature, and because in On the Origin of the 
Species, the historico-genetic style began to be clearly concerned with the organization of 
populations in space and time. With Darwin, the style reached a point at which testable 
hypotheses, instead of mere speculations, could be formulated. The historico-genetic style 
does not introduce criteria of truth for the sentences it generates; however, by themselves, 
such sentences constitute historical claims (presumably) supported by evidence.  
 The theories of evolution and the Big Bang are two illustrations of the historico-
genetic style. The Big Bang theory provides a scientific, twenty-first century story of the 
origins of the universe, distinct from past stories because it offers a model of the universe. 
During the early twentieth century, the Steady-State theory propounded by Bondi and Hoyle 
competed with the Big Bang theory. In 1965, Arno Penzias and Robert Wilson discovered 
microwave background radiation at Bell Labs, which fit predictions by astronomer Robert 
Dicke of a trace of an original “explosion,” supported the Big Bang theory. This case shows 
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the transition from mere speculation to experimental testing in how scholars think about the 
origins of things (i.e., the origins of the universe). The theory of evolution presented in 
Darwin’s On the Origin of Species is, in Hacking’s view, is the historico-genetic style’s 
greatest triumph. In addition to being a great naturalist and taxonomist, Darwin also 
presented an historical account of how living things and fossils originated and were 
distributed through time. 
Rather than truth in a given domain, or the rightness or wrongness of classification in 
the taxonomic style, the aim of the historico-genetic is explanation, and truth is derived from 
explanation. This explanation speaks to the truth of a conclusion extracted by its means. 
Therefore, Hacking considers the logic of the historico-genetic style to be a type of inference 
to the best explanation (IBE). Hacking conceives of IBE as a subjective or psychological 
notion, providing very weak support for the existence of hypothetical or unobservable entities.  
As it stands, the historico-genetic style is the least developed of Hacking’s styles. 
Although Hacking provides a general account of the historico-genetic style, his presentation 
is sketchy and raises more questions than answers. 62  
 
3.3. Philosophical theses 
Hacking’s Styles Project stands apart from other similar works in its philosophical 
character. By combining Williams’ philosophical notions with Crombie’s template, Hacking 
creates a framework from which he extracts further philosophical implications. First, the styles 
are self-authenticating (although not all of them are equally successful at it). Second, the 
styles have different levels of successful self-authentication depending on their techniques of 
                                                            
62 The historico-genetic style raises red flags in Hacking's Styles project, insofar as at least two central 
characteristics of the styles, the introduction of objects of inquiry and of a criterion of validity, are not 
met by the historico-genetic style. One of the strengths of characterizing the styles in terms of their 
introduction of objects of inquiry and criteria of validity is that these distinguish the styles of scientific 
reasoning from merely scientific methodologies. Furthermore, the historico-genetic style also lacks the 
epistemic and ontological specificity of the other styles. It is unclear whether it is a style that 
characterizes scientific reasoning more than it does reasoning in general. 
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stabilization. Third, the traditional ontological debates in the philosophy of the sciences are 
the product of the introduction of scientific objects by the styles.  
The styles have different levels of successful self-authentication depending on their 
techniques of stabilization. These techniques are distinct to the criteria of truth and/or validity 
introduced by each style, but they participate in the generation and validation of knowledge. 
In the following two sections I elaborate, first, on the notion that the styles are self-
authenticating, and subsequently, on their respective techniques of stabilization. The 
ontological debates about the reality of certain scientific objects (e.g., theoretical and abstract 
entities) result from the introduction of the kinds of objects associated to each style. Although 
that fact may not resolve the debates, Hacking argues, it does downplay their significance. 
Furthermore, the stabilization of a style of reasoning involves developing adequate 
techniques of stabilization, one of which is clearly specifying its objects of inquiry. 
Conversely, the instability of a style of reasoning results from the inadequacy or the 
insufficiency of its techniques of stabilization, and/or the lack of clarity in the specification of 
its object of inquiry. The mathematical and laboratory styles are the most stable, while the 
taxonomic and the genetico-historic styles are the most unstable. Each style is stable or 
unstable in its own ways.63  
 
3.3.1. Self-Authentication  
The styles originate when they introduce a criterion of validity (or truth) for the 
sentences they generate. The criteria of the first three styles include truth-telling; the second 
three do not. The criteria of validity for statistical, taxonomic, and historico-genetic styles 
concerns something other than truth: probability, rightness of category, and explanation. 
Given these differences, characterizing the styles and their origins in terms of an introduction 
                                                            
63 Unfortunately, most of what Hacking has said about techniques of stabilization has to do with the 
laboratory style; and he has not said much about the specifics of the ontological debates. In this section, 
I review the three philosophical aspects of Hacking’s Styles Project: the self-authentication of the styles, 
their techniques of stabilization, and the ontological debates brought about by the styles. 
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of a criterion of validity or truth-telling seems inadequate at face value. The notion of self-
authentication, however, captures a critical insight about the validation of scientific claims: 
different sorts of scientific claims are generated and validated by different means. These 
include distinct “logics” or methods of reasoning (e.g., mathematical or experimental 
techniques), and distinct types of evidence (e.g., mathematical, experimental, statistical, etc.). 
This insight applies to all the styles, regardless of their (lack of) success at producing 
adequate methods of validation or types of evidence. The claims generated by a style cannot 
be settled by means of another style’s criteria of validity. This is, I think, central to Hacking’s 
view that the styles of scientific reasoning and doing are (all) self-authenticating (regardless 
of their success).    
Ontological distinctions help clarify the self-authentication of the styles: the sentences 
generated by each style are concerned with distinct sorts of objects of inquiry and require 
distinct techniques of justification. Claims generated by the mathematical style about abstract 
entities such as numbers and classes require distinct techniques of validation from those 
generated by the experimental or the statistical styles. A proof could not validate an 
experiment. A statistical analysis could not validate a proof. The knowledge claims put 
forward by different styles are plainly distinct in both form and content. In this respect, the 
notion of the self-authentication of the styles is reminiscent of Moritz Schlick’s articulation of 
the positivist criterion of verification, according to which the meaning of a statement is its 
method of verification (Schilck 1936).  
The absence of a clear criterion of validation for sentences generated by the 
taxonomic and the historico-genetic styles, and the contrast between the objectives of the 
first and second set of styles (truth-telling vs. probability/aptness of classification/explanation) 
create a difference in their self-authentication. In addition, the second set of styles uses 
evidence produced by other styles for establishing their knowledge claims. The statistical and 
the historico-genetic styles may use evidence, for instance, from the experimental style. 
However, the claims made by these styles differ in form, content, and aim from the originating 
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styles. In a sense, they bring in outside evidence, turn it into their data, and reinterpret it on 
their own terms. For example, the results of an experimental drug trial may be statistically 
generalized for a given population.     
 The notion of self-authentication also helps distinguish methods of inquiry from the 
styles of reasoning. Even if it is not easy to articulate a clear distinction between the two, 
characterizing the styles in terms of their criterion of validity facilitates their separation. 
Whereas methodologies of research are useful for finding out about a phenomenon in 
practice, the styles of reasoning are more abstract, serving as general principles of inquiry 
and framing the validation of knowledge claims produced by different methodologies. 
The notion of self-authentication implies—radically—a type of circularity: the styles 
produce both types of evidence and knowledge claims, and the criterion of validity by which 
these are established. Such circularity comes out from the fact that the styles do not only 
produce their type of evidence and knowledge claims, but also the criterion of validity by 
which these are established. They introduce a class of sentences as candidates for a 
truth/value, and they also establish what counts as true or false. In other words, the logical 
and evidential adequacy of a sentence can only be determined in terms of the style that 
produces it. This type of circularity, in Hacking’s view, is far from being relativist in the sense 
of lacking standards of truth and objectivity, or understanding the criteria of validation 
introduced by the styles as merely convenient conventions. On the contrary, it helps explain 
the sort of objectivity achieved by the styles, achieved in part by producing adequate 
techniques of stabilization of their objects of inquiry.64   
                                                            
64 One may argue that Hacking's styles presuppose a form of epistemic relativism. Baghramian and 
Carter characterize epistemic relativism with three main assumptions: (a) framework-relative epistemic 
justification, which is the view that beliefs could only be justified within an epistemic system; (b) that 
there are many equally valid, and even incompatible, epistemic systems; and (c) that there is no non-
circular way to uphold one epistemic system as superior to another one (Baghramian and Carter 2016). 
The styles of scientific reasoning clearly do not presuppose (b) and (c). Against (b), one central point of 
the styles is that they are intended as exhaustive of the distinct mode of reasoning in the sciences. 
Each of them concern distinct domains of knowledge and reality, so that there is no simple way in which 
one could say that they are better than others or that they are alternative epistemic systems. The styles 
are intended to capture a limited plurality of modes of reasoning in the sciences, each concerning 
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3.3.2. Techniques of Stabilization  
 Each style possesses distinct, advanced techniques of stabilization and different 
levels of development. Better techniques of stabilization are marked by a style’s ability to self-
authenticate, or self-seal.65 The mathematical, hypothetical modeling, experimental, and 
statistical styles have established more adequate techniques of stabilization than the 
taxonomic and historico-genetic styles.  
 Hacking discusses stabilization primarily in terms of the laboratory style, which at 
least to a point serves as a model of stability for the other styles.66 Here, he responds to 
Kuhn’s revolutionary model of the development of science, which posited radical breaks 
followed by revolutionary periods in which knowledge and practices are highly unstable.67 
Hacking believes that despite these conceptual breaks, there is continuity in the styles of 
reasoning and doing, the modes of producing and validating knowledge, and the practices 
around them.       
                                                                                                                                                                         
distinct types of objects of inquiry and validating its knowledge claims about such objects through their 
own criteria of validity. This may suggest that the styles presuppose (a) insofar as the validity of 
scientific knowledge claims is relative to the epistemic framework provided by them.  This form of 
epistemic relativity is seen as undermining the possibility of objectivity, insofar as the justification is 
seen as dependent on the epistemic framework (rather than an external objective reality). Hacking's 
account of the styles, nonetheless, can avoid this concern by acknowledging that each of the styles 
introduced their own objects of inquiry, and providing a detail account on how such objects came into 
being as the relationship between the development of epistemic resources, human cognitive capacities, 
and reality.    
65 In a comment to this work, Prof. Dinishak pointed out that the idea that the styles are self-sealing 
suggest the insulation, which appears to be in tension with other aspects of my presentation of the 
styles such as the ideas that the styles could borrow from one another and that there are continuities 
between them. This observation calls for some clarification. The idea that the styles are "self-sealing" 
certainly suggests that they are insulated. This is the case in the sense that each of them concerns 
distinct objects of inquiry, introduce their own criteria of validation, and the claims produced by them are 
stated in their own language. The claims concerning the objects of inquiry of one style have no sense 
within the confines of another style. The sense in which there is continuity between the styles or in 
which some styles borrow from others does not go against the idea of the styles being sealed. Although 
the statistical knowledge on a given population may give rise to the introduction of a hypothetical or 
experimental object of inquiry, the two types of objects -the statistical and the experimental- and the 
knowledge claims produced about them are confined within their own styles.   
66 Hacking claims that his view on the stability of the laboratory style is descriptive rather than 
normative: “I shall repeat this, because I am regularly misunderstood: This paper does not praise 
stability. It does not imply that stability is a good thing. It does not admire stability. It observes it and 
tries to explain it” (Hacking 1992b, 38).   
67 Note that this is only a partial reply since, in Hacking’s view, not all the styles are as stable as the 
laboratory style. Hacking also notes that his view on laboratory science address short-term, or “frontier 
research,” but the general picture that forms in the long term (similar to Crombie’s longue dureé).  
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In “The Self-Vindication of the Laboratory Sciences” (Hacking 1992b) Hacking 
presents a taxonomy of the elements in an experiment which, through their mutual 
adjustment, generate the self-vindicating character of laboratory science. Hacking groups 
these elements into three distinct categories: (i) ideas, or “the intellectual components of an 
experiment”; (ii) things, such as instruments and substances; and (iii) marks, covering a 
number of items such as inscriptions, “visible impressions,” and “written or printed signs or 
symbols” (Hacking 1992b, 44). Ideas and things are easy to distinguish. Marks and things are 
more difficult to differentiate; for instance, instruments, the data they generate, and the 
analysis of this data are often tightly interwoven. 
Under ideas Hacking includes: (a) traditional questions concerning the 
truth/falsehood of the theories of a given inquiry; (b) the measurement of entities, processes, 
substances, etc., which are involved in inquiry and its impact on their treatment; (c) 
background knowledge and expectations assumed in practice, which do not form a part of the 
theoretical apparatus; (d) systematic theory, generally abstract in character and with or 
without experimental consequences on its own; (e) topical hypotheses concerning the 
(systematic) connection between theory and phenomena (i.e., in Hempel’s language, bridge 
principles, although Hacking does not consider them “principles”);68 and (f) background 
knowledge, both theories and common lore, concerning the instruments and apparatuses 
used in inquiry (Hacking 1992b, 44-46).  
Under things Hacking includes (a) the target of inquiry, such as a substance or 
population; (b) “sources of modification” like apparatuses, instruments, or tools that interfere 
with the target (e.g., substances used in the preparation of an object in experiment); (c) 
detectors, which measure the interference or modification of the target; (d) data generators, 
                                                            
68 “The connections I have in mind are too revisable for me to speak of principles or a dictionary. I call 
them topical hypotheses. Hypothesis is here used in the old-fashioned sense of something more readily 
revised than theory. It is overly propositional. I intend to cover whole sets of approximating and 
modeling procedures in the sense of Cartwright (1983), and more generally the activity that Kuhn (1962, 
24-33) called the "articulation" of theory in order to create a potential mesh with experience” (Hacking 
1992b, 45).  
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which may be machines such as Atwood’s machine and micrographs, or people who are in 
charge measuring a target or source of modification.69   
Under marks Hacking includes (a) data or “raw data,” including “uninterpreted 
inscriptions, graphs recording variation over time, photographs, tables, displays”;70 (b) distinct 
kinds of data processing such as data assessment, including calculating probable error and 
estimating systematic error (both of these require a sufficient background knowledge of the 
apparatuses and statistical and non-statistical techniques); (c) data reduction, by which a 
large amount of numerical data is turned into a manageable number through statistical or 
computational techniques; (d) data analysis and interpretation, which are based on the (i) 
focus of the research questions, (ii) theoretical background, including systematic theory, (iii) 
topical theory, and (iv) apparatus modeling.71  
Hacking’s taxonomy is not rigid. He recognizes that not every experiment includes 
every element, and that some elements may be amalgamated. He also takes a flexible view 
of the initial state of experiment. Although a great deal of knowledge, tools, and techniques 
must already be in place in order for the experiment to begin, these may change over its 
development.72 
The final and most important components of Hacking’s taxonomy are “the 
experimenters, their negotiations, their communications, their milieu, the very building in 
                                                            
69 According to Hacking, “there is no need to insist on a sharp distinction in all cases between detector 
and data-generating device. In the early days a camera taking micrographs from an electron 
microscope was a data generator that photographed a visible image for study, analysis, or the record. 
Today the camera is more often the detector; the data generator may be a scanner working from the 
micrograph” (Hacking 1992b, 48). 
70 Although in Hacking’s view “[i]n the laboratory nothing is just given. Measurements are taken, not 
given. Data are made, but as a good first approximation, the making and taking come before 
interpreting. It is true that we reject or discard putative data because they do not fit an interpretation, but 
that does not prove that all data are interpreted” (Hacking 1992b, 48). 
71 “Pulsars provide an easy example of data interpretation requiring theory: once a theory of pulsars 
was in place, it was possible to go back over the data of radio astronomers and find ample evidence of 
pulsars that could not have been interpreted as such until there was theory. The possibility of such 
interpretation also mandated new data reduction (12) and analysis (13), and the systematic error part of 
the data assessment (11) had to be reassessed” (Hacking 1992b, 49).   
72 Hacking does consider “themata” and “thematic presuppositions,” to be rigid. “Expectations about 
how the world is like and practices of reasoning about it” govern theories and the interpretation of data 
(Hacking 1992b, 50). The laboratory style, generally characterized by methods of reasoning and objects 
of inquiry, falls into this category.  
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which they work or the institution that foots the bills” (Hacking 1992b, 51). Hacking also 
includes authors, authority, and audience. This last set of elements, in contrast to the 
previous three, is “external” rather than “internal” to an experiment.    
Hacking notes the interplay between the different elements included in his 
taxonomy.73 Each element, from questions to experimenters, can be modified to fit each other 
in case of conflict.74 Hacking’s circularity extends Duhem’s thesis by adding a series of 
material elements as a part of the interplay, including “data, theory, experiment, 
phenomenology, equipment, data processing" (Hacking 1992, 54). In addition, it aligns with 
Goodman’s famous view that “[a] rule is amended if it yields an inference we are unwilling to 
accept; an inference is rejected if it violates a rule that we are unwilling to amend."75    
The mutual adjustment of theories, laboratory equipment and experimental practices 
generate the self-vindication of laboratory science. Such stability does not merely come from 
the object of study (either understood as theory-free or value-free nature or the phenomena 
created as a product of laboratory science), but is “a contingent fact about people, our 
scientific organizations, and nature" (Hacking 1992b, 56). In other words, while nature plays a 
role, it is not sufficient for the stabilization of laboratory science. Moreover, stability is not 
automatically a virtue: it may also be a sign of stagnation. Hacking resolves this tension by 
positing “the noblest stability,” occurring when “a science that has been surpassed by deeper 
enquiries and new types of instrumentation… remains humbly in place as a loyal and reliable 
servant for our interventions in, our interactions with, and our predictions of the course of 
events” (Hacking 1992b, 37). 
                                                            
73 On this Hacking agrees with Duhem, Ackerman, and Pickering: “Pickering attends to the modeling of 
the apparatus and the working of the instruments: we acknowledge data as data only after we have 
gotten handmade apparatus to work in ways that we understand. Duhem emphasized the intellectual 
elements [under ideas]. Ackermann, observing that data can be understood in many ways or not at all, 
put the emphasis on a dialectic involving theories and interpretation, regarding instruments and the data 
that they produced as fixed points. We should learn from all these authors” (Hacking 1992b, 54). 
74 “We can (1) change questions; more commonly we modify them in mid-experiment. Data (2) can be 
abandoned or selected without fraud; we consider data secure when we can interpret them in the light 
of, among other things, systematic theory (3)” (Hacking 1992b, 54).  
75 Here, Hacking reminds us of Goodman's dictum (Hacking 1992b, 54) 
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3.3.3. Ontological Debates  
 The introduction of new types of objects of inquiry by the styles generates distinct 
ontological debates. This occurs in part due to the way in which (European) languages work. 
Hacking illustrates this with three examples: the debate between Platonists and anti-realists 
on the ontological status of abstract objects, traditionally discussed within the philosophy of 
mathematics (mathematical style); the debate on the existence of theoretical entities 
(scientific realism vs. instrumentalism) in the traditional philosophy of science or the 
philosophy of physics (laboratory style); and the debate concerning the reality of taxa (the 
taxonomic style). 
The statistical and historico-genetic styles are two exceptions to this ontological view. 
Hacking does not cite any debates about the ontological status of populations—the object 
associated with the statistical style.76 Nor does he recognize a specific debate in the 
historico-genetic, since no object is clearly associated with that particular style.  
The styles do not “create” their objects, but they “introduce” them within their domain 
in such a manner that they have no place outside of them. Neither the kinds of objects (e.g., 
a theoretical entity) nor the individual objects comprising those kinds (e.g., positrons) are 
specific outside of the styles. In that sense they only “exist” within the styles.77  
When the styles of scientific reasoning introduce new types of objects, this generates 
ontological debates. This, in turn, changes the conception of such debates and their 
philosophical significance. The Styles Project, furthermore, provides an alternative view of 
why the ontological debates “are so enduring, and why they are so irrelevant to scientific 
practice” (Hacking 2009a, 23).  
                                                            
76 A distinct but related debate in the statistical style concerns the interpretation of probability theory; 
namely, the debate between the subjective, frequency, and propensity interpretations of probabilities.  
77 Hacking distinguishes the ontological debates about the existence of scientific objects from other 
more comprehensive ontological debates in philosophy, such as those concerning the existence of an 
external world or other minds. Concerning the external world, for instance, the styles do not deny its 
existence.   
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According to Hacking, the styles’ generation of ontological debates is due in part to 
the way in which European languages work. In particular, Hacking argues that European 
languages have the tendency to presuppose the existence of the entities referred to by 
names, including scientific entities, as if they picked out objects in the real world. In addition, 
European languages tend to include those names as the subjects of sentences presumed to 
be knowledge claims (Hacking 2009a, 23). That is, the objects of scientific discourse tend to 
be reified, which in turn produces ontological questions.  
It seems relativistic to suggest that the existence of objects of inquiry is internal to the 
styles. However, Hacking conceives of this view as “profoundly rationalist in character,” since 
the thesis of self-authentication explains the objectivity of the styles. Hacking treats the notion 
of “objectivity” as an epistemic concept, according to which “the truths discovered in the 
sciences are true, independent of what we think, or of how we discover them” (Hacking 
2009a, 24). Such a view of objectivity is not inconsistent with the styles, as shown by 
Williams’ distinction between truth and truthfulness. The styles merely introduce the “truth 
conditions” by which the sentences produced should be evaluated (rather than truth itself). 
Moreover, the styles do not “create” their objects of inquiry; rather, they bring the objects into 
scientific discourse.  
 Despite the epistemic and ontological distinctions between styles, different styles can 
and are used across disciplines. Hacking has said very little about how distinct disciplines, or, 
more importantly, interdisciplinary studies of phenomena, call upon the styles.  
 
3.4. Making Up People and the Styles of Scientific Reasoning 
 The styles of scientific reasoning, Hacking argues, provide a sufficient and 
parsimonious picture of the rationalities operating in the sciences. Each style introduces its 
own objects of inquiry and criteria of validity, and produces distinct techniques of stabilization. 
Each scientific field, including the human sciences, can use whichever style best fits its 
research agenda. How this takes place, however, is neither specified nor obvious. Despite 
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the apparent relevance of the styles of scientific reasoning to the analysis of categories of 
people, Hacking has not elaborated on any of the links between the two projects.  
I have so far presented an overview and analysis of the MUP and Styles Projects. In 
this section, I explore the philosophically relevant connections between Hacking’s projects. I 
structure this exploration according to philosophical domain, beginning with logic, continuing 
with epistemology, and concluding with ontology. This illuminates how the Styles Project 
framework informs a philosophical analysis of how the human sciences categorize people. 
 
 3.4.1. Logic 
Both of Hacking’s projects endeavor to reveal the underlying rationality operating in 
the sciences. The Styles Project evaluates the validity of distinct types of knowledge claims, 
and the MUP Project evaluates the validity of the classifications of people. Although one 
might expect knowledge claims with a scientific pretense to belong to the discourse of one 
style or another, the validity of a given category of person is not established by any one 
style’s rules in isolation. Insofar as the knowledge claims are presumed to be scientific, there 
is an overlap between the styles and MUP—and yet, the two are very distinct creatures. The 
domain of a style’s discourse may only partially specify the domain of a given category of 
person. Because of this, as it concerns the categories of persons and despite the differences 
in the development of the styles, no style has priority over any other. The validity of a 
category of person is not reducible to the validity of the knowledge claims of any style. 
Additionally, when considering the looping effect, it seems plausible that determining the 
modus operandi of the formation of categories of people—a “logical” task—is not exhausted 
by combining the styles. The phenomenological component contributed by the people who 
live within the categories gets to the core of the scientific enterprise: the determination of their 
validity.   
Each style introduces both the type of “sentences” that are candidates for truth 
values and the criteria for determining their truth. If Hacking’s premise is correct and the six 
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styles indeed provide a sufficient account of scientific rationality, then the validity of any 
knowledge claim would be expected to fit within the scope of a style, and the rules developed 
within that style would be expected to determine its truth and validity. However, truth and 
validity apply only internally, and as such, a style has neither authority nor priority over other 
styles. The differences in the criteria of truth and validity from style to style also suggest that 
reducing one to another is not possible. The styles are incommensurable; although they 
share some philosophically relevant features, they do not share a common measure.  
Just as different styles are called upon in categorizing people, different scientific 
domains—established by the styles—constitute the domain of a category of person, and each 
style’s distinct criteria of truth and validity participates in its validation. Considering the 
framework provided by the styles, some questions arise concerning the relationships 
between the styles and the roles they play when they combine to categorize people. If the 
domain of each style is distinct, how can they come together to constitute the domain of a 
category of person? If the validity of a style is internal to it, how can it be extrapolated outside 
of it? How is it possible to determine if the statements produced by one style are consistent 
with the statements produced by another, if truth and validity are internal to each of them? If 
they do not share the same domain of discourse, how can different styles be called upon in 
the scientific categorization of people?  
These conundrums echo those generally posed in response to Thomas Kuhn’s and 
Paul Feyerabend’s views on the incommensurability of paradigms and comprehensive 
theories, as well as to Ludwig Fleck’s earlier work on the incommensurability of distinct 
“thought styles.” This should be no surprise, as Hacking’s work is heavily influenced by all 
three. The solution to these seemingly puzzling questions is found in a more comprehensive 
view of rationality: one provided by Nelson Goodman’s notion of relevant kinds.  
The categories of people are cross-cutting. Their validity cannot be established by 
“the logic” of a style alone, without taking into account extra-logical—i.e., pragmatic—
considerations. Categories of persons show how different systems of classification coexist 
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and can cut across one another. The way in which the styles cross-cut into them is not fully 
explained by logic. Since a particular kind of person cannot be reduced to a single style’s 
domain of discourse, more than one style is generally needed to understand a category.78 
Categories of people, conceived as objects of inquiry in the human sciences, are complex 
domains and must possess the ability to operate within multiple styles. Furthermore, while the 
validity of the styles does confer validity to scientific categories of persons, this validation 
process is complicated by the presence of looping effects.  
In any case, it seems to follow that the domain of discourse of a category of person is 
constituted by sets of sentences compartmentalized according to the styles in which they are 
expressed; and that any sentence falling outside the styles can be discarded as unscientific 
with its true value remaining at least undetermined, if not false. Conversely, any claim about a 
category of person established by a style has limited truth and validity.  
 
3.4.2. Epistemology 
The six styles of scientific reasoning reveal a heterogeneous image of scientific 
knowledge. The ways of “finding out” and the types of evidence admitted by the styles shape 
the scientific understanding of categories of people. Advances in the understanding of 
categories of people result from improving the styles’ epistemic resources and applying them 
successfully when studying the associated phenomena. The availability and recognition of 
evidence within a style sets the stage for the type of knowledge claims that can be 
formulated, and the truth or falsehood of a given knowledge claim can only be determined 
                                                            
78 Following the logic of the styles as informing MUP brings up critical questions. Take, for instance the 
case of addiction in which multiple scientific domains are involved. The statistical and laboratory styles 
are clearly at play in epidemiological, pharmacological, and genetic studies - to mention some relevant 
domains. However, some other domains of study are less clearly accounted for by the styles, e.g., 
psychodynamic, cognitive and social aspects that generally play a role in clinical descriptions. These 
may be accounted for within the historico-genetic style, of which Hacking gives only an incomplete 
picture of, or possibly the hypothetical modeling style as these may involve the generation of sorts of 
hypothetical models (e.g.. cognitive), or lastly they may hint to the need of another style of scientific 
reasoning, which Hacking does not account for. However, how we regard the sorts of reasoning 
involved in psychodynamics is beyond the purview of this work. 
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according to the criteria established by it. As such, the knowledge claims that fall outside a 
style either pose new puzzles for, or contain a critique of the styles. The use of different 
styles is limited both by their development and by technological advances (or the lack 
thereof) in the study of people.    
 Each style develops different types of knowledge. However, the type established by 
one may prompt the development of new types by other styles. In the case of categories of 
people, the development of the statistical style and its application to the study of human 
populations set the stage for their scientific study. This brought about the very idea of ideal 
types of human beings: Quetelet’s “average man” and Durkheim and Galton’s “normal man.” 
As the statistical style was stabilized, a type of man was normalized, and those falling far 
from its norm were pathologized. Pathological types, the deviant or abnormal, were turned 
into their own objects of study—then became available for other styles to study. Extrapolating 
from Hacking’s MUP Project, such studies are generally undertaken via the laboratory style, 
which informs medical thought and practices.  
 The study of types of persons, normal or pathological, is both driven and made 
possible by social perceptions of what is acceptable, problematic, or wanted. Being short in 
height may not be desirable, but it is generally acceptable, at least in the present moment in 
time. Crime, poverty, and mental illness are seen as problematic and therefore necessary to 
control, prevent, or eradicate. Intelligence, creativity, and healthy bodies are desired; thus, 
studies are conducted on how to foster them. Moreover, when the looping effect occurs, the 
people affected by particular knowledge claims in turn impact how scientists think about 
them. One paradigmatic example is the transformation in the scientific conception of 
homosexuality from unlawful to pathological to acceptable. Furthermore, the people so 
classified also vindicated the knowledge associated with this category by acknowledging that 
it provided a framework for reinterpreting their experiences.  
 Interestingly, looping effects introduce a level of destabilizing noise to the stabilizing 
effects of the styles. Conversely, when people inside a category accept certain knowledge 
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claims associated with it, this increases the perception of stability. The sciences use the 
styles in an attempt to stabilize phenomena. However, the people placed into scientific 
categories actively interact with them, alternatively fixing (stabilizing) and changing 
(destabilizing) them for their own purposes. 
 The knowledge established by one style is both built upon older knowledge 
established by other styles, and sets stage for subsequent studies undertaken by other 
styles. For example, the statistical and laboratory styles interacted to create the category of 
Multiple Personality Disorder: once the correlation between child abuse and multiple 
personality disorder was established, a putative underlying bodily causal link was sought out 
and supported on the basis of animal trauma models.79  
 
3.4.3. Ontology 
The styles of scientific reasoning introduce their own objects of inquiry that remain 
confined to the boundaries of their particular style. According to the MUP Project, the 
categories of people worked out by the human sciences also assume or imply a differentiated 
ontology of persons, in which human beings are allocated according to distinct types. Both 
the Styles Project and the MUP Project make their own ontological claims about the objects 
of science. The objects of the styles and the objects of the categories of people are both 
                                                            
79 Although psychoanalytic theory played a more prominent role in the making of MPD, studies on 
trauma may also have a minor influence. This is at least suggested in a discussion on the 
"psychobiological" dimension of MPD attributed to Frank Putnam (Hacking 1995a, 85): "T]he link 
between MPD and child abuse was sought on the underlying biological mechanisms of trauma.  
Psychobiological? Thus far, no biological concomitants specific to multiple personality have been 
sustained. Putnam’s sentence is intended to get at two distinct propositions. First, there is a systematic 
connection between multiplicity and childhood trauma. But why is that psychobiological? The answer 
lies in a second proposition from the traumatic stress literature. Something is known about the brain 
chemistry of terrified animals. Rats subjected to inescapable electric shocks are paralyzed by fear, and 
this reaction is correlated with the depletion of important brain chemicals. Moreover, the behavior of the 
rats is said to resemble that of war veterans diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder. From a 
study of “the psychobiology of the trauma response,” [Frank] Putnam quotes the assertion that “the 
symptoms of hyper-reactivity (i.e. startle responses, explosive outbursts, nightmares, and intrusive 
recollections) in humans resemble those produced by chronic nonadrenergic hypersensitivity following 
transient catecholamine depletion after acute trauma in animals." It is a reasonable research guess that 
human hyperreactivity (psychological) is paralleled by chemical changes in traumatized rats. But it is not 
knowledge."  
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scientific, and yet it is not obvious whether the respective scientific ontologies coincide with or 
are distinct from each other. Here again, a puzzling situation gives rise to some questions. 
Given a category of person and its subdetermination by different styles, how many scientific 
kinds of entities are implied in such a category? Is one kind of man/object or many distinct 
kinds of scientific objects brought together to characterize a kind of man? The ontological 
view posited by the styles suggests multiple scientific worlds inhabited by different kinds of 
entities; and yet, distinct styles are called upon in the characterization of a particular kind of 
people. While each style has a unique object, boundaries, and court of appeal, ultimately, all 
still are participating in the constitution of the object of human sciences.  
How then do the two ontological pictures relate to each other? Here again, the 
Goodmanian notion of relevant kinds provides a useful framework: the objects of kinds of 
people are scientific motely entities, cross-cutting categories characterized by distinct 
scientific taxonomic classes. Furthermore, the historical character of both the styles of 
scientific reasoning and MUP also suggests another node of connection. Kinds of people 
comprise scientific ontologies. As they are introduced within scientific discourse, types of 
being human emerge as scientific objects framed by the styles of scientific reasoning. These 
two ontological pictures do not exclude each other, although Hacking has not yet fully fleshed 
out the ways in which they complement each other.   
In practice, distinct scientific disciplines utilize different styles to understand their 
object of inquiry. Sociology and genetics, for instance, may use the statistical and laboratory 
styles in their study of crime. Each of Hacking’s MUP studies demonstrates how the statistical 
style introduces kinds of people as scientific objects into the scientific discourse. This, in turn, 
opens the door for the subsequent introduction of nested scientific objects, in which 
hypothetical, experimental, and laboratory styles further characterize the statistical style’s 
types of men. Using different styles, each scientific disciplines studies distinct scientific 
objects that nonetheless all fall under the category of person. The statistical style is not only 
crucial because it introduces kinds of persons as scientific objects, but because it bridges 
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distinct scientific taxonomies—types of populations, types of behaviors, types of memories, 
types of brain mechanisms, types of metabolisms, types of genes. The objects of the 
hypothetical, experimental, and laboratory styles, in a sense, surface from “the world” of the 
statistical style. Statistics allows the various objects across the “worlds” to form a singular, if 
motely, entity—a scientific kind of person.  
By systematically counting people according to traits of interest (crime, suicide, etc.), 
norms begin to emerge alongside whole new kinds of persons.  The bodies of the kinds of 
persons emerged by statistical means are then studied using other styles (hypothetical 
modeling, laboratory experiments, historical research, etc.). Next, they are characterized 
further by their other constitutive parts, which are the other styles’ objects of inquiry 
(theoretical and experimental entities, such as putative brain and genetic models).  Each of 
these styles observes its own object and validates aspects of it in accordance with its own 
rules; yet it continually refers back to the entity initially disclosed and supported by the 
relevant statistical results. Technological advances, changes in scientific taxonomies, 
developments in the social milieu of the populations studied and the perception of them, 
prompt continual revisions of the knowledge associated with the kinds of persons under 
study. These knowledge revisions may be accompanied by ontological transformations.  
The looping effects that shape categories of people have another ontological 
outcome. Kinds of people are dynamic kinds, not only because of changes in scientific 
taxonomies or developments in technology, but because of the ways in which people 
themselves change, affecting the further development of these taxonomies. 
Hacking's styles of scientific reasoning offer a distinct view on traditional themes in 
the philosophy of the sciences. They present a historically grounded picture of the 
rationalities at work in the sciences, and their role in the introduction of criteria of validity of 
knowledge and scientific objects. In this chapter I recounted the origins of each of the styles 
envisioned by Hacking, their philosophical background, and the figures in the history of 
science which Hacking views as exemplars of these styles. I suggested a possible 
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connection between the styles of scientific reasoning and making up people. Moreover, the 
ontological and epistemological significance of the styles was explained, as types of 
reasoning that create certain objects as well as asserting the epistemic criteria for making 
truth claims about that object. In the following chapter I recount and respond to some 
representative criticisms of Hacking's account of human kinds. 
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Chapter 4  
Criticisms & Replies 
 In this chapter I review some critiques that have been raised against Hacking's 
account of kinds of “making up people” and, on the basis of my earlier development of 
Hacking's analytics of MUP, I offer a response to these critiques. My discussion includes 
those posed by Rachel Cooper and Muhammad Khalidi against Hacking's characterization of 
human kinds on the basis of looping effects, Jonathan Tsou's rejection of the view that all 
human kinds are unstable objects, and Dominic Murphy's rejection of Hacking's semantic 
approach to overcoming the conflict between the two competing explanatory models of 
mental illness represented by the medical model and the biopsychosocial model. 
  All the criticisms discussed target Hacking's intended "semantic resolution" between 
scientific realism and social constructivism in the context of mental illness presented in The 
Social Construction of What? Although Hacking has abandoned the use of some of the 
terminology introduced in that piece, the criticisms presented are still relevant since they 
target notions that remain in subsequent formulations of the account. All the critiques concern 
the characterization of kinds of people as subjected to looping effects, and the resulting view 
that kinds of people are unstable objects or "moving targets", and the relation of such views 
to some traditional philosophical issues such as natural kinds, causation and explanation.  
 Although each of the critiques emphasizes different aspects of Hacking's account, 
the response to all of them comes from a common source: the philosophical background 
articulated in chapter 1. Specifically this relates to Hacking's understanding of kinds of people 
as relevant kinds, his pragmatic understanding of causality and scientific ontology, and (less 
directly) the possible role played by styles of scientific reasoning in MUP. That is, the 
solutions to these critiques can then be found implicitly or explicitly in Hacking's larger body of 
work, and by systematizing his projects we can see that the problems raised can either been 
dissolved or posed in a different manner. 
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 The chapter is divided in three sections. First I review Cooper's and Khalidi's rejection 
of Hacking's characterization of the looping effect on the basis that the sense of awareness it 
employs fails to differentiate human kinds from other kinds, remarkably, natural kinds. 
Second, I examine Jonathan Tsou’s argument that Hacking's characterization of kinds of 
people as "moving targets" constitutes a hasty generalization from the looping effect. Third, I 
respond to Dominic Murphy's rejection of Hacking's semantic strategy to connect the natural 
and the social, in which he argues that Hacking's strategy involves an inconsistency with 
either a) Hacking's own account of the social forces involved in the production of the 
manifestation of mental illness, b) the causal story associated to the semantic view borrowed 
from Putnam, or c) the psychiatric understanding of the classification, which does not admit 
essences.  
 I will argue that a fuller understanding of Hacking's projects and claims should satisfy 
these critics. Cooper and Khalidi misinterpret the role which awareness plays in looping and 
the role which intentionality plays in awareness. Tsou's critique can be addressed by drawing 
upon the complexity of forces behind the stabilization of particular categories, which often 
extend outside of the domain of scientists. Finally, Murphy's critique can be addressed by 
recognizing the fact that Hacking's project does not make any metaphysical claims about the 
nature of causality, nor does Hacking seek to solve problems in scientific explanation.  
 
4.1. Critique 1: The looping effect is not unique to "human kinds"  
Rachel Cooper and Muhammad Khalidi argue against Hacking's view that the looping 
effect is unique to human kinds. Following a similar argumentative strategy, Cooper and 
Khalidi offer a series of counterexamples intended to show, on the one hand, that there are 
some non-human kinds that present looping effects and, on the other hand, that there are 
some human kinds that do not present looping effects. Cooper's and Khalidi's respective 
arguments primarily target the notions of "self-awareness" and "intentional action" that figure 
in Hacking's characterization of the notion of the looping effect, however drawing distinct 
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conclusions (Cooper 2004 and Khalidi 2010). While Khalidi extracts a challenge to the realist 
view that there are mind-independent kinds in nature, Cooper finds support for the realist 
view that at least some human kinds might be natural kinds. In this section I first review 
Cooper’s and Khalidi's respective discussions on the notion of awareness and its role in the 
looping effect, and subsequently offer a response to their critiques.  
 In her interpretation of the looping effect, Cooper emphasizes Hacking's appeal to 
G.E.M. Anscombe's account of "intentional action", which she takes to be central to the view 
that the descriptions of kinds of people introduced by the human sciences make it possible 
for the people they characterize to act intentionally. In support of her reading, Cooper quotes 
Hacking saying that "[i]n creating new terminology, the human sciences would make it 
possible for people to act in new ways” from which she infers that in Hacking's account 
"descriptions are required for intentional action" (Cooper 2004, 81). She nonetheless argues 
that Hacking's characterization of the looping effect is inadequate since, in Anscombe's 
account, intentional action does not require descriptions.  
 In Cooper's reading, the looping effect occurs at two levels, one conceptual and one 
cultural. At the cultural level once a scientific description enters popular culture it may prompt 
changes in the behavior of the people it describes. The concept of "obesity," for instance, 
may produce negative feelings among young women, prompting them to start dieting and 
exercising as to avoid being labeled "obese" (and the negative connotations associated to 
such a label). Cooper identifies Anscombe's notion of "intentional action" to be at play at the 
conceptual level of the looping effect. To explain this she discusses the following example: 
"Consider Ug the caveman, sitting in his cave at the dawn of time before language 
developed. According to Hacking, Ug cannot intentionally light a fire, go outside, or hum 
himself a tune—as there are no descriptions, Ug must wait for them to develop before he can 
intentionally do anything" (Cooper 2004, 82). In her discussion of this passage, Cooper notes 
two possible interpretations of the clause ‘under a description’ that characterizes Anscombe's 
notion of intentional action and Hacking borrows in his characterization of the looping effect: 
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first, since hypothetically language has not been developed and there are no descriptions 
available, along Hacking’s interpretation, Ug the caveman could not act intentionally, and; 
second, 'under a description' could be understood, along Anscombe's account, as an action 
"qua" a description.80 To determine whether or not Ug's actions are intentional one would 
have to attribute to him certain intentions rather than others. Ug could intentionally bang 
some flints "qua a way to make a fire" to warm himself up if he is cold, or "qua a way to make 
a noise" if others around him are playing drums (Cooper 2004, 82). By understanding "under 
a description" as equivalent to "qua", Cooper argues, Anscombe's account allows for "other 
ways in which we can decide what it is that he [Ug] intends to do" than only through a Why 
Test, in which he would have to provide his reasons for acting the way he does. Cooper 
suggests that to determine whether an action is intentional in the second sense, it may suffice 
that a third party is able to attribute the intention to someone else’s action on the basis of 
their overt non-verbal behavior.  
 Cooper appeals to Anscombe's discussion of intentional actions in non-verbal agents 
to further articulate the view that determining intentional action could be determined without 
"descriptions" in the sense in which Hacking suggests, such as through the attribution of 
motives to an agent by a third party: 
 
[Consider] a bird which lands on a twig that happens to be both covered in bird lime 
and near some seeds. The bird […] lands on the twig with the intention of reaching a 
seed but not with the intention of landing in the bird lime. We infer the bird’s intention 
by attributing intentions that are appropriate for the bird given its perceptual 
apparatus, its intelligence, and typical bird behavior. We think that birds can identify 
seeds, that they get hungry, and that typically birds try to get seeds, and so we 
attribute the intention of getting the seed to the bird. (Cooper 2004, 82). 
 
This example shows, in Cooper's view, that intentional action is not unique to human beings. 
Intentional actions can be performed insofar as observers can infer the intentions of the 
                                                            
80  “A may, qua B, receive such-and-such a salary and, qua C, such-and-such salary” (Anscombe 1971, 
208, quoted in Cooper 2004, 81). 
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agent.81 Against Hacking, Cooper's counterexamples aim to show that a third party can infer 
the intentions behind the action of an agent without requiring that the agent is aware of such 
intentions. The bird in the example acts intentionally, despite lacking awareness of the 
intention of its action. Its action is intentional because we, as observers, could attribute 
intentionality to its action on the basis of our knowledge of bird and their behavior. 
Furthermore, the bird does not require a description of its action, as laid out in a concept of 
birdy behaviors, to intentionally act the way it does. That is, awareness of being of a kind is 
also not required for intentional action. Since neither being aware of acting intentionally nor 
being aware of being of a kind is required for intentional action, Hacking's characterization of 
the looping effect by appeal to Anscombe's notion of intentional action could not serve to 
distinguish between human kinds and natural kinds. So Cooper states, "Ug can intend to 
make a fire, and the bird can intend to land on the twig, without any descriptions being 
required. In such cases Hacking is simply wrong to claim that descriptions are required for 
intentional action" (Cooper 2004, 84). Thus, if the looping effect is characterized in terms of 
the presence of intentional action, then humans and non-humans alike could be subjected to 
the presence of looping effects (Cooper 2004, 82). Cooper, however, is not interested in 
extending the notion of looping effect to animals or other kinds, but only to show that natural 
kinds and human kinds could not be told apart by reference to the presence of looping effects 
in human kinds. Intentional action, which characterizes the looping effect as Cooper 
understands it, is not unique to human kinds.82  
 Like Cooper, Khalidi rejects Hacking's inclusion of awareness in the characterization 
of the looping effect, contending that this either trivializes or obscures the notion of interactive 
                                                            
81 “The conditions under which an intentional action can be performed are identical to the conditions 
under which an observer can infer the actor’s intentions" (Cooper 2004, 82) 
82 Cooper's argument assumes that, for Hacking, language and awareness are intimately linked, and 
that the distinction between human kinds and natural kinds rests on this. Cooper wants to critique the 
distinction between natural and human kinds and she thinks that undermining the importance of 
language in awareness and intentionality achieves that. To be conceptually aware of one's kind 
depends on being able to understand a language, but Anscombe shows that such conceptual self-
awareness is not necessary for intentional action. Thus, Cooper thinks that Hacking's appeal to 
Anscombe does not do the job he thinks it does. 
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kinds. If taken at face value, the characterization of the looping effect on the basis of 
awareness reduces all interactive kinds to human kinds since, as Khalidi notes, "arguably 
only humans (and perhaps some animals) can be aware of what is being done to them" 
(Khalidi 2010, 348). On the other hand, if the characterization of interactive kinds is not trivial, 
then the sense of awareness that figures in the characterization of the looping effect would 
require further clarification. Following this route, Khalidi considers three possible 
interpretations. In one of these, those classified are fully aware of the kind-concept under 
which they are classified. In a second interpretation, those classified may only be aware to a 
certain degree of their being classified. In the third interpretation, awareness is required but 
only by proxy; it is not the classified but only those around them who are required to be aware 
of the kind-concept.  
 Khalidi notes that the first of these possible senses of awareness is stronger than 
what Hacking's exemplars of the looping effect exhibit. Since only the strong sense of 
awareness is unique of human beings, Khalidi argues, the looping effect could not be held as 
exclusive of human kinds. The categories of "refugee women" and "multiple personality 
disorder" serve Khalidi to show that the strongest sense of awareness is not exhibited in 
Hacking's examples of the looping effect, and the other two possible senses of awareness 
that may be at play are not unique of human beings. 
 In the first case, women who may not speak the language in which the concept of 
"refugee women" is articulated, may still "acquire the characteristics of women refugees 
precisely because they are so classified" (Hacking 1999, quoted in Khalidi 2010, 349). In the 
case of multiple personality disorder, individuals identified as "multiples" may not explicitly be 
aware of their diagnosis or their psychological characteristics. Despite the lack of awareness 
of the kind concept or its associated descriptions, Hacking considers that the two cases 
exemplify the looping effect. This shows that the sense of awareness at play in the looping 
effect is not as strong as to require that the individuals classified are aware of the kind-
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concept under which they are labeled (first sense of awareness) or of its associated 
descriptions (second sense of awareness).  
  The second sense of awareness does not require a "grasp of a certain set of beliefs" 
but only that the individuals classified have some understanding of what is done to them. For 
instance, the individuals classified may only be aware of being (or not) treated in a certain 
way (due to the category) or of "the acceptability of expressing certain things and no others” 
(Khalidi 2010, 349). Against Hacking's view that the looping effects is unique to human kinds, 
Khalidi argues that some non-humans creatures, like some animals, also exhibit this second 
sense of awareness. As an example Khalidi claims that dogs may well be aware "of the 
attempt to domesticate them and might comply (e.g. in exchange for rewards) or not” (Khalidi 
2010, 349). 
 In a third possible sense of awareness, it is not the individuals classified but the 
people around them who are central to the looping. Khalidi writes, “while those who are 
classified may not have to be aware of the kind in question, nor of the kind-concept with its 
associated beliefs, nor indeed of what is being done to them, still there must be others in 
society who are aware of the classification in order to generate the feedback loop in the first 
place" (Khalidi 2010, 350). This third sense is met by the two examples of "refugee woman" 
and "multiple personality disorder", since it is others who by treating them in certain ways 
make it possible for the individuals classified to generate the changes required for the 
feedback loop. Against Hacking, Khalidi contends that this sense of awareness is also 
exhibited in non-human kinds. As an example of this, Khalidi considers the case of selective 
breeding:  
 
for selective breeding to occur, someone must have been aware of the contrast 
between tame and wild animals and acted accordingly. The same process occurs 
when domestication takes place in the present day. Scientists choose specimens of 
plants and animals and practice artificial selection on them, leading to the creation of 
new varieties with new properties that then lead them to modify their classifications. 
(Khalidi 2010, 351) 
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To put it briefly, Khalidi's argument against Hacking goes as follows. Since Hacking's 
examples of the looping effect do not exhibit awareness of the kind-concept under which an 
individual is categorized, the notion of awareness that operates in the looping effect must be 
weaker. A weaker characterization of awareness, however, could not serve as a criterion to 
differentiate between human kinds and other sorts of kinds (Khalidi 2010, 350). Under such 
criteria, the case of selective breeding, for example, shows that the looping effect could also 
be present in non-human kinds. Thus, Khalidi concludes, Hacking is incorrect in 
characterizing human kinds as the only type of "interactive kinds" (i.e., kinds in which the 
looping effect presents).  
 Cooper and Khalidi offer critiques that share a common theme. Both reject the view 
that awareness plays a central role in the looping effect. In their view, Hacking's demand that 
the people classified by the sciences are aware of the kind-concept under which they are 
being classified is stronger than what his characterization and illustration of the notion shows.  
 The strength of Cooper's and Khalidi's arguments against Hacking's characterization 
of the looping effect as defining "human kinds" depends on whether they correctly understand 
the role played by the notions of "acting under a description" and awareness in the account of 
"human kinds". On the basis of my reading of Hacking's characterization of the looping effect, 
I argue that Cooper's and Khalidi's arguments are irrelevant to Hacking's project, if not 
incorrect. The adequacy of Hacking's characterization of the looping effect does not depend 
on his appeal to Anscombe's notion of intentional action. Cooper may be right that 
Anscombe's notion does not support Hacking's view that people act "under a description" 
provided by the category that classifies them when the looping effect occurs. However, 
Hacking's appeal to Anscombe's notion may be related to another aspect of the notion not 
sufficiently considered by Cooper, and it may in any case not be necessary for the 
characterization of the looping effect. Against Khalidi I argue that Hacking's introduction of the 
looping effect in his characterization of "interactive kinds" is not trivial even if it is specifically 
introduced to refer to human beings. It is not in "intentionality" or "awareness" that the 
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philosophically relevant points of the looping effects lie, but in what is entailed by 
"interactive".  Both arguments fail in placing too much weight on the notion of awareness as 
applicable to individuals rather than kinds, and ignoring the suggested complexities involved 
in the interaction between categories and people. 
 In Chapter 2, I've offered a discussion on Hacking's appeal to Anscombe's notion of 
intentional action in his description of the looping effect as entailing "action under [a] 
description." In section 2,2,1. I offer a brief review of Anscombe's views on intentional action, 
noting that her characterization of "intentional actions" as "action under a description" is only 
one of at least three senses of her account of "intention".  The other two are "intention to act" 
and "intention in acting". This third sense may be the one that Cooper brings up in her 
argument against Hacking, since according to it, it is sufficient that a third party may be able 
to attribute an intention to the actions of an agent for intentional action to take place.  
 A brief reminder of Anscombe's account may be useful. In her discussion of 
intentional action, Anscombe held that “to call an action intentional is to say it is intentional 
under some description that we give (or could give) of it” (Anscombe 1957, §19). If an action 
is to be considered intentional, one must be able to offer reasons in response to "why" 
questions. For this to occur the agent performing the action has knowledge of both his doing 
the action and some causal knowledge that goes beyond the action performed such that, in 
case he is asked, he could offer a reason as to why he performed the action. 
 Anscombe is clear in her account of intentional action regarding the need of some 
non-observational causal knowledge for intentional action to occur. Otherwise, she notes, 
many involuntary events such as bowel movements or ordinary breathing would have to be 
considered as intentional, while they are evidently not. Physical events do not meet the 
criteria of intentional action because no non-observational causal knowledge could be offered 
as to why the action is performed, for instance, by the guts or the lungs. Having theoretical 
knowledge of an event, on the flip side, is also not sufficient to meet the criteria for intentional 
action. One may possess all the current scientific knowledge that explains bowel movements 
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and ordinary breathing, but having such knowledge would not be sufficient to consider those 
movements "intentional". Providing an explanation of an event through either merely physical 
evidence or merely theoretical knowledge does not suffice to establish intentionality. Such a 
view would allow for nearly any event of which there is a scientific theory to be considered 
intentional.  
In Anscombe's account, when an action is intentional the agent performing the action 
has some knowledge that a given action is performed (i.e., knowledge of the physical events) 
as well as some non-observational causal knowledge of the action performed (i.e., causal -
theoretical- knowledge of the action performed). In addition to this, if the agent were to be 
asked why he performed the action, he would be able to offer reasons. . For example, when 
cooking, the cook is (a) aware that they are performing the act of cooking, (b) are aware of 
the way the flavors combine when introduced in a certain order and prepared at a certain 
temperature, and could describe the ingredients put into the dish to a third party (luckily for 
those with allergies to peanuts or shellfish), and (c) explain why certain ingredients were used 
over others (so if a person wanted to know "why did you put salt in the pie?" you could 
respond "it is a meat pie!"). With these three characteristics, we can establish that an action is 
"intentional". Anscombe is trying to avoid positing intentionality as a special mental state. Her 
concern is to identify conditions under which one can be said to be morally liable for what one 
did, and a paradigm case of moral liability is acting intentionally. 
 Although Cooper may be right that one of the senses of Anscombe's account of 
intention includes the actions of non verbal agents, that sense does not seem to be the one 
to which Hacking appeals in his characterization of the looping effect. It is rather Anscombe's 
notion of intentional action in terms of "reason giving" that seems to be relevant to the notion 
of awareness involved. Hacking's discussion of MPD illustrates the sense that acting "under a 
description," as it relates to Anscombe's notion of intentional action as "reason giving", 
applies to looping effects. Furthermore, the case of MPD also suggests a way to respond to 
Khalidi's criticisms.   
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 In my revision of Hacking's discussion of MPD in Chapter 2, I noted that the 
introduction of a theoretical language about MPD provided experts and lay people alike with a 
theoretical framework for the organization of the experiences and behaviors of those 
classified as multiples. This theoretical language also served the subjects labeled as 
multiples to put in perspective and describe their experiences. “Switching,” “alter,” 
“personality fragment,” “coming out” were among the terms used by experts and multiples. 
With the theoretical framework and language of MPD experts and multiples were able to 
make sense of experiences lived, starting by recognizing their very occurrence. The role 
played by the theoretical framework and language of MPD may be seen in relation to 
Anscombe's two aspects of intentional action of (1) having some knowledge that an action is 
being performed and (2) some non-observational causal knowledge of sorts. The theoretical 
framework and language made it possible for experts and agents to acknowledge, 
understand and offer a rationale for their experiences in the ways specified by (under the 
description of) a causal theoretical framework and the language associated to it. They 
opened a "new world of opportunities" for action. It is in the opening of such conceptual 
space that Hacking's appeal to Anscombe has relevance in his characterization of the looping 
effect: 
 
Anscombe’s theses about action seem to have an unexpected corollary. When new 
descriptions become available, when they come into circulation, or even when they 
become the sorts of things that it is all right to say, to think, then there are new things 
to choose to do. When new intentions become open to me, because new 
descriptions, new concepts, become available to me, I live in a new world of 
opportunities. (Hacking 1995a, 236). 
 
A central concern in Anscombe's notion of intentional action was to be able to tell apart 
intentional and non-intentional actions as a way to determine in which cases we should 
allocate moral responsibility to an agent. Hacking is less concerned with this aspect of 
Anscombe's notion. Instead, his emphasis is on the logic of concepts and the possibilities of 
action that they open up. Intentionality is only significant insofar as we gain new possible 
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actions to choose from when conceptual frameworks are introduced. For instance, with the 
introduction of MPD, a "personality fragment" or "alter" can intentionally "come out", 
something which could not be described in those terms before the introduction of the 
framework or now that the category of MPD has fallen out of use.83  
 The discussion just offered on MPD also serves to offer a response to Khalidi's 
criticisms. First, it was not only the "experts" (a third party) who became aware of the jargon 
regarding the psychological condition of "Multiple Personality Disorder," but the patients 
themselves. Terms like "Alter" and "Personality fragment" became a part of the vocabulary 
that people with MPD used to understand and respond to their own experiences. The 
emergence of self-help groups founded by MPD patients show how individuals were aware of 
their diagnoses and adopted certain behaviors and self-conceptions in response. The 
terminology employed by experts was appropriated by those under the category to 
understand, interpret and respond to the behaviors they expressed, thereby ensuring that the 
category itself had a causal impact on the people being categorized. As varying positions on 
these questions informed the therapeutic methods pursued by experts, it came to influence 
the conditions of treatment faced by the patients. Moreover, since the different views were 
adopted by groups of people diagnosed with the condition, they also impacted the self-
conception of the patients with multiple personality as well as how they responded to the 
therapies applied in their treatment. This shows that looping effects were present in the 
                                                            
83 Hacking addresses this point in the following passage: "Anscombe was interested in the intentions of 
whole people, responsible moral agents. Now under one account of what is happening in multiplicity, 
the switch is not intentional but involuntary. This may be the account that will be favored if the diagnosis 
and the name dissociative identity disorder succeeds. We have in effect “less than one person”; we 
have no well organized person to form intentions. Contrast an account that was widespread during the 
1980s and is still current among the rank and file of the multiple movements. When Esther switches to 
Stan, Stan comes out, takes over, dominates Esther and other alters of Daphne, the host personality. 
Stan is an agent; Stan is the personality who is responsible for the switch. The switch was not one of 
Esther’s or Daphne’s intentional actions, but it was one of Stan’s. Stan has decided to come out. Until 
the new language and conceptions of multiple personality came into use, this was not an option for a 
personality fragment, not as something like an intentional action. But it was described in the manner of 
an intentional action, Stan’s action, at least in the 1980s. As dissociative identity disorder becomes the 
official diagnosis, and personalities become less distinct in theory and practice, these opportunities for 
intentional action may fade away" (Hacking 1995a, 237). 
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population of people categorized as having "multiple personalities." Moreover, the changing 
conceptions of experts led to changing approaches to therapy, leading to similar changes 
among those categorized as such. 
 Were Khalidi to be correct in his categorization of multiple personalities, their 
condition could be wholly explainable according to a theoretical framework (e.g. biological or 
behavioral), without any need to refer to the experiences and actions of people with MPD. On 
the contrary, the shifting category of the experts led to similarly shifting self-conceptions by 
"multiples". By failing to address Hacking's research into the genealogy of this category and 
its historical development, Khalidi's criticism does not refute Hacking's understanding of 
looping effects as a characteristic of this group. While it is true that some individuals labeled 
with MPD might not be clearly impacted by the categorization, the theoretical impact on the 
treatment of the population as a whole contributed to shaping the category and the 
experiences of multiples, either through their treatment by others or through the 
internalization of the concepts upheld by the experts. In either case the knowledge and 
language produced on MPD impacted multiples through either the treatment they received by 
experts or a shift in self-conception. Although Khalidi's observation that some non-human 
kinds change in response of the impact of their being classified (e.g., marijuana) and some 
objects may even be said to interact with their classifications (such as in the domestication of 
animals), the change and the interactions in the classification does not seem fit for the 
epistemic (and ontological) role played by human agents. Had Khalidi been right that non-
human objects showed the same changes as human agents, his critique would have had 
more legs 
 Is Khalidi correct in his assessment that Hacking's notion of "interactive kinds" 
trivializes or obscures the notion of interactive kinds, as it ultimately reduces to the idea that 
objects of classification have some awareness of how they are being classified? Perhaps, but 
only if one ignores the ontological and epistemic significance of Hacking's characterization of 
human kinds as interactive. It is not awareness per se that is philosophically significant for 
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Hacking's project, but interaction. Although Khalidi may be correct in his evaluation that the 
introduction of the notion of interactive kinds as an intended classification of kinds of kind 
(i.e., kinds of people) may have been trivial or confused, the kind it intended to capture and 
the features it highlighted still stand. If my reading of Hacking's MUP project is adequate, then 
the presence of looping effects, and the analytic framework for the analysis of MUP 
represents a heuristic to account for the interactions involved in the constitution of kinds of 
people (i.e., the notion of kinds of people is all that Hacking needed).  
 Nevertheless, Khalidi places a stronger weight to "awareness" in the characterization 
of the notion than it ever had (i.e., even in the characterization of "interactive kinds"). What 
distinguish human kinds from other types of kinds is not primarily that they are aware, but that 
they interact in ways peculiar to them with their classifications. Not one single human being or 
all the individuals classified as being of given kind need be aware, but as a type they might 
be (i.e., some individuals may become aware of their being classified; that's a possibility open 
to them, which would be closed in case they were not human beings). The merit of the notion 
does not lie in acknowledging awareness as a defining feature, but in pointing out at the 
epistemic and ontological dimensions that open up for philosophical analysis due to such a 
feature. Such philosophically relevant interactions are at the center of Hacking's subsequent 
development of his framework for the conceptual analysis of kinds of people.  
  
5. 2. Some human kinds are stable 
Jonathan Tsou presents a critique of Hacking's characterization of kinds of people as 
"moving targets", contending that while some human kinds may be unstable objects, there is 
also a subset of stable psychiatric objects, identified through law-like biological regularities 
that are uniform across cultures and unaffected by looping effects. Tsou discusses the cases 
of schizophrenia and depression to illustrate the point.  Against Hacking, Tsou argues that in 
the case of some Psychiatric categories, the presence of looping effects do not destabilize 
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their objects of classification, and thus Hacking is at fault for a hasty generalization when he 
characterizes all human kinds as unstable objects or "moving targets".  
 Against Tsou, I argue that although he may be correct that a component of the 
Psychiatric categories he discusses can be understood as fairly stable objects, such objects 
are not on their own sufficient to account for the ontology of Psychiatric categories, if these 
are to be understood as kinds of people. First, Psychiatric categories, if taken as kinds of 
people, are better understood within the motley ontological view of relevant kinds that has 
been articulated in Chapter 1. Second, considering Hacking's comprehensive philosophical 
proposal, one may expect to find answers to questions about the stability of scientific 
ontology within the framework of scientific styles of reasoning, which is not taken into account 
in Tsou's critique. Third, it is unclear whether Tsou's understanding of the implications of the 
looping effect is adequate, as he seems to prioritize the reinterpretation of the biological as a 
necessary component for ontological change. This last point, nonetheless, brings up some 
interesting questions about the scope of the looping effect, its relation to the styles of 
scientific reasoning, and its implication for scientific change in Psychiatry (and the human 
sciences). The following passage shows Tsou 's contention against Hacking's ontological 
view:  
[Hacking’s] claim is that the kinds of people (e.g., autistic children or schizophrenics) 
classified by interactive kinds (‘autism’, ‘schizophrenia’) will change in lieu of looping 
effects such that there is no stable object of knowledge to study. The idea is that 
because of the constant dynamics between social science classifications and people 
being classified, the kinds of people being classified are constantly changing in 
response to how they are classified, and in this precise sense are ‘on the move’. 
Below, I argue that Hacking’s claim is a misleading generalization, which requires 
qualification. I argue that interactive and indifferent kinds—understood as objects of 
classification—represent a class of objects that are stable. (Tsou 2007, 338) 
 
Tsou's argument follows from the assumption that there are certain subtypes of psychiatric 
disorders that are causally characterized by the presence of a biological pathology. In such 
cases, the stereotypical abnormal behaviors associated to a given condition are causally 
understood as the effects of the biological pathology. For example, Tsou notes, in the case of 
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schizophrenia the "excessive dopamine activity in the mesolimbic pathway causes 
hallucinations and delusions" (Tsou 2007, 339), and the feelings of sadness stereotypical of 
depression "are caused by an underactivity of monoamine neurotransmitters, especially 
serotonin and norepinephrine" (Tsou 2007, 337). In both cases, Tsou observes, 
pharmacological research and interventions support the dopamine hypothesis of 
schizophrenia and the monoamine hypothesis of depression. Tsou takes these two putative 
mechanisms for schizophrenia and depression as concrete and plausible examples of what 
Hacking would accept as a putative "pathology P", in his characterization of the distinction of 
indifferent kinds as opposed to interactive kinds.  
 The fact that such biological regularities are common in Psychiatry, Tsou suggests, 
goes against Hacking's characterization of all kinds of people as "moving targets", on the 
basis that their objects of classification are unstable due to looping effects. If Hacking's 
characterization were correct, Tsou suggests, he would need to show that the classification is 
affected due to the effects on the underlying biological pathologies causing the stereotypical 
manifestations of a condition, and not only the manifestations of such biological pathologies 
in people's behaviors and experiences.  
 Tsou's critique of Hacking's ontological view is based on a distinction between a 
"weak implication" and a "stronger implication" of the looping effect. In the weaker sense an 
"individual's experience and behaviors are altered in response to looping effects", and in the 
stronger sense, an "individual's experience and behavior are altered in response to looping 
effects to the extent that the defining criteria for that classification change" (Tsou 2007, 339). 
Tsou grants that Hacking's characterization of the weaker implications of the looping effect 
might be correct, but rejects the stronger implication. Elaborating on the case of 
schizophrenia, Tsou points out that although the classification of an individual (or a subset of 
them) may affect his experiences and behaviors (weaker sense of the looping effect), these 
changes may have no consequence for the revision of the classification (stronger implication 
of the looping effect). This is so because the underlying causal pathology is unaffected by the 
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weaker implications of the looping. It may be worth emphasizing at this point that Tsou's 
central point is that "the law-like biological regularity associated with a particular kind of 
person can be understood as a stable object of classification that does not change as a result 
of looping effects" (Tsou 2007, 339). 
 There is one straightforward response to Tsou's critique on this point. Following the 
logic of classification and causal knowledge presupposed in Hacking's view, it is inadequate 
to identify the object of classification of kinds of people with the "law-like biological regularity" 
associated to a particular kind of person. The biological components characteristic of a kind 
of people are neither the unique nor the primary defining elements of such a category. That's 
one of the core takeaways from Hacking's appeal to Goodman's relevant kinds in his view of 
kinds of people. The objects of kinds of people, understood as relevant kinds, are conceived 
of as motely entities constituted by a multiplicity of domains, each contributing to the 
characterization of the class, none of which are hierarchically prior to any other. Tsou's 
argument takes for granted not only the stability of the biological characteristic of categories 
of people, but also the priority of such stability as a defining aspect of the category and its 
causal import. To put it bluntly, because the biological component is stable, Tsou's argument 
seems to suggest, in spite of other components being subject to change, the category is 
stable.  
 In Tsou's argument, the stable biological components seemingly confer stability to 
the category as a whole. But this is against the logic of kinds of people as relevant kinds 
presented in chapter 1, 2 and the interlude. The biological stability that may partake in a 
category of people does not exhaustively constitute or define the ontology of the class. A 
change in the conception of the biological domain involved in the constitution of a kind of 
person may or not be relevant for the looping to take place. The example of homosexuality 
illustrates this, since it is not a change in the putative biological mechanism of homosexuality 
that brought about the reclassification of the category, but to a great extent it was due to the 
role played by organized people contesting the adequacy of the pathologizing of the class. 
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 A second aspect in Tsou's argument concerns the sense in which the causal 
knowledge is transformed as a result of the looping effect. Tsou's argument assumes that the 
causally relevant element of some categories of people, such as depression and 
schizophrenia, is the law-like biological regularity in which he identifies the stabilizing element 
of kind of people. In his account it is the putative brain mechanism, dopamine or monoamines 
deregulation, which causes the stereotypical behaviors associated to conditions such as 
hallucinations and sad mood. In the reading offered in chapter 1 and 2 I noted that the sense 
in which kinds of people provide "causal knowledge" is broader and unorthodox, as the 
causal import of kinds of people is not placed in a specific domain of those which intersect 
constituting the category, but rather in the orchestration of diverse pieces of knowledge and 
the way in which such pieces contribute to the understanding of past, present, and possible 
future experiences of a person, as being of the kind. The example of multiple personality 
disorder serves Hacking to illustrate the point. 
 A third response to Tsou's arguments concerns the notion of ontological stability (or 
instability) that might be at play in the looping effect. Considering Hacking's overall 
philosophical view of the sciences, one may relate the stability of scientific ontology to the 
styles project in which Hacking elaborates on the stabilization of phenomena and scientific 
ontology through distinct techniques of stabilization specific to each style. It should not come 
as a surprise that some of the components in a category may exhibit a greater level of 
stability than others, depending on what techniques of stabilization are at play in a particular 
domain of phenomena. As the category is constituted by distinct intersecting scientific 
domains, the stability of the category - ontological or otherwise - is not determined by any of 
its constitutive domains alone. Under Hacking's picture of science, the stability of a scientific 
domain is not a given but an achievement that requires careful analysis. Such an analysis is 
in part what is at stake in the philosophical analysis of the looping effects of kinds of people. 
How does the stabilization of a component in a given category contribute to the stabilization 
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of the category as a whole, and to what extent do the unstable components continue to 
influence the transformation of the category?  
 The category as a whole would not stop transforming because one of the epistemic 
or ontological components of a kind of person had become stable. For instance, in the case 
of schizophrenia, the hallucinatory voices experienced by schizophrenic subjects may be 
conceived of as a by-product of the dopamine deregulation by the biological sciences 
studying such biological mechanism. Such a view, however, does not rule out the relevance 
of other domains of research, such as anthropological research on schizophrenia which may 
consider cultural differences in the experience of hearing voices to understand how these 
differences may impact the expression, and progression of the condition.84 Such a view has 
also not prevented the creation of social organizations such as the hearing voices movement, 
which conceives of the experience of hearing voices as meaningful experiences and not 
merely a by-product of a biological dysfunction.85  
  An account of the stability of the biological component in a given kind of person is 
relevant in the philosophical account of the category, but such stability does not provide an 
exhaustive account of the ontology of the class. A kind of person is constituted in as much by 
a characteristic brain mechanism, as it is by a set of human beings - a population- and their 
characteristic set of behaviors, experiences and interactions. To understand how a category 
of person changes, and how its object is stabilized or destabilized, one would have to pay 
                                                            
84 For instance, the collective work of the anthropologist T.M Luhrmann, and Psychiatrists R. 
Padmavati, H. Tharoor and A. Osei on the cultural differences on the expression of the 
phenomenological experience of hearing voices in qualifying subjects for a diagnosis of schizophrenia 
in the USA, Ghana and India. The study shows that "Participants in the U.S.A. were more likely to use 
diagnostic labels and to report violent commands than those in India and Ghana, who were more likely 
than the Americans to report rich relationships with their voices and less likely to describe the voices as 
the sign of a violated mind." Luhrmann et.al suggests that their findings may be clinically significant 
insofar as the content and affective tone of hallucinatory voices have been shown to affect the 
functioning of schizophrenic subjects. They suggest that their study may support the view hold by the 
Hearing Voices Network that "it is possible to improve a person's relationship with their voices by 
teaching them to name their voices, to respect their voices and to interact with them, and that doing so 
reduces the voice's caustic quality" (Luhrmann et. al. 2014, 4).   
85 Such as the International Hearing Voices Network (URL: http://www.intervoiceonline.org/). 
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close attention to all the components involved in its constitution without privileging one 
domain over the others.  
 A final aspect to consider about Tsou's criticism concerns the temporality of the 
looping effect. Tsou's discussion suggests that the looping effect occurs in cases falling under 
the weak implication of the looping effect, but do not occur in cases falling under the stronger 
implication. Tsou grants that scientific classifications influence people's behaviors and 
experiences but he rejects that the changes in people's experience and behavior that result 
from such influence prompt the modification of the classification. This suggests that the 
looping effect occurs rather frequently in its weak sense, but rarely or never in its stronger 
sense.  
That distinction exposes a misguided understanding of the looping effect. The cases 
falling under Tsou's weak implication of the looping effect are not cases of looping. They are 
the first step in the looping, but do not count on their own as such. Only the cases that prompt 
the modification of the classification in an epistemically and ontologically relevant way are 
cases of looping. I've previously argued that a change in the conception of the law-like 
regularity that may figure in the characterization of a classification, as Tsou suggests, is not 
necessary for the looping to take place (e.g., the case of homosexuality). But it is also 
incorrect to think that all cases in which a classification influences people's behaviors and 
experiences are cases of looping.  
 Although I've argued that Tsou's distinction between weak and strong implications of 
the looping effect is misguided, there is something about the distinction that highlights a 
puzzling implication of Hacking's notion of looping effect: the extent to which Hacking's view 
that kinds of people are moving targets involves ontological changes. Hacking's view that 
kinds of people are moving targets is closely related to his notion of the looping effect. The 
matrix provided by the vectors of analysis of MUP integrates both stabilizing and destabilizing 
components, but beyond that point there are no specifics on what it takes for the revision of 
classification as prompted by the looping effect to bring about an ontological transformation. If 
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kinds of people are moving targets because they present looping effects, then since the 
looping effect is not as frequent, kinds of people as scientific objects are not so volatile. Not 
all the effects of classification on the people they classified are sufficiently significant to 
produce the revision of a classification that could bring about a world change. In other words, 
although scientific classification transforms kinds of people, which in a sense amounts to an 
ontological change, not all the changes produced by scientific classification on people 
produce new kinds of people. This point does not undermine the thesis that "kinds of people" 
are a moving target, but it calls for further clarification. In the final section of this chapter I 
offer a discussion on this point.  
 
5.3. Hacking's semantic strategy cannot reconcile the competing explanatory claims of 
the medical and the biopsychosocial models  
 Dominic Murphy presents an additional criticism targeting Hacking's proposed 
semantic strategy to overcome the dichotomy between the "natural" and the "social." He 
emphasizes the explanatory, rather than the metaphysical, in the divide between the medical 
model and the biopsychosocial model in Psychiatry. Sympathizing with Hacking's conciliatory 
view of the natural-social divide, Murphy contends that the specification of distinct semantic 
domains for the natural and for the social in the determination of Psychiatric categories is not 
sufficient for their conciliation. In his view, the challenge consists in mediating between two 
competing explanatory approaches, each with their own victories; one on a natural 
(biological) basis and the other on a social basis (Murphy 2001, 140). This conciliation, he 
argues, could be better achieved at the methodological level. 
 Murphy's argument could be divided in three parts. First, he argues that 
Hacking's adoption of Putnam-Kripke semantics compromises the internal consistency of his 
account, since it entails two conflicting causal pictures of the behavioral manifestations of 
mental illness. Second, Murphy argues that Hacking's assumption of the essentialist picture 
of the Putnam-Kripke semantics renders his account empirically inconsistent since such an 
 
 
140 
essentialist picture is at odds with the scientific understanding of mental illness. Third, even if 
Hacking's semantic account were logically and empirically adequate, allocating distinct 
semantic domains to the natural and to the social would still leave each realm apart without 
bringing them any closer. 
 Murphy's criticisms follow from his understanding of Hacking's appeal to the 
Putnam-Kripke semantics as a strategy to set apart the biological or "physical basis" of 
mental illness (i.e., its referent) from its behavioral manifestations  (i.e., its stereotype) 
(Murphy 2001, 140). In his reading, the referent of "autism" would consist of a putative 
"underlying neuropathology", while its stereotype would consist of the "ways of being" of "the 
actual set of childhood autistics". The underlying neuropathology of autism is seen as an 
"indifferent kind" and the set of childhood autistics as an "interactive kind". By distinguishing 
the underlying pathology and the behavioral manifestations in this way, Murphy contends that 
Hacking assumes that the former provides the "genuine causal" story that produces the 
behavioral manifestations of autism. 
 In his critique, Murphy first targets the internal consistency of Hacking's account 
due to his appeal to the Putnam-Kripke semantics. Murphy argues that Hacking's semantic 
strategy for bridging the natural and the social entails two conflicting causal views of mental 
illness. On the one hand, Hacking appeals to the Putnam-Kripke semantics, which comprises 
a reductionist and essentialist view of mental illness, in which the behavioral manifestations 
of mental illness could be caused (i.e., explained) by a putative biological pathology. On the 
other hand, the notions of a social niche and looping effect that Hacking introduces also 
provide an account of the social causation of mental illness. According to this second view, 
the behavioral manifestation of mental illness may be produced by the accumulation of social 
vectors into a social niche, in the absence of a biological pathology. The study of the 
behavioral manifestations of mental illness may prompt the introduction of a mental illness 
category, and in turn such introduction may impact the behaviors studied, producing a 
looping effect. Under this view, the contributions of the medical approach are seen as merely 
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adding to the vectors in the social niche of a mental illness (Murphy 2001, 148). It is the sum 
of the forces in the vector that causally account for the production of mental illness, rather 
than the putative biological pathology. 
 These two causal stories suggested in Hacking's view, Murphy argues, are in 
conflict with each other: either the biological pathology causes the behavioral manifestations 
of mental illness, or the social forces in the ecological niche of mental illness do. Along these 
lines, Murphy writes,  
 
it is unclear how far Hacking is entitled to the causal story that underpins the Kripke-
Putnam picture given his other commitments. Kripke and Putnam assert that the 
connection between essence and surface manifestation (the kind of perceptually 
salient properties that get incorporated into the stereotype) is a causal one. Water’s 
surface properties are the effect of its underlying molecular structure. For Hacking, 
however, the manifestation of autism results from social forces, not the underlying 
neuropathology. (Murphy 2001, 153)  
 
Furthermore, in Murphy's view the adoption of the Putnam-Kripke semantics not only 
compromises the internal consistency of Hacking's account of mental illness, but also its 
consistency with current scientific knowledge. Against the essentialist picture Murphy 
contends that the "neurological" picture has established that the form that brain pathology 
may take varies according to the social forces that impact it, even if variation is not 
appreciated at a large-scale. Murphy draws from this view that "the brain, being the organ of 
cognition, changes in response to changes in the social and cultural environment" (Murphy 
2001, 154). If brain pathologies would serve as the "essences" of a mental illness they would 
have to resist change, otherwise what would it mean, say, for H20 to be the essence of water 
if it becomes a different substance when freezing? Brain pathologies would make unstable 
essences and, as such, not essences at all.  
 Supplementing his argument Murphy also contends that, in any case, Hacking's 
approach fails because allocating distinct semantic domains to the natural and the social still 
leaves apart the two conflicting explanatory approaches behind the medical and 
biospychosocial models. Murphy seems to suggest that what follows from Hacking's appeal 
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to Putnam-Kripke semantics is a doubled causal view of mental illness in which brain 
pathologies and social forces are held to cause the behavioral manifestations of mental 
illness. The issue with this, Murphy argues, is that the two causal accounts are in competition 
with each other and Hacking's account does not account for the way in which the two may 
interact to produce such manifestations.  
 Murphy considers that the challenge posed by the split between the medical 
model and biopsychosocial model is that it presupposes that either brain pathology explains 
the manifestation of mental illness or social forces do. He notes that whereas the medical 
model better explains some mental illnesses on the basis of brain pathologies, such as 
autism, the biopsychosocial model explains better other conditions, such as eating disorders. 
Murphy associates the medical model with scientific realism, and the biopsychosocial model 
with social constructionism. According to the medical model, brain pathology causes 
behaviors. According to the biopsychosocial model, social forces - such as Western 
standards of beauty in the case of eating disorders, cause behaviors and brains to change. 
Either the causal picture of the medical model is adequate or the causal picture of the 
biopsychosocial model is. Assigning semantic domains to each approach, Murphy argues, 
does not solve the causal challenge underlying the divide between the two approaches, let 
alone the fact that it appears to be unclear if not inconsistent. 
 In Murphy's view the mediation between the natural and the social is already 
suggested by a methodological strategy commonly used by the cognitive sciences, in which 
behavior is thought of as being caused by "the representation of social properties by the 
brain" (Murphy 2001, 155). This strategy, Murphy argues, provides some understanding on 
"how the social dynamics [that Hacking] discusses can be mediated by neuropsychological 
structures" (Murphy 2001, 141). Murphy argues that this position does not require a major 
commitment to the mental, as it only requires positing that "people can think about the social 
world and that these thoughts are realized in biological material that mediates between 
culture and behavior" (Murphy 2001, 156). Murphy considers that the strategy could 
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potentially explain how mental illness could arise in the absence of brain pathology, as well 
as individual variation. For instance, it may help to understand how some social forces play a 
role in the formation of "distinctive patterns in [the] development" of poor French men, 
explaining "how not all poor French men became fugueurs" (Murphy 2001, 156).  
 Murphy illustrates his view with a discussion of dysthymia. Dysthymia is an 
affective disorder characterized by depressed mood, for most of the day and for most days, 
over a period of 2 years, without presenting any episodes of major depression or mania. 
Studies have shown that dysthymics score low in their "ability to achieve social goals and 
carry out simple social tasks", show a tendency "to blame others for their dissatisfactions 
rather than considering their own behavior" (Murphy 2001,158), engage less in social 
interactions in comparison to control subjects and, remarkably, hold the belief that "they have 
helped others significantly more than they were helped by others" (Murphy 2001, 158). 
Murphy considers two hypotheses that possibly explain dysthymia. According to one, 
"dysthymics suffer from a psychological impairment, intrinsic to their cognitive architecture, 
that renders them incapable of learning the norms of reciprocation" (Murphy 2001, 158). 
According to the second hypothesis, "dysthymics are capable of acquiring the relevant 
information but have failed to acquire it" (Murphy 2001, 159). If the latter hypothesis is correct 
then some form of cognitive therapy may correct dysthymics' "deep-seated cognitive biases," 
replacing them with more socially acceptable norms. If the first hypothesis is correct, no 
cognitive intervention could be of help for dysthymics. In either case, Murphy argues, looking 
into dysthymics' thoughts would contribute to better explain their conditions. This makes 
plain, Murphy suggests, that the medical and the biopsychosocial models could be brought 
closer together in an explanation of dysthymia if the cognitive mediates between them. 
Murphy argues that "abnormal content" rather than "abnormal mechanism" may help to 
understand how mental illness's behavioral manifestations may be present when it is not 
clear whether there is underlying brain pathology.  
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 Murphy's criticisms are targeted at what he takes to be the metaphysical picture 
endorsed by Hacking in his use of the Putnam-Kripke's semantics. Hacking's appeal to 
Putnam-Kripke's semantics, however, does not extend to the metaphysical claims that are 
associated with their view. In particular, it does not entail either the reductionism or the 
essentialism of mental illness that Murphy attributes to him. In my discussion of Hacking's 
view on the semantic resolution and causal knowledge in Chapter 2, I noted what I take to be 
the relevant aspects that Hacking takes from Putnam's semantics; namely, his view of 
meaning as a vector, which includes the view of natural kind-terms as indexicals and the 
hypothesis of the division of linguistic labor. Although the indexicality of natural kinds terms 
has been generally associated to the essentialist view of Kripke, Hacking disentangles 
Putnam's account from Kripke's. Hacking is very clear on this point in his paper "Putnam's 
Theory of Natural Kinds and their Names is Not the Same as Kripke's" (Hacking 2007d), in 
which he clearly differentiates between Kripke’s essentialism and Putnam's version, which he 
sees as compatible with his commitment to nominalism. In this paper, Hacking states: 
"Interest in essence marks out a central difference between Putnam and Kripke. Putnam 
never allowed himself much more than "so to speak" essence, and increasingly withdrew 
from, e.g., the idea that water is necessarily H2O. In the end he wholly rejected the notion of 
"metaphysically" necessary a posteriori truths about natural kinds" (Hacking 2007d, 5-6).  
 In Chapter 2 I also noted Hacking's commitment to a fallibilist view of knowledge, 
which does not allow for the postulation of metaphysical essences nor of necessary and 
sufficient conditions. It seems to me that the notion of the indexicality of natural kind terms is 
welcome by Hacking only in a pragmatic way. And yet with such an idea he is able to rescue 
the minimal realist intuition that there is something in the world, the referent of a term, which 
is picked out by concepts. In subsequent developments of his account of kinds of people, 
Hacking has specified further his own version of the "meaning vector" of kinds of people. This 
view was discussed in Chapter 1. 
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 Hacking's semantic account could easily avoid the first two of Murphy's 
criticisms. Murphy's charges of being internally and empirically inconsistent are due to the 
combination of the essentialist and the social constructivist causal views as competing modes 
of explanation of the behavioral manifestations of mental illnesses, but Hacking's view is not 
committed to the essentialist view of brain pathologies.86 Hacking's semantic reconciliation of 
the natural and the social is better understood as a part of a philosophical account of 
classification rather than as a theory of causation. Classifications of mental illnesses are only 
one of the types of classification for which his account may be suited, but only insofar as 
these are conceived of as types of persons or "human kinds". Hacking's semantic account, 
insofar as the notion of a meaning vector that he adapts from Putnam in his account of 
human kinds, does not specify the way in which the natural and the social causally interact in 
the production of the behavioral manifestations of mental illness. In this regard, the force of 
Murphy’s third criticism would depend on how one fills that out. 
 This last point suggests that Hacking's notion of a vector could be better 
understood as a heuristic for the analysis of specific categories, including mental illnesses. In 
this account it is acknowledged that the natural and the social play may play an indispensable 
role in the determination of a category, but the relations between the two components is to be 
determined case by case. Murphy's account of the mediation between the natural and the 
social in terms of cognitive content may, in Hacking's account, be one possible way in which 
the natural and the social interact. However, no causal story of the relation between the 
natural and the social could be generalized for all mental illnesses or human kinds, although 
some common themes may be similar among them. Hacking's analyses of diverse kinds of 
people (child abuse, multiple personality, homosexuality, etc.) show that the natural and the 
                                                            
86 It may be worth emphasizing Hacking's distinction between Putnam's basic realistic commitments and 
Kripke's essentialism. As previously noted, Hacking is sympathetic to Putnam but not Kripke. One may 
also here emphasize that Hacking's own account of dynamic nominalism is emphatically non-
essentialist.  
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social components that partake in the constitution of categories varies from case to case, as 
do their interactions.   
 One can then grant that Murphy is correct in his understanding of the role played 
by the notion of an ecological niche as the space in which a series of social vectors 
participate in the generation of mental illness, but note that Hacking's account is not 
concerned with causation or explanation but with classification and its ontological 
implications. Given this distinction, Murphy is wrong in his understanding of a tension 
between this view and Hacking's semantic strategy. One can understand the reference of a 
term as an indexical without committing to essentialism. Here again, Hacking's semantic 
strategy is not committed to Kripke's essentialism, but rather we should understand it in 
relation to Hacking's defense of pragmatic realism and his commitment to nominalism.  
 Murphy's emphasis on causation and explanation highlight some interesting 
points that could be clarified and further elaborated from Hacking's account. While Hacking 
does not accept a metaphysically loaded notion of causality, Murphy's understanding of the 
ecological niche as a space in which various social vectors converge in the production of 
mental illness could be extracted as a causal account. However, this understanding is not 
explicitly supported in Hacking's work. As I've noted in Chapter 1, Hacking seems to be less 
concerned with the metaphysics of causality than with its pragmatics. He switches the focus 
from causes to the broader notion of "causal knowledge". As a reminder, Hacking rejects a 
definite account of kinds, including natural kinds, in terms of necessary and sufficient 
conditions. It is not Kripke's essentialist account that one has to associate with Hacking's 
appeal to Putnam's semantics, but to Lakoff's prototype theory of concepts and Goodman's 
account of relevant kinds.  
In the example of MPD, Hacking argues that the etiology of mental conditions rests 
on fairly-necessary-conditions rather than on necessary or sufficient conditions (generally 
purported in accounts of natural laws and natural kinds). On the one hand, childhood sexual 
trauma plays a crucial role in the understanding of the formation of MPD, but it does not 
 
 
147 
determine that an individual will develop multiple personality disorder. On the other hand, 
while most "multiples" were victims of childhood sexual assault, not all of them were. This 
shows that childhood sexual trauma is neither necessary nor sufficient for MPD (or 
disassociation), and yet it serves experts to understand MPD's associated behaviors. 
Childhood sexual abuse, Hacking argues, is better understood as a part of a prototype of 
MPD. Bringing again Hacking's words on this matter: “[I]f you were giving a best example of a 
multiple, you would include child abuse as one feature of the example” (Hacking 1995a, 83). 
(A multiple who has been the subjected to childhood sexual trauma fits the prototype of MPD, 
the way a raven or a turkey is more likely than an ostrich to be the prototypical bird for a 
person from California. The prototype of a kind is seen as causal insofar as it serves as a 
guide to deal with experience, whether for the purpose of identification, explanation or 
intervention.   
A second point highlighted by Murphy’s critique concerns explanation. Murphy 
correctly notices that Hacking's semantic resolution does not deal with the problem of 
deciding between two competing explanatory accounts of mental illness. Similarly to 
causation, Hacking switches from talking about explanation to talking about the validation of 
knowledge claims and vindication of kinds of people. These two are at the heart of Hacking's 
overall project, and the most we can extract from Hacking's work is two schematic views: the 
5-vector framework for the analysis of MUP and the six schemata used for the validation of 
knowledge claims in the styles of scientific reasoning. Hacking asks us to envision a distinct 
way of doing philosophy of science. Rather than trying to decide between competing 
accounts of causation, explanation, laws of nature, and other metaphysically loaded units of 
analysis, we are invited to look into how the distinct knowledge claims (and their associated 
ontologies) are produced and accepted in actual scientific discourse.  
When we look into such processes what we find is not one or two views, call them 
"the medical model" and "the biopsychosocial model", but a myriad of views all contributing to 
the understanding of a phenomenon (or a type of entity, such as a kind of person). Hacking's 
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understanding of kinds of people as cross-cutting categories and relevant kinds presented in 
Chapter 1 offers some insight into how one could go around the challenge of inconsistency. 
Another insight into the constitutions of kinds of people - understood as scientific categories - 
and the validation of scientific knowledge about them is provided by the styles of scientific 
reasoning. From this point of view we might say that the medical model prioritizes the 
laboratory style, whereas the biopsychosocial model may be more open to other forms of 
validation. Whether the styles could suffice to account for the ways in which knowledge 
claims about psychiatric kinds come into being and are validated is a different matter.  
 The absence of a treatment of explanation and scientific methodology in MUP 
highlights the extent to which Hacking is pushing us to reconfigure the way we think about the 
philosophy of the sciences. One may wonder whether there is still room to raise general 
questions concerning scientific explanation and the methodology of the sciences within 
Hacking's philosophical picture of the human sciences. In the conclusions of this dissertation I 
offer some insights into the way in which explanatory and methodological matters may still be 
relevant for MUP. A careful exploration of these two points, however, fall beyond the scope of 
this work. 
 
4.4. Looping effects and MUP: are kinds of people moving targets? 
  By reading Hacking's proposal as merely responding to the social constructivism and 
scientific realism debate, the critiques reviewed underestimate the extent to which Hacking's 
account represents a move away from this philosophical conversation. The philosophical 
significance of Hacking's characterization of kinds of people in terms of the presence of the 
looping effect does not reside in the contrast it suggests between human kinds as opposed to 
natural kinds, nor in the putative challenge that the distinction represents for a realistic 
understanding of mental illness, as the criticisms suggest. Of more philosophical significance 
is the role it plays as the backbone of a distinct philosophical approach to the analysis of 
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scientific classification in the human sciences and the picture of the human sciences that 
emerges from it.  
 The notion of the looping effect highlights the peculiarities of scientific classification 
as it operates in the human sciences. What distinguishes scientific classification in the human 
sciences form other scientific enterprises is not just that human beings have awareness nor 
that they change due to the introduction of scientific classification. The notion of the looping 
effect stresses the distinct ways in which the classifications of human beings interact with 
their objects in contrast to other scientific classifications. Specifically, that the very 
introduction of scientific classifications of human beings motivates the change of their 
classified objects, generating ontological changes that other scientific classifications do not 
undergo. Such ontological changes prompt Hacking to suggest that kinds of people are 
"moving targets". That human beings are self-aware agents undoubtedly matters in the notion 
of the looping effect, but the presence of awareness is not by itself the main differentiator. 
The emphasis is rather on the characteristics of the interactions between classification and 
objects, which are made possible in part due to human awareness. The epistemic and 
ontological significance of the notion of the looping effect concerns the ways in which 
scientific classification allows for new types human beings to come into being, and how, once 
they have been brought into existence, they continue to change, or they cease to exist insofar 
as we grant reality to scientific objects. It is a notion that signals where the philosophical 
action is, namely, on the interactions between classifications and the classified (and what 
goes on in the mediation of such interactions).  
 An additional point I'd like to address concerns the ontological implications of 
Hacking's account suggested by Tsou's criticism against the view of human kinds as "moving 
targets". Tsou’s differentiation between a weak and a strong implication of the looping effect 
highlights the ontological strength of the notion of the looping effect. I do not think that the 
suggested weak implications of the looping effect are cases of looping at all, but only an 
aspect of the looping. However, I sympathize with Tsou's observation that the claim that kinds 
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of people are "moving targets" suggests a stronger sort of epistemic and ontological change 
than merely the, so to say, everyday effects of classification on people's behaviors and self-
understanding. I disagree that this stronger sort of change requires the redefinition of the 
biological components of a classification. But it is unclear that the changes that matter for 
producing the strong epistemic and ontological transformations suggested in the notion of the 
looping effect present as frequently to support the characterization of kinds of people as 
moving targets.87  
 The idea that kinds of people are moving targets suggests that epistemic and 
ontological change is continuous and continual in the human sciences, specifically as it 
concerns (scientific) human ontology. Along these lines we may say that kinds of people are 
Heraclitean. Through their interaction, classifications and human beings are constantly 
changing each other. This suggests that change is common. Perhaps the commonality of 
change refers to the effects produced in people by scientific classification, as Tsou notes in 
the notion of a weak implication of the looping effect.  
But perhaps the idea of constant changes in classification may be understood within 
a different time frame. After all, in comparison to other sorts of scientific classification, it is 
rather hard to find scientific classifications in the human sciences that have been agreed on 
for long periods of time. It would suffice to say that scientific classification in the human 
sciences is a product of the twentieth century. Hacking's account of the emergence of the 
statistical style offers at the same time a partial story of their origins of scientific classification 
                                                            
87 The cases of homosexuality, fugue, MPD and hysteria may be seen as supporting Hacking's 
characterization of kinds of people as moving targets. They are certainly so when considered over the 
longer term. Twenty or fifty years, or even a century of endurance as diagnostic categories are relatively 
short lived for scientific categories. Consider two examples. The case of homosexuality introduced in 
Heinrich Kaan's 'Psychopathia Sexualis in 1884 or its introduction into the first edition of the DSM in 
1952, to its removal from the third version of the DSM in 1980. The popularity of the diagnosis of 
hysteria as an umbrella category for a myriad of afflictions of women endured approximately from the 
1840s to the beginning of the 20th century, and continued with infrequent use until about the 1940's 
(Micale 1993). Some authors, such as Rachel Maines are more candid in their accounts of the 
condition, acknowledging the life of the category from the fourth century B.C. to its abandonment by the 
American Psychiatric Association in 1952 (Maines 1999, 2). Nonetheless it is worth noting that the sort 
of substantive change required for the completion of the looping is not a daily, monthly or even yearly 
event. In these cases, it took decades for the looping to be realized. 
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in the human sciences. On a long and slow paced time frame such as the one of the styles, 
the speed at which classifications change in the human sciences appear fast and continuous. 
Take as a point of reference the DSM, which was introduced relatively recently, in 1952, and 
has been subjected to relatively constant revisions. Revisions in classification are not unique 
to the human sciences but the rate of change and the extent to which those changes have 
transformed their conceptions of their objects of classification differentiate them from other 
sorts of scientific classification. To continue with the DSM example, classifications have come 
and gone, but perhaps most dramatic is the exponential growth of the number of 
classifications.   
 Classifications in other sciences also have an origin, but once introduced, major 
redefinitions are rare. This does not deny that classifications in the natural sciences also 
change. Knowledge is fallible through and through. But major revisions in classification, like 
those suggested in Kuhn's scientific revolutions are extraordinary events in the natural 
sciences. It may also be appropriate to remember that a central thesis in the Styles project is 
that each style introduces a distinct kind of scientific object, creating the space of possibility 
for new kinds of things to come into existence. This point is remarkably illustrated by the 
laboratory style, in which new objects are quite literally created, in the sense of being 
materially produced.  But Boyle's vacuum, once its existence was established, remained in 
the inventory of reality. In contrast, neither the classifications of people nor their objects of 
classification (people) have stayed put. Hacking accounts for the rate of and extent of 
changes in the classifications of human beings in the human sciences by introducing the 
notion of looping effects.  
 Classifications of people in the human sciences do not only change as a result of 
further scientific study, nor is change always gradual. First, the very introduction of the 
classifications fosters ontological change (a change that in turn may prompt subsequent 
revisions). This is one sense in which kinds of people are inherently "on the move". But the 
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looping effect also suggests a stronger type of ontological change, when the transformation 
of the objects produced by the introduction of scientific classification prompts their revision.  
I take this second sense to be the most radical of the theses put forward in Hacking's 
analyses of MUP: scientific classification changes its objects (people), and such ontological 
changes are significant enough to prompt the revision of the classification (epistemic 
change). There are two distinct senses in which scientific classification in the human sciences 
produces ontological change. Both senses are distinct to the way in which scientific 
classification interacts with its objects in the non-human sciences. But of particular 
philosophical interest is the second sense, since it is such substantive revisions that make it 
possible for new kinds of people to come in and out of existence. It is the second sense that 
produces breaks in the body of knowledge about what kinds of people are a part of the 
inventory of reality. It is the second sense which is at play in Hacking's exemplars of MUP. 
That's the sort of transformation that occurred when multiple personality disorder ceased to 
exist (and was replaced by dissociative identity disorder) and when homosexuality ceased to 
be a subclass of mental illness.  
 What happens when a new kind of people come into being? How does it fall out of 
existence? Those changes are not everyday changes due to just any destabilizing force. 
Those changes transform the world associated to a kind of person. That is, I think, the most 
significant point of MUP analyses and the looping effect. New kinds of people, like MPD or 
fugue, do not come in or out of existence every day, nor are all the changes that might be 
produced by the introduction of the scientific classification of people sufficiently significant to 
prompt the revision of the classification such that it produces an epistemic and ontological 
break. This suggests that kinds of people are not so quickly "moving" as it appears if one only 
considers the first sort of ontological change. Both sorts of ontological change distinguish 
kinds of people (classifications and their objects) from other kinds, but only the second 
supports a strong interpretation of the characterization of kinds of people as "being on the 
move". 
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 Tsou is right when he notes that not all ontological changes produce substantive 
ontological changes but he is, however, incorrect in his view that for a substantive change to 
occur the law-like biological regularities associated to a kind of people have to change. Yet, in 
the grand scheme of time, the scientific classifications of people are young and subject to 
frequent revisions. In spite of founded law-like biological regularities and genetic markers, 
classifications of mental illness still are prone to change. Time may prove Tsou right 
concerning the cases of schizophrenia and depression as they endure revisions, but for the 
time being it is rather too early to draw any strong conclusions. Hacking's MUP suggests a 
case-by-case analysis through time and in space. Hacking's account of MUP in terms of 
looping effects offers a heuristic to analyze how kinds of people come into being, how they 
are sustained within an ecological niche, and how when such an ecological niche is 
transformed change takes place (including the very transformations that people undergo due 
to the introduction of classification). The MUP analytic framework covers these sorts of 
ontological change.  
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Final Remarks 
Hacking's Philosophy of the Human Sciences and Making Up People 
 In this work I've offered a reading of Hacking's account of MUP, articulating its 
philosophical background and situating it within the general philosophy of the sciences where 
it belongs. I have shown how once we look at the larger philosophical picture, it becomes 
clearer that the notion of looping effect plays a heuristic role by highlighting the epistemic and 
ontological importance of the interactions between some common elements which partake in 
the classification of people, including their generation, validation, implementation and 
revision.  
 The analysis of classification in the human sciences in Hacking's MUP does not 
merely pertain to the relationship between concepts and objects.  This relation is mediated 
and enacted by a manifold of elements, including a multilayered set of knowledge claims 
validated according to distinct styles of scientific reasoning, institutions within which 
knowledge claims are both generated and implemented, an ecological niche which makes 
possible the generation and sustenance of a classification and kind of people, the people 
classified as constituted by their set of behaviors and physical components (e.g., their brains 
and body systems), and the people for whom the classification is relevant such as the 
advocates of the classified. From this complex of factors and forces, Hacking extracts his 
novel and radical thesis that kinds of people are moving targets. That is, the way in which the 
scientific classifications of people work both the people's classifications and people as their 
objects of classification prove to be shifting entities.  
 The difference between the human sciences and non-human sciences is neither 
explanatory nor methodological, nor does it entail a higher regard for the non-human 
sciences above the human sciences as more "objective" or "scientific". In Hacking's picture of 
the sciences, the difference between the human sciences and non-human sciences is 
established by the interactions held between their respective types of objects of study and 
their classifications. The sciences that study rocks and the sciences that study human beings 
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both use the same validating criteria (e.g., hypothetical, experimental or statistical 
techniques). But the relationships between classifications of rocks and the rocks they classify, 
in contrast to the relationships between the classifications of people and the people they 
classify are radically different. The classifications of people are not merely top-down labeling 
or even top-down creation of phenomena (as in the case of rocks and artificial breeding) but 
also a bottom-up influencing and revolting (as in subjects' advocacy and activism). The 
institutions and bureaucracies in which the classifications are implemented and within which 
the interactions between classifications and people occur are lacking in the case of the non-
human sciences. The scientific classifications of people are not only shaped in a top-down 
manner, but also in a bottom-up manner mediated by a multiplicity of institutional and social 
interactions. Such multifaceted shaping has both epistemic and ontological import.  
 The image of the human sciences, and the place they occupy in a general philosophy 
of the sciences as suggested by the notion of MUP, is both old fashioned and innovative. It is 
old fashioned insofar as MUP fits within a general philosophy of science whose core is an 
account of scientific rationality (the styles of scientific reasoning) and conceptual analysis 
(dynamic nominalism and relevant kinds). Hacking's philosophy of the sciences, however, 
reconfigures most, if not all, the traditionally central issues in the philosophy of the science, 
remarkably, scientific rationality and ontology.  
Hacking's account of scientific rationality distinguishes from traditional philosophical 
accounts by breaking up scientific rationality into a parsimonious plurality, namely, the styles 
of scientific reasoning. All the sciences, natural and human alike, can and do make use of the 
styles. In that sense, Hacking's philosophy of the sciences is perhaps the most 
comprehensive model of science developed since Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 
Moreover, it is perhaps the most comprehensive account that has ever been proposed in the 
philosophy of science, as it covers both the natural and the human sciences. Such 
philosophy of the sciences, whether human or not, is both historically grounded and socially 
contingent, and yet substantiated in the real world. Not only scientific knowledge has a history 
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and place of birth, but the rationalities that operate behind it do too. Furthermore, the very 
entities that are postulated by the sciences are both historically and socially originated. 
Neither their historicity nor their being socially constrained makes them less real. 
 While Hacking's account of the styles of scientific reasoning is revolutionary, his 
framework for the conceptual analysis of MUP is pioneering. Hacking's framework offers a 
rich heuristic for approaching and organizing the different aspects that may be involved in the 
generation of scientific knowledge about classes of people and their ontological implications. 
It presents an original and radical view on the ontology of the human sciences by highlighting 
the postulation and generation of "human types" as a consequence of scientific classification 
and their legitimization through institutional interventions. Such a postulation is largely 
implicit, and one could even say unconscious, but its acknowledgment is crucial for 
advancing a philosophical understanding of the human sciences; particularly, on the 
ontological spaces that are opened and closed in the scientific study of human beings. 
Ultimately, Hacking's MUP warns us against an understanding of scientific classification of 
people as the imposition of a privileged theoretical perspective on a group of people as if one 
of its constitutive parts defined a kind of person as a whole, and highlights the confluence of a 
multitude of theoretical perspectives, practices, social arrangements, and agents in the 
shaping and re-shaping of human beings. 
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